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ABSTRACT 
 
NICOMACHEAN AND NEO-ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS  
IN SHAKESPEARE‘S TRAGEDIES 
 
By 
Janine M. Bayer 
December 2010 
Dissertation supervised Dr. Anne Brannen 
 ―Nicomachean and Neo-Aristotelian Ethics in Shakespeare‘s Tragedies‖ examines two 
of Shakespeare‘s most compelling tragedies—Othello and King Lear—through the lens 
of contemporary virtue ethics theory, thereby offering new conceptions of how morality 
operates in these plays. Although neo-Aristotelian moral philosophers locate the roots of 
their theories in Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics, their arguments reach far beyond 
Aristotle‘s original theoretical conception, offering innovative ways for us to understand 
virtue in our analysis of morality. The dissertation Introduction provides an overview of 
contemporary moral philosophy—i.e., the state of normative ethics today, including brief 
explanations of Deontology, Teleology, and Virtue theory. Discussion in Chapter One 
focuses on Aristotle‘s original conception of Virtue Ethics as espoused in his 
Nicomachean Ethics, and Chapter Two highlights the theories advanced by prominent 
contemporary neo-Aristotelian philosophers: Rosalind Hursthouse‘s argument in defense 
of the action-guiding principles of virtue ethics, Christine Swanton‘s Nietzschean 
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formulation of virtue, Michael Slote‘s Agent-Based approach to understanding human 
morality, and the collaborative efforts of Virginia Held, Annette Baier, Michael Slote, 
and Nel Noddings in the development of the Ethics of Care. Chapter Three examines the 
principal characters in Othello through lenses offered by Swanton and Slote, thereby 
offering viable new analyses of the characters‘ behaviors. And through a close reading of 
King Lear, Chapter Four illustrates the scholarly import of the Ethics of Care in literary 
analysis. An innovation in virtue ethics that locates the very essence of morality in human 
caring, the Ethics of Care offers an avenue for us to gain greater insight and a deeper 
appreciation of literature from a new and significant philosophical perspective.   
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Part One 
1 An Introduction to Normative Ethics 
 
In this dissertation, I plan to examine William Shakespeare‘s tragedies Othello and King 
Lear through the lens of contemporary (neo-Aristotelian) Virtue Ethics. Over the years, 
various literary scholars have taken up the task of analyzing Shakespeare‘s plays from an 
Aristotelian ethical perspective. This has resulted in a small but meaningful body of 
scholarship that connects Shakespeare‘s texts with Aristotle‘s moral theories. 
Contemporary virtue ethics, however, is a relatively new field in moral philosophy, 
originally sparked by Elizabeth Anscombe‘s seminal work ―Modern Moral Philosophy‖ 
(1958).  Anscombe‘s paper revived a long-dormant interest among philosophers in 
exploring virtue as a viable means of understanding morality. Although Anscombe and 
the virtue ethicists who followed her locate the roots of their theories in Aristotle‘s 
Nicomachean Ethics, they have developed their particular philosophies beyond 
Aristotle‘s original theory, building upon his foundational concepts and expanding in 
completely new and different directions. A significant majority of philosophical 
scholarship in this area has been published only within the past twenty-five years; 
consequently, Shakespearian literary scholars have not yet made connections between 
Shakespeare‘s works and neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics theory. I see this dearth of 
criticism as an excellent scholarly opportunity; I have therefore decided to analyze  
developments in contemporary virtue ethics theory in order to determine how important 
shifts in ethical thought impact or altogether change present-day moral readings of 
Shakespeare‘s tragedies. It is important scholarship in that it introduces literary scholars 
to an entirely new and rapidly growing field of philosophical analysis to use as a lens for 
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understanding literature. Those who are intrigued by connections between ethics and 
literature, therefore, now have a fresh supply of excellent source material.   
This project consists of an analysis of two of Shakespeare‘s most compelling and 
best-loved tragedies—Othello and King Lear—through the lens of contemporary virtue 
ethics theory. Before I offer a comprehensive neo-Aristotelian ethical analysis of each 
play, however, it is essential that I provide a logical framework for my reader‘s 
understanding of the project‘s purpose and scope. Toward this end, I use this Introduction 
to furnish my reader with an overview of contemporary moral philosophy (i.e., the state 
of normative ethics today). Chapter Two outlines the basic tenets of Aristotle‘s 
Nicomachean Ethics that specifically lend themselves to Shakespearian character 
analysis; and in Chapter Three, I offer a comprehensive explanation of contemporary 
virtue ethics: what it is, how it developed, who the most prolific scholars are, and what 
theories they are currently advancing. Chapters Four and Five are devoted to the analysis 
of the plays from a neo-Aristotelian perspective. In these chapters, I examine the moral 
development of the major characters (each of whom makes decisions that carry 
significant moral consequence), focusing primarily on how the characters‘ virtues (and 
vices) operate; how they influence the characters‘ thoughts, feelings, behaviors, and 
overall moral development.    
The study of ethics, also known as moral philosophy, concerns ideologies of what 
constitutes ethical and unethical behavior. Generally speaking, the major ethical theories 
can be divided into three subject fields: metaethics, normative ethics, and applied ethics. 
Metaethics explores the origin and development of our moral principles and attempts to 
ascribe meanings to them. It ponders whether or not our ethical principles are more than 
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merely social constructions, and it focuses on issues such as ―universal truths, the will of 
God, and the role of reason in ethical judgments‖ (Fieser). Normative ethics is much 
more practical in nature, as it attempts to provide an outline of moral standards that can 
be used to determine proper behavior. What good habits should we adopt? What are the 
various consequences of our actions? What are our duties to ourselves and others? 
Finally, applied ethics attempts to offer viable solutions to various controversial issues, 
including abortion, animal rights, the environment, homosexual marriage, capital 
punishment, and war (Fieser).  
 Since my dissertation concerns specific judgments about moral behavior in 
Shakespeare‘s tragedies, I dedicate my attention to normative ethics throughout. 
Specifically, my interest lies with Virtue Ethics — a moral theory within the school of 
normative ethics. I believe, however, that my discussion of virtue ethics will be of greater 
value to my reader if placed within a larger framework of ethical theory. To that end, I 
now offer a brief synopsis of the basic precepts of normative ethics today.   
Within the school of normative ethics, Deontology, Consequentialism, and Virtue 
Ethics are generally accepted as the three chief approaches to examining moral behavior. 
―Deontology‖ comes from the Greek deon, meaning ―duty‖ and logos, meaning ―logic.‖  
Here, duties and rules are emphasized as the factors that must govern our actions. 
According to this moral theory, the locus of value in an action is the act or kind of act 
itself, not the outcome or consequence of the act. Certain features in a particular act either 
have intrinsic value or are intrinsically wrong (Pojman 225-26). Deontologists would 
argue, for example, that there is something intrinsically wrong in the act of lying, even if 
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the consequence of the lie is positive. Since truth-telling is intrinsically right and lying is 
intrinsically wrong, we have a duty to tell the truth. 
Consummate deontologist Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) is generally esteemed as 
the greatest philosopher of the Enlightenment. In the Introduction to Kant‘s Fundamental 
Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals, Kantian scholar Marvin Fox reminds readers of 
the extraordinary importance of Kantian philosophy with the well known adage: ―You 
can philosophize with Kant or against Kant, but you cannot philosophize without him‖ 
(vii). Even those who disagree entirely with Kant‘s philosophy invariably concur that his 
theory of the ―supreme principle of morality‖ had a profound influence on all subsequent 
scholarship on morality and metaphysics. Fox explains Kant‘s supreme principle of 
morality: 
 Kant was convinced that there is a supreme principle which controls all  
  valid moral judgment, and that this principle is purely rational in  
 character. It can be established independently of any consideration of  
 empirical factors in the moral life. The advantages of such a rational moral  
 principle are clear enough. In appealing to reason, which Kant thought to  
 be universally the same in all men, we transcend the limitations of  
 particular societies and cultures, and we free ourselves from any  
 consideration of the individual differences among men. Were we to permit  
 these many diversities to enter into our formulation of the supreme  
 principle of morality we would have moral chaos rather than a stable  
 moral order. For to consider the differences among men and cultures  
 would mean to restrict morality to a relativistic or even an individually  
5 
 
 subjectivist foundation. The good would then differ from person to person  
 and society to society. If, on the other hand, we are able to ground  
 morality in reason alone, then we have achieved the foundations of a  
 universal morality whose basic principles, like the rule of logic or  
 mathematics, are the same for all men, in all places, and at all times. (qtd.  
 in Kant ix-x) 
All morality, according to this theory, is based on reason as opposed to emotion, feeling, 
sympathy, or self-interest. And, as a supreme principle that encompasses all people and 
cultures, it disallows any hint of subjectivism or relativism. 
As rational beings, Kant argues, we must act out of respect for the Moral Laws—
which are unconditional and universally valid—regardless of the possible consequences 
(Pojman 295). And where can these Moral Laws be found? According to Kant, most 
moral laws can be derived from the first and second formulations of his Categorical 
Imperative: First—―Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that 
it should become a Universal Law‖ (Kant 38). This means that we should only judge an 
action as morally right if we can consistently wish that everyone in the world would 
engage in that type of action. If we cannot will that everyone engage in that action or 
behavior, then the action or behavior is morally wrong. The second formulation of Kant‘s 
Categorical Imperative holds that ―Man and generally any rational being exists as an end 
in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his 
actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must always be regarded 
at the same time as an end‖ (Kant 45). By virtue of our reason, Kant insists, each of us 
possesses dignity and tremendous worth. Therefore, no person should ever be 
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manipulated, exploited, or used merely as a means to a particular end. On the contrary, 
each person must be recognized and treated as an end in and of him or herself. 
In addition to the importance of the Categorical Imperative in determining moral 
action, Kant outlined what he called the Three Propositions of Morality:  
1. An action must be done from a sense of duty, if it is to have moral  
    worth.  
2. An action done from duty derives its moral worth not from the purpose  
    which is to be attained by it, but from the maxim by which it is  
    determined, and therefore does not depend on the realization of the    
    object of the action, but merely on the principle of volition by which the   
    action has taken place, without regard to any object of desire.  
3. Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the moral law. (Kant 17- 
    18) 
These principles, according to Kant, are absolute and clearly justify the duty that we, as 
rational beings, owe to the moral law. 
On the opposite end of the normative ethics spectrum, we have the school of 
Teleology, from the Greek teleos, meaning ―having reached one‘s end‖ or ―finished.‖ A 
consequentialist moral theory, teleology holds that the locus of value is the outcome or 
consequence of the act; there is no such thing as an act having intrinsic worth. So, for a 
teleologist, the action that produces the best consequence is morally right. From this  
perspective, then, lying is only wrong if it produces negative consequences. If we can 
reasonably calculate that a lie will do even slightly more good than telling the truth, we 
actually have a moral obligation to lie (Pojman 226). This example clearly illustrates the 
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fundamental mission of moral action from a consequentialist perspective: ―to enhance the 
amount of intrinsic goodness in the world, and to diminish the amount of what is 
intrinsically bad‖ (Shafer-Landau 453).  
Philosopher William Shaw explains standard consequentialism (the most common 
type in the family of consequentialist ethical theories) as a maximizing doctrine: 
Standard consequentialism holds [. . .] that we are not merely permitted or 
encouraged to act so as to maximize good; we are required to do so. 
Accordingly [. . .] an action is morally right if and only if there is no other 
action, among those available to the agent, that has better consequences; 
otherwise, the action is wrong. Thus, several actions might be equally 
right, and what morality requires is that the agent do one of them. Finally, 
an action might have bad consequences and yet be right. This will be the 
case if all alternative actions have worse results. (463-64) 
In this sense, standard consequentialism distinguishes itself from the thesis that critics 
often erroneously ascribe to it: that an action is right only if the consequences of that 
action are good. Instead, standard consequentialism maintains that we are required to 
engage in moral actions that will maximize good, that we have a responsibility to engage 
in the actions that will produce the very best of the available consequences, and that 
sometimes taking the right moral action will mean choosing the lesser of the possible 
evils that may result from the action. Shaw additionally clarifies that it is the expected 
consequences, not the actual consequences of an action that count. Since we rarely know 
in advance exactly what the consequences of our actions will be, the onus is on us to ―do 
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what has the highest expectation of good as judged by what a reasonable and 
conscientious person in the agent‘s circumstances could be expected to know‖ (466). 
This may involve some degree of educated guesswork. However, as long as we are 
making decisions based on reason and good judgment about expected consequences, then 
we are morally right.   
Clearly the best-known consequentialist theory, Utilitarianism aims at 
maximizing happiness. Developed by humanist reformers Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) 
and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), utilitarianism advances the belief that morality should 
serve humanity. (Kant‘s deontological theory, by contrast, argues that humanity should 
serve morality.)  As advocates of social progress and reform, Bentham and Mill felt 
strongly that following the letter of the law often impeded progress, and that our moral 
actions should be based on what would produce ―the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number‖ (Pojman 227) and what would aid us most effectively in achieving the ultimate 
end:  ―an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in 
enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality‖ (Mill 457). Mill issues a stern warning, 
however, against using this moral theory to advance purely selfish individual objectives. 
An agent‘s own individual happiness never determines the standard for what is 
considered correct moral behavior in Utilitarianism. Instead, this approach to moral 
conduct asserts that the happiness of all people concerned must be considered in deciding 
moral action: ―As between [an agent‘s] own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism 
requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator‖ (Mill 
457).  Here, Mill references Jesus of Nazareth‘s Golden Rule as the essence of utility: 
―Do unto others as you would have them do unto you,‖ and ―Love your neighbor as 
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yourself‖: together, these ―constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality‖ (Mill 
457). 
Utilitarians generally follow the tenets established by either Act or Rule 
Utilitarianism. The classic version, Act Utilitarianism, simply states that an act is right to 
the extent that it promotes the most overall happiness. According to this theory, before 
we engage in any action, we must consider if another action might produce greater 
happiness. If so, we have a moral obligation to do that act instead. A more moderate 
version of this theory, Rule Utilitarianism, states that we must select a certain set of rules 
that promise to produce the greatest overall happiness. These rules must be followed by 
the members of the society at all times—even when a particular instance arises that will 
clearly not produce the greatest happiness for the most people. 
The third major contemporary moral theory (which I examine at length in 
chapters one and two) is Virtue Ethics. Also known as Arêtaic Ethics, and derived from 
the Greek word Arête, meaning ―excellence‖ or ―virtue,‖ this moral theory has its roots in 
the teachings of Plato and, more specifically, Aristotle.  Instead of emphasizing duty or 
consequence, Virtue Ethics centers in the heart and personality of the agent—in his or her 
moral character. It focuses on being a certain kind of person instead of doing good works. 
Virtue Ethics asks ―What type of person should I become?‖ instead of ―What should I 
do?‖ and seeks to produce excellent or virtuous persons: persons whose behavior is 
guided by spontaneous goodness.  
As outlined in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle‘s esteemed treatise on ethics, Arête 
(excellence or virtue), phronesis (practical or moral wisdom) and eudaimonia (happiness 
or flourishing) stand as the three central concepts in the development of virtuous 
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character and moral goodness. And, according to Aristotle, we cannot possibly become 
genuinely virtuous or achieve ultimate happiness unless we observe the Doctrine of the 
Mean. Briefly stated, this doctrine asserts the importance of moderation in all human 
activity. Each moral virtue, Aristotle explains, exists somewhere between the vices of 
excess and deficiency. As responsible moral agents, we must consistently locate the 
appropriate ―middle ground‖ or ―Golden Mean‖ between excess and deficiency, for only 
then will we be practicing the virtuous behavior that leads to eudaimonia. 
A true understanding of virtue ethics also requires an acknowledgement of the 
importance of friendship and community to Aristotle. Relationships, both personal and 
community, are an essential part of the good life; without them, we cannot possibly 
flourish as independent agents. Through good, healthy friendships and communal 
relationships, we experience moral growth and aspire to the supreme goal of eudaimonia 
(Aristotle VIII). 
Let us now examine Aristotle‘s virtue ethics theory in detail so that we may 
ultimately apply it to a contemporary moral reading of Shakespeare‘s tragedies.  
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2   Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics: Virtue and the Good Life 
 
Aristotle was born in 384 BC in Stagira, Greece, but he moved to Athens when he 
was still quite young. In Athens, he immediately found an intellectual home at Plato‘s 
Academy, where he embraced the scholarly life with other academicians: philosophers, 
mathematicians, scientists, and politicians. A gumptious student, Aristotle demonstrated 
an early interest in the study of rhetoric, logic, ethics, and metaphysics, and he ―drank 
deeply from the Platonic springs‖ (Barnes qtd. in Aristotle x). By his death at age 61 (323 
BC), Aristotle had amassed a formidable body of work that included essays, treatises, and 
entire books. Although only a fraction of his original oeuvre survives, it still comprises 
approximately fifteen volumes of text. Two of the surviving treatises on ethics are the 
Eudemian Ethics (named after the editor of the treatise, Eudemus), and the Nicomachean 
Ethics (most likely named after Aristotle‘s son, Nicomachus). The ethical perspectives 
with which I am primarily concerned in this dissertation are those contained in the 
Nicomachean Ethics—the treatise that scholars generally agree represents Aristotle‘s 
mature and more fully developed philosophies on ethics. It is also important to note here 
that I will not be attempting to discuss every aspect of The Nicomachean Ethics; instead, 
I will be directing my attention toward the philosophies that most effectively lend 
themselves to neo-Aristotelian revision and to Shakespearian character analysis. These 
include, in a rather general sense, Aristotle‘s conception of Eudaimonia, the Moral and 
Intellectual Virtues, the Doctrine of the Mean, and the importance of Friendship and 
Community in civilized life.  
Although most of Aristotle‘s surviving works can be categorized as ―theoretical‖ 
because they are concerned with natural science (physics), The Nicomachean Ethics is a 
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work of ―practical science.‖ This means that the attainment of knowledge about action is 
not the primary objective of studying ethics; instead, the goal of studying ethics is action 
itself. We do not study ethics, according to Aristotle, merely to learn about the 
characteristics of good persons; we study ethics so that we may become good persons. In 
Book II—―Moral Goodness‖—Aristotle clearly states this pragmatic intention: 
 Since the branch of philosophy on which we are at present engaged is not,  
 like the others, theoretical in its aim—because we are studying not to  
 know what goodness is, but how to become good men
1
 [. . . ] since  
 otherwise it would be useless—we must apply our minds to the problem of  
 how our actions should be performed, because [. . .] it is these that actually  
 determine our dispositions.
2
 (ii. 1103b 27-32) 
The Nicomachean Ethics is not practical only in its objective (as stated above), however; 
it is also very functional in its prescribed method, which, according to Aristotle, is quite 
simple: learn by doing. Again in Book II he explains: 
 Anything that we have to learn to do we learn by the actual doing of it:  
 people become builders by building and instrumentalists by playing  
 instruments. Similarly, we become just by performing just acts, temperate  
 by performing temperate ones, brave by performing brave ones. This view  
 is supported by what happens in city-states. Legislators make their citizens  
 good by habituation; this is the intention of every legislator, and those who  
 do not carry it out fail of their object. This is what makes the difference  
                                                 
1
 While Aristotle‘s original language is obviously non-inclusive, I will be using inclusive language—i.e., 
―persons,‖ ―men and women‖ instead of ―man‖ and ―men‖ in my discussion of his work.  
2
 All textual quotes are taken from Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics. Ed. Jonathan Barnes. Trans. J.A.K. 
Thomson. Rev. Trans. Hugh Tredennick. New York: Penguin, 2004. 
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 between a good constitution and a bad one. (i. 1103a 33-35; 1103b 1-7) 
Aristotle‘s purpose in Nicomachean Ethics is clear: to teach us that our aim in life should 
be to become good persons, and to convince us that we can only achieve that goal by 
practicing virtuous behavior.  
 At this point, a critical reader may justifiably question why we should care so 
much about becoming good persons. What, in other words, is the ultimate objective or 
desired consequence of our good behavior? This query provides a logical segue to 
Aristotle‘s conception of Eudaimonia.  A key term in ancient Greek moral philosophy, 
eudaimonia is commonly translated as ―happiness,‖ ―flourishing,‖ or ―well-being.‖ For 
Aristotle, however, eudaimonia represents an ultimate human state or condition: 
happiness as the ―summum bonum or supreme end of life‖ (Barnes qtd. in Aristotle 
xxviii). Here, we must endeavor to understand that Aristotle‘s quest for happiness or ―the 
good life‖ refers not to any immediate aim or action in our lives but rather to an ultimate 
objective. We admittedly engage in daily activities that are not directly connected to our 
quest for happiness. The immediate goal of holding a job, for example, may be to make 
money, and the immediate objective of making money may be to meet our financial 
obligations. At some point, however, the line of reasoning through which we trace the 
intention of our actions (unless they are completely frivolous) must conclude with the 
acknowledgment that ―this would make me happy.‖ Aristotle contends in Book I: 
  If, then, our activities have some end which we want for its own sake, and  
  for the sake of which we want all the other ends—if we do not choose  
  everything for the sake of something else (for this will involve an infinite  
  progression, so that our aim will be pointless and ineffectual)—it is clear  
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  that this must be the good, that is, the supreme good. (i. 1094a 18-23) 
In other words, our final response in a conversation investigating the reasons for our 
actions must always be ―Because by doing so, I will achieve happiness.‖ 
Certainly, only the most ascetic types would reject the notion of happiness as a 
worthwhile goal. Aristotle‘s conception of exactly what constitutes happiness (or the 
good life) and precisely how we should work toward achieving it, however, often cause 
great consternation. In Book I, Aristotle states that ―happiness is a virtuous activity of the 
soul.‖3 In order to reach this conclusion, however, Aristotle claims that we must first 
determine what the proper function of a person is, as distinct and separate from other 
sentient beings: 
 If we assume that the function of man is a kind of life, namely, an activity  
 or series of actions of the soul, implying a rational principle; and if the  
 function of a good man is to perform these well and rightly; and if every  
 function is performed well when performed in accordance with its proper  
 excellence; if all this is so, the conclusion is that the good for man is an  
 activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, or if there are more kinds of  
 virtue than one, in accordance with the best and most perfect kind. 
  
There is a further qualification: in a complete lifetime. One swallow does  
not make a summer; neither does one day. Similarly, neither can one day,  
or a brief space of time, make a man blessed and happy. (vii. 1098a 14-26)  
                                                 
3
 The word ―soul‖ as used by Aristotle carries no religious connotations; it refers simply to being alive. So, 
―activities of the soul‖ are merely activities in which living beings can and inanimate objects cannot 
engage. 
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In examining the first part of this quote, we understand that happiness, in 
Aristotle‘s estimation, can only be achieved through the development of good moral 
character (via the practice of virtuous behavior). And in the second part, we learn that it 
takes time to achieve eudaimonia. Unlike pleasure, which can certainly be temporary 
(and often very brief!), our summum bonum, or ultimate happiness, takes a lifetime to 
cultivate; by its very nature, it cannot be short-lived.
4
  In summary, then, Aristotle‘s 
conception of happiness is not concerned with feeling happy; instead, it is more a matter 
of living properly. As Dr. Robert Zunjic, professor of philosophy at the University of 
Rhode Island
5
 explains, ―A person who is happy (eudaimon) is not simply enjoying life 
but is enjoying life by living it to the fullest, that is to say, by living successfully under 
stable conditions rather than trying everything anew.‖   
Good moral character, then, is essential to achieving ultimate happiness and can 
only be attained by the cultivation of the virtues. According to Aristotle, however, acting 
virtuously is not always a natural human inclination; we must practice virtuous behavior 
so that it ultimately becomes a habit. He offers the following reasoning in Book II: 
 Moral goodness [. . .] is the result of habit, from which it has actually got  
 its name, being a slight modification of the word ethos.
6
 This fact makes it  
 obvious that none of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, since  
 nothing that is what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by  
 habituation. For instance, a stone, which has a natural tendency  
                                                 
4
 This does not imply that we can never experience happiness in a general sense until late in life. On the 
contrary, Aristotle explains in Book I, Chapter X that ―the happy man [. . .] in fact will be happy throughout 
his life; because he will spend all his time, or the most time of any man, in virtuous conduct and 
contemplation‖(1100b 19-22). 
5
 This and all other quotations that do not have a parenthetical page reference are from non-paginated 
websites or online sources. See Works Cited for complete citation information. 
6
 Editor‘s note: The words ēthos ‗character‘ and ethos ‗custom‘ show different grades of the same root 
eth—. 
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 downwards, cannot be habituated to rise, however often you try to train it  
 by throwing it into the air; nor can you train fire to burn downwards; nor  
 can anything else that has any other natural tendency be trained to depart  
 from it. The moral virtues, then, are engendered in us neither by nor  
 contrary to nature; we are constituted by nature to receive them, but their  
 full development in us is due to habit. (i. 1103a 16-27) 
Here, Aristotle reminds us that we can only progress toward eudaimonia once we have 
successfully cultivated the habit of virtuous conduct.  
 Since we have been challenged to develop virtuous habits, therefore, we must 
ascertain the specific features of Aristotle‘s virtue theory.  Virtue—aretē—denotes 
possessing a particular skill, or excellence. He offers the following explication in Book II, 
―Moral Goodness‖: 
  Let us assert [. . .] that any kind of excellence renders that of which it is  
  the excellence good, and makes it perform its function well. For example,  
  the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and the function good  
  (because it is through the excellence of the eye that we see well). Similarly  
  the excellence of a horse makes him both a fine horse and good at running  
  and carrying his rider and facing the enemy. If this rule holds good for all  
  cases, then human excellence [virtue] will be the disposition that makes  
  one a good man and causes him to perform his function well.  
(vi. 1106a 15-24) 
He imposes a strict condition on this definition, however: in order to be considered 
virtuous individuals, we must always be obedient to our human reason.  A more accurate 
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explanation, then, might indicate that virtues are those ―good character qualities that 
enable an individual to achieve happiness while obeying the commands of reason‖ 
(Zunjic).   
 Aristotle makes a clear distinction between the two types of virtues: Moral and 
Intellectual. Moral virtues are those which must be cultivated by habit (as explained 
above). They include courage, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, proper 
ambition, patience, truthfulness, wittiness, friendliness, modesty, and righteous 
indignation (Aristotle Appendix 1). Intellectual virtue, on the other hand, refers to a  
quality of the mind; it ―owes both its inception and its growth chiefly to instruction, and 
for this very reason needs time and experience‖ (Aristotle II. i. 1103a 15-16). The 
intellectual virtues include practical skill, knowledge, prudence (phronēsis), intuition, 
wisdom, resourcefulness, understanding, judgment, and cleverness. We can only function 
at our full potential when we exert both moral and intellectual virtue because, according 
to Aristotle, our moral virtue ―ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim,‖ and 
prudence, or intellectual virtue, ensures the correctness of the means toward it (Aristotle 
VI. xii.1144a 7-9). 
 The very core of Aristotle‘s position on moral goodness is his Doctrine of 
the Mean, in which he argues the importance of moderation in all human activity. Each 
moral virtue, he contends, exists somewhere between the vices of excess and deficiency.
7
   
Courage, for example, is a moral virtue. If a person exhibits too much courage, however, 
he may be said to be rash (a vice), and if he exhibits no shred of courage at all, he is said 
                                                 
7
 See Appendix I for the Doctrine of the Mean chart illustrating the moral virtues and their corresponding 
vices of excess and deficiency. 
18 
 
to be cowardly (also a vice). We must strive, therefore, for the appropriate middle ground 
or ―Golden Mean‖ between excess and deficiency: 
 It is possible [. . .] to feel fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity, and pleasure  
 and pain generally, too much or too little; and both of these are wrong. But  
 to have these feelings at the right times on the right grounds towards the  
 right people for the right motive and in the right way is to feel them to an  
 intermediate, that is to the best, degree; and this is the mark of virtue.  
 (Aristotle II. vi. 1106b 19-25) 
 The difficulty, however, lies in the fact that the virtuous mean is very rarely found at an 
exact mathematical center between the vices on each end. Instead, it is our responsibility 
to determine whether the virtue that we seek may be found closer to the vice of excess or 
the vice of deficiency.  Referring back to courage, for example, the actual virtue of 
courage is closer on the scale to the vice of rashness (excess) than it is to the vice of 
cowardliness (deficiency). The challenge of determining the mean, according to Aristotle, 
contributes to the very real difficulty of being good, for ―failure is possible in many ways 
[. . .] but success in only one. That is why one is easy and the other difficult; it is easy to 
miss the target and difficult to hit it. Here, then, is another reason why excess and 
deficiency fall under evil, and the mean state under good; ‗For men are bad in countless 
ways, but good in only one‘ ‖8 (II. vi. 1106b 29-35).    
 Since Virtue comprises the pith of Nicomachean Ethics, it makes sense to offer a 
compendious of Books III through VI at this time. In these chapters, Aristotle defines and 
analyzes the moral and intellectual virtues, offering specific examples to elucidate his  
discussion. He begins with an exhaustive treatment of Courage, clarifying that it refers to 
                                                 
8
 Editor‘s note—the source of the quotation is unknown 
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a ―mean state in relation to feelings of fear and confidence.‖ The courageous man, he 
explains, ―will fear what it is natural for man to fear, but he will face it in the right way 
and as principle directs, for the sake of what is right and honourable; for this is the end of 
virtue‖ (III. vi. 1115a 7; 1115b 12-14). This type of courage, according to Aristotle, is 
proper and noble, as opposed to the brutishness exhibited by one who behaves as if he 
fears nothing:  
The man who exceeds in confidence about things that are fearful is rash.  
The rash man is considered to be both a boaster and a pretender to  
courage; at any rate he wishes to seem as the courageous man really is in  
his attitude towards fearful situations, and therefore imitates him where he 
can (i.e. where there is no real danger). Hence such people are usually  
cowardly as well as rash, because while they make a show of confidence 
when circumstances permit, they cannot face anything fearful. (III. vii. 
115b 28-33)   
Both the rash man and the coward (i.e. one who ―exceeds in fearing‖; one who ―fears the 
wrong things in the wrong way‖) are despondent, as opposed to the courageous man, who 
is confident and optimistic.  
Naturally, soldiers in a war have the greatest opportunity to display their courage, 
as they are faced with the possibility of painful wounds and even death every day. But the 
truly courageous soldier, Aristotle clarifies, is not the one who flies blindly into battle 
without concern for the potentially dire consequences. Instead, the courageous soldier is 
pained by the knowledge that he may be wounded or die, and he does not willingly 
endure these consequences. But since it is the right thing to do, and since it would be a 
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disgrace not to, the courageous man endures the consequences—accepting even the 
possibility of death with a noble spirit. Aristotle makes an important distinction here 
regarding the truly virtuous man of courage:  
The more completely a man possesses virtue, and the happier he is, the  
more he will be distressed at the thought of death. For to such a man life is  
supremely worth living; and he is losing the greatest blessings, and he  
knows it; and this is a grievous thing. But that does not make him any less  
brave; he is probably even braver for it, because in preference to these  
blessings he chooses a gallant end in war. (III. ix. 1117b 10-15) 
The virtue of courage, then, consists in fearing what it is appropriate to fear, and facing 
these fears in the right way. 
 Next, Aristotle introduces the moral virtue of Temperance, which concerns the 
avoidance of excess in regards to physical pleasure. Those who eat or drink too much are 
crude; those who engage in indiscriminate sexual behaviors are base; and those who 
display excess in every form, allowing themselves to be carried away by their physical 
desires, are licentious. But the temperate man, Aristotle states, ―enjoys neither the things 
that the licentious man enjoys most (he positively objects to them) nor wrong pleasures in 
general, nor does he enjoy any pleasure violently; he is not distressed by the absence of 
pleasures, nor does he desire them—or if he does, he desires them moderately‖ (III. xi. 
1119a 11-13). Appropriate restraint and proper appreciation of physical pleasures are the 
keys to temperance. 
 The virtue of Liberality means having the right attitude with regard to giving and 
receiving money. The liberal man, Aristotle informs us, ―will not only give and spend the 
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right amount on the right objects, in great and small matters alike, and do it with pleasure; 
he will also accept the right amounts from the right sources‖ (IV. i. 1120b 28-30). A 
virtuous man neither squanders his money nor takes it too seriously. Instead, he makes 
the very best use of wealth, or goods, or any possession that is to be given or received.
 9
 
Aristotle issues a stern warning about the dangers of prodigality (i.e. excessive spending; 
wasting or squandering money). Most prodigal people, he argues, are actually illiberal: 
  They become acquisitive because they want to spend money and cannot  
  do so readily, since their resources quickly run out; so they are forced to  
  get a supply from elsewhere. What is more, since they care nothing for  
  honourable conduct, they take money irresponsibly from any source;  
  because they are eager to give, and it makes no difference to them how or  
  from where they get it. For this very reason their gifts are not liberal  
  either, because they are not fine, nor given from a fine motive, nor in the  
  right degree. Sometimes they enrich those who ought to be poor; and  
  while they would not give anything to people of respectable character,  
  they heap gifts on flatterers or purveyors of some other pleasure. Hence,  
  most of them are licentious as well; because, spending freely as they do,  
  they squander their money on forms of self-indulgence, and as they do not  
  direct their lives towards an honourable end, they fall into sensuality.  
  (IV. i. 1121b 1-10)    
Despite the various dangers of prodigality, however, Aristotle argues that Illiberality, or 
meanness, is a much more heinous vice. These types go to any length to get money from 
                                                 
9
 Aristotle makes a further moral distinction regarding spending and receiving money, which he explains as 
the virtue of ―Magnificence.‖ This virtue primarily concerns matters on a larger scale than those discussed 
in relation to Liberality. Its opposing vices are Vulgarity and Pettiness. 
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any source, even if their actions are illegal (such as the card shark or pick-pocket). They 
will not hesitate to cheat their friends for their own profit, and they do not mind the bad 
reputation they earn—as long as it makes money. This kind of illiberality is, according to 
Aristotle, ―sordidly avaricious‖ (IV. i. 1122a 13).  
 The next virtue, Magnanimity, is generally considered a very upper-class Greek 
virtue. Commonly interpreted as proper pride or self-respect, Aristotle defines it as 
―Greatness of soul,‖ and specifies that it concerns matters of honor and dishonor. A 
magnanimous man is one who correctly thinks that he is worthy of great things; in this 
sense, he differs from both the foolish, vain man who overestimates his own worth, and 
the pusillanimous man, who undervalues his worth. The magnanimous man is ―the best 
man of all,‖ and is ―characterized by greatness in every virtue‖ (IV. iii. 1123b 28; 30). 
Due to his impeccable moral conduct, the magnanimous man is worthy of honor, which is 
the prize of virtue: ―So magnanimity seems to be a sort of crown of virtues, because it 
enhances them and is never found apart from them. This makes it hard to be truly 
magnanimous, because it is impossible without all-round excellence‖ (1124a 37-39).  
 Next, Aristotle expounds upon the virtue of Patience and its opposing vices—
irascibility and lack of spirit. These very different dispositions concern how we deal with 
feelings of anger. Arguing that certain events and circumstances merit an angry response, 
Aristotle explains that the patient man will only demonstrate anger in the right way—i.e. 
toward the right people, at the right moment, for the right reason, and for the right length 
of time. The patient man never becomes perturbed over insignificant matters, and does 
not allow his emotions to get the best of him; he also lacks a vengeful spirit, invariably 
opting to forgive others instead of harboring ill feelings against them. Although the 
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patient man cautiously monitors his anger, Aristotle clarifies that certain situations 
absolutely call for an angry or indignant response. If one fails to become angry about a 
severe injustice or flagitious wrongdoing, for example, then he is foolish, ―deficient in 
perceptivity and sensitivity‖ or even servile, since he lacks the spirit to defend himself or 
others against insult or injustice (IV. iv. 1125b 25-35; v. 1126a 1-10).  
On the opposite end of the spectrum, irascibility manifests itself in various 
degrees of offensiveness. All irascible people share the characteristic of becoming angry 
too quickly at the wrong people for the wrong reasons. Possessing no self-control, these 
people vent their anger openly and sometimes violently; once they have released their 
emotions, they feel better and drop the whole matter. Although their temper-tantrums can 
be hostile and even ferocious, their anger completely vanishes when the tantrum 
concludes. Aristotle distinguishes between irascibility and other types of anger that can 
potentially be more dangerous. As the name implies, hypercholeric people are 
exceedingly quick-tempered and become angry about anything for any reason. Their 
response to any given situation is impossible to predict, so others tend to be on edge 
around them—always wondering when the next anger-inducing moment will occur. 
Bitter men, on the contrary, suppress their anger for long periods of time—building 
resentment that is difficult to reconcile. For these people, Aristotle claims, the only 
possible relief is retaliation: ― For revenge provides release from anger by substituting 
pleasure for pain. In default of this, they still labour under the weight of resentment; 
because owing to its concealment nobody helps to persuade the sufferer out of it, and it 
takes him time to digest his anger internally‖ (IV. v. 1126a 22-25). Therefore, although 
24 
 
every man is entitled to feelings of anger for the right reasons, Aristotle strongly censures 
both the deficiency (lack of spirit) and the various excesses associated with anger.      
 As an enthusiastic proponent of the virtues, Aristotle remains within character in 
his discussion of truth and falsehood regarding our daily speech and actions. The 
virtuous man, he explains, is ―sincere both in his daily life and in his speech, 
acknowledging the qualities that he possesses and neither exaggerating nor depreciating 
them. [ . . .] Such a person would seem to be a good type; for a lover of truth, who speaks 
it when nothing depends on it, will speak it all the more when something does depend on 
it‖ (IV. vi. 1127a 24-25; vii. 1127b 3-5). The corresponding vices regarding our daily 
pretensions include boastfulness and understatement, both of which Aristotle condemns. 
Although depreciating one‘s own qualities can certainly be considered dishonest, 
however, Aristotle censures boastful men as having ―worse character‖ than their self-
deprecating counterparts, for their lies place them on an undeserved pedestal.   
 The final virtue I will discuss here concerns the art of conversation, a very 
important aspect of ―the good life‖ in Aristotle‘s Greek society. Proper social conduct 
and good taste mandate certain ways of speaking and listening, including knowing the 
right things to say and how to say them as well as knowing when we would be better 
served by listening. One who dismisses all decency of expression and cares only about 
making others laugh is, according to Aristotle, a buffoon. Such a vulgar individual 
―cannot resist a joke, sparing neither himself nor anybody else provided that he can raise 
a laugh, and saying things that a man of taste would never dream of saying, and some that 
he would not listen to, either‖ (IV. viii. 1128a 34-36). The boor, on the other hand, is 
completely humorless—neither attempting to be witty himself nor appreciating the humor 
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of others. Such a sour individual, according to Aristotle, ―is useless for any kind of social 
intercourse, because he contributes nothing and takes offence at everything‖ (1128b 2-3). 
But the individual who exercises good taste regarding humor is witty (or nimble-witted) 
and should be commended, for this ―intermediate disposition also has the property of tact, 
and the mark of tact is saying and listening to the sort of things that are suitable for a man 
of honourable and liberal character‖ (1128a  18-19). Clearly, relaxation, amusement, and 
good conversation are necessary in the Aristotelian conception of a happy life. The 
parameters between socially acceptable and socially objectionable behaviors, however, 
must always be strictly observed. 
Throughout Aristotle‘s discussion of the virtues and vices, he insists that 
―freedom of the will‖ is vital to virtue, for it holds within it both virtuous and vicious 
possibilities. ―Courage, for instance, is only really worthy of the name when done from a 
love of honor and duty: munificence again becomes vulgarity when it is not exercised 
from a love of what is right and beautiful, but for displaying wealth‖ (―Aristotle‖).  As 
individuals, we are continually making choices that ultimately determine our moral 
character. And, although one bad or vicious choice does not automatically condemn us as 
―bad characters‖ (any more than one swallow makes a summer), the more we practice 
virtuous behavior by making morally sound choices, the faster we will achieve ultimate 
happiness.  
 Regardless of how many virtuous behaviors we practice and how many morally 
sound choices we make, however, only those of us who have friends can ever experience 
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the ―good life.‖10  As we learn in Books VIII and IX of Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle 
feels strongly that friendship is indispensable to moral goodness because ―friendship 
provides the ideal conditions for the successful pursuit of excellence‖ (Thunder). He 
drives directly to the heart of his position in Chapter 1 of Book VIII, as he substantiates 
the claim of the chapter title—―Friendship is necessary‖:  
  Nobody would choose to live without friends even if he had all the other  
good things. Indeed those who hold wealth and office and power are  
thought to stand in special need of friends; for what is the use of such  
prosperity to them if they are denied the opportunity for beneficence,  
which is most commonly and most commendably directed towards  
friends? Or how can their prosperity be guarded and preserved without 
friends? because the greater it is, the more precarious. In poverty too and  
all the other misfortunes of life people regard their friends as their only  
refuge. Friends are indeed a help both to the young, in keeping them from 
mistakes; and to the old, in caring for them and doing for them what  
through frailty they cannot do for themselves; and to those in the prime of 
life, by enabling them to carry out fine achievements. (1155a 5-15) 
Clearly, Aristotle feels that friendship is necessary to all people, regardless of age or  
economic standing in the community. And the purpose of friendship, as we understand 
from the quote above, is quite simple: to help and to be helped; to engage in morally 
virtuous behaviors (i.e. young people caring for old people), and to accept morally 
                                                 
10
 It is important to clarify here that Aristotle‘s conception of friendship differs significantly from our 
modern conception, for Aristotle includes family members, business associates, and minor acquaintances in 
his definition of ―friend.‖  
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virtuous behaviors that are bestowed upon us (i.e. allowing friends to enable our 
successes). But not all friendships qualify as what Aristotle calls ―complete‖ and 
therefore morally good or excellent friendships. He divides friendships into three distinct 
categories: those based on utility (engaging in a friendship only to seek some advantage 
from it), those based on pleasure (befriending someone who makes us laugh or flatters 
us), and those based on goodness—moral goodness, excellence. Only this third type of 
friendship is perfect, according to Aristotle: 
  For these people each alike wish good for the other qua good, and they are  
  good in themselves. And it is those who desire the good of their friends for  
  the friends‘ sake that are most truly friends, because each loves the other  
  for what he is, and not for any incidental quality. (VIII. iii. 1156b 8-12)  
This reciprocal goodness—genuine, selfless love of other—solely qualifies as complete 
and therefore perfect friendship. The circumstances of these friendships are not 
changeable, and they are not motivated by short-term considerations; on the contrary, 
they are steadfast and enduring. Each friend wants what is best for the other, and each 
truly appreciates the other. This kind of friendship, Aristotle insists, ―is perfect both in 
point of duration and in all other respects; and in it each party receives from the other 
benefits that are in all respects the same or similar, as ought to be the case between 
friends‖ (1156b 33-36). This complete and perfect brand of friendship constitutes 
Aristotle‘s conception of ―virtuous‖ friendship, for a true friend acts as our second self—
offering us a ―mirror‖ of good and moral actions.  Such friendship, Aristotle maintains, 
which helps us to understand ourselves more completely and enjoy life more fully, is 
absolutely necessary for true happiness.    
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 It is important to note that Aristotle‘s idea of friendship extends beyond mere 
individual relationships and into the political realm. In fact, he argues that an individual 
cannot live successfully if he is not an active, engaged member of the polis. As R.G. 
Mulgan states in Aristotle’s Political Theory:  
The polis can exist without the individual, but the individual cannot exist 
without the polis . . . If men are separated from the polis, they cease to be 
men in the same way as a hand ceases to be a hand if cut off from the body 
. . . the function of man, the realisation of his essence, lies in the 
achievement of the good life which cannot be lived except in the polis. 
(14) 
Evidently, then, a solitary man leading a solitary life will never achieve eudaimonia, for 
―It is [. . .] paradoxical to represent the man of perfect happiness as a solitary; for nobody 
would choose to have all the good things in the world by himself, because man is a social 
creature, and naturally constituted to live in company‖ (Aristotle IX. ix. 1169b 16-17). 
Man‘s very function in life is to live well, and this function cannot be performed without 
friends and full community engagement.  
 Aristotle‘s Virtue Ethics held a prestigious position in Western philosophy 
as the dominant approach to understanding human moral action for well over two 
thousand years. During the nineteenth century, however, bold new systems of ethics such 
as Deontology and Utilitarianism dominated Western philosophical study, entirely 
deracinating Virtue as a feasible means for exploring morality. It wasn‘t until 1958, with 
the publication of Elizabeth Anscombe‘s ―Modern Moral Philosophy‖ that ethicists began 
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to re-examine Virtue as an effective method for understanding morality. In this seminal 
work, Anscombe   
criticizes modern moral philosophy‘s pre-occupation with a law  
conception of ethics [. . .] that deals exclusively with obligation and  
duty. Among the theories she criticizes for their reliance on universally 
applicable principles are Mill‘s utilitarianism and Kant‘s deontology.  
These theories rely on rules of morality that were claimed to be applicable 
to any moral situation. [. . . ] This approach to ethics relies on universal  
principles and results in a rigid moral code. Further, these rigid rules are  
based on a notion of obligation that is meaningless in modern, secular  
society because they make no sense without assuming the existence of a  
law-giver—an assumption we no longer make. (Athannassoulis ―Virtue‖ 
2) 
In place of our law and duty-driven ethics, Anscombe argues for a return to Aristotelian  
emphasis on excellence, moral wisdom, and flourishing. At the time of its publication, 
Anscombe‘s paper enjoyed a tremendous critical reception by the philosophical 
community. Ethicists were beginning to recognize that the moral standards of the day—
duty and consequence—alone simply did not provide the scope necessary for examining 
moral action. Despite positive scholarly reception of Anscombe‘s initial foray into virtue, 
however, the philosophical community at the time did not immediately take her lead, and 
a majority of the scholarly conversations in ethics continued to focus on Deontological 
and Consequentialist ideologies. In fact, academic interest in developing new principles 
regarding virtue and moral character has only occurred within the past twenty-five years. 
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Since approximately 1980, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics has become a burgeoning field 
of philosophical specialization. We will examine some of the major theories in this 
relatively new school of ethics in Chapter Three.  
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Table of Virtues and Vices 
 
Action or 
Feeling  Excess   Mean   Deficiency 
 
fear and  rashness  courage  cowardice 
confidence  thrasutēs  andreia  deilia 
 
pleasure  licentiousness   temperance  insenssibility 
and pain  akolasia  sōphrosunē  anaisthēsia 
 
getting and  prodigality  liberality  illiberality 
spending  asōtia   eleutheriotēs  aneleutheria 
(minor) 
 
getting and  vulgarity  magnificence  pettiness 
spending  apeirokalia,  megaloprepeia mikroprepeia 
(major)  banausia 
 
honour and  vanity   magnanimity  pusillanimity 
dishonour  chaunotēs  megalopsuchia mikropsuchia 
(major) 
 
honour and  ambition  proper ambition unambitiousness 
dishonour  philotimia           . . .  aphilotimia 
(minor) 
 
anger   irascibility  patience  lack of spirit  
   orgilotēs  praotēs  aorgēsia 
 
self-   boastfulness  truthfulness  understatement 
expression  alazoneia  alētheia  eirōneia 
 
conversation  buffoonery  wittiness  boorishness 
   bōmolochia  eutrapelia  agroikia 
 
social   obsequiousness friendliness  cantankerousness 
conduct  areskeia  philia(?)  duskolia 
         (duseris) 
 
indignation  envy   righteous  malicious enjoyment 
   phthonos  indignation  epichairekakia 
      nemesis 
 
(Source: Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics 285-6) 
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3 The New Aristotelians: 21
st
 Century Virtue 
 
In Chapter One, I presented a synopsis of some essential ideas in Aristotle‘s 
Nicomachean Ethics. Clearly, concepts of virtue assume a crucial role in Aristotle‘s 
conception of ethical behavior and moral character development. Despite the central role 
of the virtues in Nicomachean Ethics, however, the term ―virtue ethics‖ is never 
specifically used by Aristotle. Certainly, Elizabeth Anscombe‘s 1958 essay ―Modern 
Moral Philosophy‖ sparked twentieth-century philosophical interest in a return to virtue 
as a way of understanding moral behavior. Even her work, however, never makes specific 
reference to ―virtue ethics.‖ Instead, she calls for a return to a more Aristotelian approach 
to doing philosophy, suggesting that we look to ―character, virtue, and flourishing‖ as 
important concepts in our examination of morality (Athanassoulis ―Virtue‖). In fact, 
―virtue ethics‖ as an acknowledged field of academic study is a relatively recent addition 
to the scholarly stage.  It was not until the 1980‘s, by which time a significant number of 
philosophers had taken up Anscombe‘s call for a return to virtue, that ―virtue ethics‖ as a 
field of philosophic specialization actually came to be. 
If virtue ethics is a relatively new field of study, then, what ideas does it espouse 
and what theories does it advance? Part of the allure of contemporary virtue ethics is its 
infancy: it is still so new that the major theories and ideologies that will ultimately 
identify it in the future are still being hashed out by the scholars. The new virtue ethicists 
(neo-Aristotelians) have embraced an exciting and burgeoning area of specialization—
one that changes, develops, and grows more solid and reputable with each new scholarly 
publication.  
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One conclusion about this flourishing subject area is certain, however: today‘s 
philosophers do not share the same ideas regarding the operation of virtue and moral 
action. Rosalind Hursthouse, for example, combines Kant‘s focus on human reason with 
Aristotle‘s insistence on eudaimonia as the ultimate human goal, arguing that acting 
virtuously is rational and invariably leads to eudaimonia. Philippa Foot, on the other 
hand, suggests that virtuous behavior should be used as a model for how we can improve 
the world, thus benefiting both the virtuous individual and the greater community. 
Michael Slote advances a radical departure from Aristotle‘s ―Agent-Focused‖ virtue 
theory, arguing that moral judgments about the motives, attitudes, or inner life of an 
individual must be made before the virtue of an action itself can be evaluated. And 
Christine Swanton‘s pluralist perspective connects virtue theory with Nietzsche. These 
four scholars represent a small but important segment of the neo-Aristotelian population. 
It is worth noting that, despite the very recent establishment of this field, the sheer 
number of philosophers who have joined the virtue ethics conversation is quite daunting. 
I do not, therefore, attempt a comprehensive discussion of today‘s virtue ethicists. 
Instead, I dedicate this chapter to a sampling of esteemed critical theories—focusing 
especially on those that lend themselves to Shakespearian literary analysis.  
Before I discuss specific theories of the neo-Aristotelian scholars, I believe it will 
be helpful to assess some important beliefs that today‘s virtue ethicists actually do share. 
In an article titled ―Varieties of Virtue Ethics,‖ Philosopher Justin Oakley outlines six 
commonly held views that he calls ―positive features‖ of virtue ethics. 11 It is worth 
                                                 
11
 I am indebted to philosopher Justin Oakley for his clear and concise scholarship on this topic.  This is an 
important article because, as he explains in the introduction, the resurgence of virtue ethics occurred in 
response to ―dissatisfaction with standard Kantian and Utilitarian ethical theories‖; therefore, the claims 
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reminding my reader here that a vast majority of contemporary virtue ethicists locate the 
essential roots of their theories in the teachings of Aristotle. The striking similarities 
between the claims that Oakley makes about today‘s virtue ethics and those advanced by 
Aristotle, therefore, should not be entirely surprising.
12
 The first of these six claims is that 
―An action is right if and only if it is what an agent with a virtuous character would do in 
the circumstances‖ (129). This first claim concerns ―the primacy of character in the 
justification of right action‖ (129). In other words, an action can be considered right if it 
is in accordance with what a virtuous person would do under those particular 
circumstances. And the important part of this claim is that the action being considered is 
the action that a virtuous person would take. The focus is on the person‘s character, not 
on the specific action being taken or the result of the action. Philippa Foot offers an 
excellent example of this first claim: If a person possesses the virtue of justice, then s/he 
will always repay money s/he has borrowed. Even if s/he knows that the person to whom 
s/he owes the money will waste it on gambling or drugs, a virtuous person will 
nonetheless repay the money (Foot Virtues 44).  
 A second belief commonly held by virtue ethicists is that ―Goodness is prior to 
rightness‖ (Oakley 138). This acknowledges a relationship between goodness and right 
action, but ascribes primacy to the notion of human goodness. According to this claim, 
we cannot determine which action is right in a particular situation until we have an 
account of ―human good‖—i.e., which human traits and characteristics are considered 
                                                                                                                                                 
made by virtue philosophers are usually stated ―in negative form, and expressed in terms of an opposition 
to an ‗ethics of principles‘ or [ . . .] an ‗ethics of action‘, etc. Unfortunately, this negative emphasis has 
resulted in virtue ethics becoming better known to many by what it is against rather than by what it is for‖ 
(Oakley 128-29).   
12
 See chapter one of this dissertation for a synopsis of main ideas in Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics . 
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estimable. Although this second claim seems to be implicit in the first claim, Oakley 
makes the statement explicitly in order to highlight the distinction between virtue-based 
character assessments and deontological character-based ethics. Deontologists hold that a 
good agent will take certain actions because those particular actions are in accordance 
with moral rules; and moral rules, by the same token, are consistent with practical 
rationality. Virtue ethics, by contrast, ―derives its account of rightness and right action 
from prior aretaic notions of goodness and good character, which (in Aristotelian virtue 
ethics) are themselves grounded in an independent account of human flourishing that 
values our emotional as well as our rational capacities‖ (Oakley 139). Although virtue 
ethics certainly recognizes reason as an important guiding factor in our lives, then, it also 
acknowledges our emotions and our ultimate desire for ―the good life‖ (eudaimonia) as 
key factors in how we live and how we develop our moral character. 
A third claim of virtue ethics, according to Oakley, is that ―The virtues are  
irreducibly plural intrinsic goods‖ (139). In order to comprehend the meaning of this 
claim, it is important to remember that virtue ethics holds certain traits of character (i.e., 
virtues) to be essential to human flourishing. Each of these virtues is important in a way 
that cannot be reduced to one single value. They are, in other words, intrinsically 
valuable as opposed to being valuable only as a means to some other objective. Those 
who possess the virtues appreciate and value them for their own sake. 
The next claim—that ―the virtues are objectively good‖—clarifies the notion that 
the virtues are valuable in and of themselves, regardless of whether or not the agent 
desires them. A person may not necessarily want to be patient, for example, but the 
absence of desire does not detract from the objective value of the virtue. Likewise, if an 
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agent merely desires a virtue without actually acquiring it, s/he cannot be described as 
virtuous. A person who desperately wants to be perceived as courageous, in other words, 
will only be perceived as courageous if s/he actually exhibits that particular trait. 
Claims five and six—that ―some intrinsic goods are agent-relative‖ and that 
―acting rightly does not require that we maximize the good‖—require little explanation. 
The former simply refers to the notion that a particular virtue of mine may give it 
additional moral importance to me. For example, suppose that I have established a very 
close friendship with Mary; our friendship is genuine and extremely important to me. 
Although I may have told a group of new friends at my workplace that I would attend 
their party on a given night, I am absolutely justified in cancelling that commitment if 
Mary develops a sudden problem that requires my attention and support. The virtue of 
friendship in this case is agent-relative: my friendship with Mary holds greater moral 
importance to me and cannot, therefore, be considered equal in value to that of my new 
friendships at my workplace. The final claim (―Acting rightly does not require that we 
maximize the good‖) rejects the Consequentialist belief that right action should be 
determined by what would produce the most overall good. The entire idea of maximizing 
the good is patently neglected by virtue ethicists, who focus instead on the inherent 
quality or excellence of the virtues themselves. Referring to the example of friendship 
(above) then, a virtue ethicist would not feel a need to cultivate friendships with large 
numbers of people, even if a massive peer group could guarantee that s/he would win an 
election. On the contrary, a virtue ethicist would concentrate on developing excellent 
friendships, wherein quality (not quantity or consequence) matters.
13
  
                                                 
13
 See chapter one, pp. 16-18 for an explanation of Aristotle‘s conception of excellent friendship. 
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Now that we have examined the core philosophical beliefs that today‘s virtue 
ethicists seem to share, let us shift our focus to a much larger and more exciting subject—
the multifariousness of their virtue theories. I begin with Rosalind Hursthouse, as she has 
been a staunch proponent of virtue ethics since its reintroduction as a viable philosophical 
approach to behavior examination. Hursthouse‘s scholarly contributions to this field are 
extensive and multifaceted; my interest in her scholarship, however, primarily concerns 
her work in defense of virtue ethics as a normative rival to the schools of deontology and 
consequentialism. The most pervasive objection to virtue as a normative ethical theory is 
its inability, according to its detractors, to actually ―tell us what we should do [. . . since it 
is] concerned with Being rather than Doing, with good (and bad) character rather than 
right (and wrong) action, with the question ‗What sort of person should I be?‘ rather than 
the question ‗What should I do?‘ ‖ (Hursthouse ―Virtue‖ 184-85). Although Hursthouse 
acknowledges virtue ethics as ―being-centered,‖ she argues that it is no less action 
guiding than deontology or utilitarianism. Following the rules of deontology, for instance, 
one determines how one should act by adhering to moral rules. The premise specifying 
right action in this case would be: ―An action is right if and only if it is in accordance 
with a correct moral rule or principle‖ (186). If one wishes to use utilitarianism as a guide 
for behavior, one must determine which action or course of action would result in the 
greatest good for the most people. The premise here would be: ―An action is right if and 
only if it promotes the best consequences‖ (185). Clearly, however, neither of these first 
premises serves as a sufficient guide to behavior. Knowledge of the moral law is requisite 
for deontology to be action-guiding, so a second premise is necessary--one clarifying or 
outlining what constitutes a moral rule or principle. And, until one knows exactly what 
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constitutes the ―best consequences,‖ one is offered no action guidance whatsoever from 
the school of consequentialism. For this theory to guide behavior, then, a second premise 
explaining that ―best consequences are those in which happiness is maximized‖ is 
required.  
In much the same fashion, Hursthouse argues, virtue ethics can guide right action. 
A first premise working toward such an objective might posit: ―An action is right if and 
only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances‖ (187). 
In order to guide behavior, however, second and third premises-- clarifying what a 
virtuous agent is and possibly enumerating the virtues-- are probably necessary. 
Hursthouse suggests that once a person understands what the virtues are, what a virtuous 
agent is, and how that virtuous agent would characteristically act, that person can easily 
determine right action.  
A second objection to virtue ethics is manifested in the ―conflict problem.‖ 
Simply stated, the conflict problem arises when the requirements of different virtues 
point us in opposite directions. For example, ―Charity prompts me to kill the person who 
would (truly) be better off dead, but justice forbids it. Honesty points to telling the hurtful 
truth, kindness and compassion to remaining silent or even lying‖ (192). Certainly, 
Hursthouse admits, this type of virtue conflict is problematic and often unavoidable. It 
would be blatantly untrue, however, to suggest that similar conflicts never arise in 
deontological or utilitarian systems of ethics. Proponents of utilitarianism often fail to 
achieve consensus regarding the meaning of and logical relationship between the two 
uses of ―greatest‖ in their definitive rule (―the greatest good for the greatest number‖), for 
example; and the various hard-line rules of deontologists also frequently clash: ― ‗Don‘t 
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kill,‘  ‗Respect autonomy,‘ ‗Tell the truth,‘ ‗Keep promises‘ may all conflict with 
‗Prevent suffering‘ or ‗Do no harm‘ ‖ (192). Furthermore, according to Hursthouse, both 
deontology and virtue ethics employ the same strategy in resolving these purportedly 
conflicting edicts: they argue that the conflicts are merely prima facie and may easily be 
resolved by considering which moral rule or virtue takes precedence in each particular 
case. Deontologists, for instance, readily admit that certain moral rules outrank others and 
must be respected as the weightier rules when conflicts arise.  Likewise in virtue ethics, if 
a particular truth is of great import, the moral necessity of telling the truth to the other 
outweighs the hurt feelings that the act of truth-telling may cause. Sometimes, 
Hursthouse acknowledges, an agent may still be unsure of how to resolve a conflict 
because he lacks certain moral knowledge of what to do in such difficult situations. 
According to virtue theory, this lack of moral knowledge ―arises from a lack of moral 
wisdom, from an inadequate grasp of what is involved in acting kindly (or unkindly) or 
charitably (uncharitably), in being honest, or just, or lacking in charity, or, in general, of 
how the virtue (and vice) terms are to be correctly applied‖ (―Virtue‖ 193). This type of 
moral wisdom, according to Aristotle, is not generally found in people who are too young 
to have gained life experience, and it cannot be acquired simply by pursuing an 
education. Instead, some combination of accumulated knowledge and life experience 
allows an individual to attain moral wisdom. This in itself is viewed by some as 
problematic, for how can a moral theory be considered viable if it cannot be accessed by 
the very young or the uneducated? Hursthouse dismisses this objection, however, by 
arguing the necessity of a similar skill in moral differentiation for resolving deontological 
and utilitarian conflict as well.  
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In her text On Virtue Ethics, Hursthouse defends what she calls a ―bold‖ thesis 
concerning moral motivation:  
The perfectly virtuous agent, when she acts virtuously, from virtue, sets  
the standard for ―moral motivation,‖ for acting ―because one thinks it‘s  
right,‖ ―from duty,‖ etc., a standard against which we assess the extent to 
which the less than perfectly virtuous do the same. The more an agent‘s  
character resembles that of the perfectly virtuous, the more he may be  
credited with ―moral motivation‖ when he does what is V [virtuous] for X  
reasons. (141)  
One direct result of this, according to Hursthouse, is that moral motivation can and does 
manifest itself in degrees rather than as an ―all or nothing matter,‖ as many ethicists 
believe it to be. In other words, an agent will only be considered as acting from pure 
moral motivation when her character is sufficiently virtuous to justify such an 
assessment.  
Following this logic, then, one can only act from moral motivation if her character 
can be said to be—to some degree—virtuous. The actions of a person whose character is 
thoroughly immoral, such as an extreme racist, member of a wicked cult, or Nazi can 
never be said to be morally motivated. Even if, say, this extreme racist does something 
that others view as very noble, courageous, generous, or self-sacrificial (i.e., boldly 
standing against a tyrant or giving a large amount of money to a charitable cause)—and 
even if this particular action is not uncharacteristic of the type of actions this person 
routinely engages in, she cannot, according to Hursthouse, be said to be morally 
motivated. Although this person may claim that she acted out of principle, because it was 
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the right thing to do, she cannot be said to have acted from moral motivation because 
morally motivated acts do not and cannot exist as isolated events. Instead, they must exist 
as part of the person‘s virtuous character. Since an extreme racist, Nazi, or member of an 
evil cult has essentially adopted wicked moral beliefs (he may be cruel, violent, hypo-
critical, intolerant, lacking any semblance of integrity, dishonest, etc.), his character is far 
from virtuous. Therefore, according to Hursthouse, his individual actions can never be 
judged as virtuous, and he cannot be said to have any virtues at all:   
 The Nazism or racism or religion (supposing them to be very bad) has 
poisoned their characters to such an extent that no character trait they  
have can count as [a virtue]. And this means that I would go back to the 
apparently splendid act and, denying that it was done from virtue to any  
extent at all (since the agent has none), deny that the agent acted ―because  
she thought it was right‖ (or on principle, etc.).  And this would allow me 
to say (what does not seem so far from the truth) that such people have no  
real idea of rightness or goodness in action, no moral principles, no real 
idea of moral duty, at all. They say they have, they think that they have,  
and they are just wrong, hopelessly corrupted by the wicked doctrines they  
have embraced and made their own. (On Virtue 147) 
On this point, Hursthouse stands firmly. An agent‘s actions can only be viewed as 
morally motivated if that person can be judged (to some degree) as having a virtuous 
character. And, the more perfectly virtuous the person‘s character is, the more likely it 
will be that her actions are motivated by moral principles. 
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A self-professed devotee of  Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas, Philippa Foot is 
generally credited as a leading scholar in the neo-Aristotelian movement. One of the 
founders of Oxfam, Foot feels strongly that ethics must achieve more than ―dry 
theorizing‖ among scholars. Ethics, she argues, must explore how we can make the world 
a better place. Since virtuous action often benefits both the individual and the community 
in which one exhibits virtuous behavior, the virtues contribute to the good life, Aristotle‘s 
eudaimonia (Athanassoulis ―Virtue‖).  Like Hursthouse, however, Foot believes that our 
complex contemporary world problematizes how virtue is defined and often obfuscates 
the critical difference between virtuous action and intention.  
As a first order of business, then, Foot sets out to offer a working definition of 
virtue, one comprised of several equally important parts. The first part of her definition 
speaks to the human necessity of the virtues: ―Virtues are in general beneficial 
characteristics, and indeed ones that a human being needs to have, for his own sake and 
that of his fellows‖ (Foot 3).  Some measure of courage, temperance, and wisdom, for 
example, certainly benefit the possessor; he is neither paralyzed by fear nor overwhelmed 
by desire, and he exercises good practical judgment when faced with difficult decisions. 
In the same way that the aforementioned virtues benefit the individual, virtues such as 
justice and charity directly concern the welfare of others. Although an individual‘s 
charitable donation to a worthy cause may only benefit him by giving him a sense of self-
satisfaction, for instance, the donation will certainly be of direct benefit to the 
recipient(s).   
 The second part of Foot‘s definition of virtue concerns the will, for ―it is the will 
that is good in a man of virtue [ . . . ] .  It is primarily by his intentions that a man‘s moral 
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dispositions are judged‖ (4).  Foot refines her definition even further by adding ―attitude‖ 
as a qualifying factor for virtue because, as she explains, the inclination of the heart is 
part of virtue. A person‘s intention, or will, ―covers what is wished for as well as what is 
sought‖ (5). Her definition in sum, then, incorporates three equally important aspects of 
virtue: that it is not only beneficial but also necessary, to the individual and society; that 
an individual‘s will (or intention) is paramount; and that genuine desire must be 
inherently connected with the will. 
 After establishing her working definition of virtue, Foot turns her attention to a 
thesis with which Aristotle was concerned: that the virtues are ―corrective, each one 
standing at a point at which there is some temptation to be resisted or deficiency of 
motivation to be made good. As Aristotle put it, virtues are about what is difficult for 
men‖ (8). Temperance and Courage are considered virtues, for example, because desire 
for pleasure and the urge to run away from something often operate as temptations. 
Temperance is corrective in that it prevents us from immersing ourselves excessively in 
pleasure for its own sake; likewise, courage acts correctively in situations where we 
might want to run away or shirk responsibility instead of doing the right thing by 
standing firm and acting steadfastly. Foot explains that many of the virtues serve as curbs 
to temptation: humility is a virtue because people tend to develop large egos; 
industriousness is a virtue because people find it so easy to be lazy or idle; hope prevents 
people from succumbing to despair. Virtues such as charity and justice, on the other 
hand, serve as correctives to man‘s lack of motivation. We tend to care much more 
deeply about our own individual rights, for example, than we do about the rights of 
others; and we care a good bit more about our own well-being than that of others. 
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Because human nature tends toward this type of selfishness, we require the motivation 
provided by the virtues of charity and justice to keep us on the right moral path. 
 Having established the virtues as corrective in nature, Foot tackles the great 
ethical controversy regarding the connection between difficulty and virtue. Is a man who 
finds it very difficult to act virtuously more or less virtuous than the man who finds it 
very easy to act well? According to Aristotle, the man who takes great pleasure in acting 
virtuously, the man who finds it easy to act morally, is truly the most virtuous type of 
person. The man who acts virtuously despite the fact that he finds it very difficult to do 
so, argues Aristotle, is only second best (Foot 10). The difficulty that the second man 
experiences in behaving morally demonstrates that he is imperfect in virtue. If his 
character were more virtuous, he would not only find it easy to behave well, but would 
actually find pleasure in doing so. On the other side of this debate, however,  
philosophers argue that the more difficulty a person experiences in acting virtuously, the 
more virtue s/he displays by acting well. In The Fundamental Principles of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant suggests that only actions done out of a sense of 
duty have ―positive moral worth.‖ He offers the example of two philanthropists; the first 
takes great pleasure in the happiness he provides to those around him with his generous 
donations and gifts, while the second acts only from what he perceives as his duty. Since 
he is a wealthy man, he believes that his moral duty must be to help relieve the suffering 
of those less fortunate than himself. Since he is acting from a sense of moral duty, this 
second philanthropist, according to Kant, is more virtuous than the first philanthropist, 
who may well be helping others, but whose primary motivation is the pleasure he derives 
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from his actions. For Kant, moral praise should only be bestowed when moral effort is 
exhibited.  
 Embracing neither Aristotle nor Kant entirely in this matter, Foot argues that each 
specific situation presents its own set of moral concerns, and that no blanket statement 
regarding virtue and difficulty can adequately speak to all situations. To illustrate, she 
offers the following example of honest action: 
  We may suppose [ . . .] that a man has an opportunity to steal, in 
circumstances where stealing is not morally permissible, but that he  
refrains. And now let us ask our old question. For one man it is hard to  
refrain from stealing and for another man it is not; which shows the  
greater virtue in acting as he should? It is not difficult to see in this case  
that it makes all the difference whether the difficulty comes from  
circumstances, as that a man is poor, or that his theft is unlikely to be  
detected, or whether it comes from something that belongs to his own 
character. The fact that a man is tempted to steal is something about him  
that shows a certain lack of honesty: of the thoroughly honest man we say 
that it ―never entered his head,‖ meaning that it was never a real  
possibility for him. But the fact that he is poor is something that makes the  
occasion more tempting, and difficulties of this kind make honest action  
all the more virtuous. (11) 
In this illustration, Foot demonstrates that neither Aristotle‘s nor Kant‘s position will 
suffice. The man who is so thoroughly honest that stealing was never a consideration 
cannot be praised as more virtuous than the poor man who had to resist great temptation 
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in deciding not to steal. The first man acted in accordance with virtue, but virtue was not 
required for the performance of that action; the second man, however, acted in 
accordance with virtue—and that action (unlike the first man‘s action) proves the 
possession of virtue. 
 Foot‘s final thesis regarding virtue in action14 concerns another point of partial 
departure from Aristotelian theory. According to both Aristotle and Aquinas, virtues can 
produce only good actions; no one can make bad use of the virtues.  Following this logic, 
then, courage could never be displayed in an act of villainy since only good and innocent 
actions can result from virtues. Foot disagrees to a certain extent, electing to side 
conditionally with the majority of her contemporaries who claim that the virtues can 
sometimes be displayed in bad or evil actions. Her position, however, exposes the claim 
(that the virtues can sometimes be displayed in bad actions) as an oversimplification. She 
readily admits that courage may certainly benefit a villain in his criminal behavior. But it 
is fallacious, she argues, to leave this matter in such an unexamined state. Using the 
example of a sordid murder, for example, a murder that is committed purely for personal 
gain or out of jealousy, she asks her reader to imagine that the murderer faces real danger 
in committing the murder. Although many modern philosophers would readily admit that 
the murderer displayed real courage in facing the danger and committing the murder, 
Foot suggests otherwise. Although he may have acted boldly or with intrepidity, and 
although his actions could not be described as cowardly, Foot argues that it is a non 
sequitur to say that an act of villainy can be courageous. She uses the following analogy 
to shed light on her position: 
                                                 
14
 This is the final aspect of Foot‘s theory with which I am particularly concerned in this dissertation. It is 
not, however, her final theory regarding virtue in general. 
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  We might think of words such as ―courage‖ as naming characteristics of 
 human beings in respect of a certain power, as words such as ―poison‖  
and ―solvent‖ and ―corrosive‖ so name the properties of physical things. 
The power to which virtue-words are so related is the power of producing  
good action, and good desires. But just as poisons, solvents, and  
corrosives do not always operate characteristically, so it could be with the  
virtues. If P (say arsenic) is a poison, it does not follow that P acts as a  
poison wherever it is found. It is quite natural to say on occasion ―P does 
not act as a poison here‖ though P is a poison and it is P that is acting here.  
Similarly courage is not operating as a virtue when the murderer turns his  
courage, which is a virtue, to bad ends. (16) 
And so it becomes clear that, according to Foot, behaviors that we generally label as  
virtuous do not always operate as virtues. In distinguishing good actions from bad ones, 
we must examine the specific circumstances of the action in order to determine whether 
or not the particular action is operating as a virtue in each case. 
 Regardless of whether they are examining aspects of virtuous action, character, or 
motive, contemporary ethicists tend to hail back to Aristotle as the penultimate authority 
on virtue. University of Aukland Professor of Ethics Christine Swanton, however, steps 
away from this paradigm, introducing Nietzsche‘s conception of virtue as a viable 
alternative to Aristotle. In her article ―Outline of a Nietzschean Virtue Ethics,‖ she 
determines to answer two basic questions from a Nietzschean virtue perspective:  1.) 
What makes an action right? and 2.) What makes a trait of character a virtue? Before 
attempting to answer these questions, Swanton reminds us that, unlike Aristotle, 
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Nietzsche has a deeply pessimistic view of the human condition.  As he suggests in his 
celebrated work On the Genealogy of Morality, sickness is the normal state of the human 
condition: ―The more normal sickness becomes among men—and we cannot deny its 
normality—the higher should be the honor accorded the rare cases of great power of soul 
and body, man‘s lucky hits‖  (Nietzsche qtd. in Swanton 29). We are, according to 
Nietzsche, very fragile beings with a predisposition to sickness: ―For man is more sick, 
uncertain, changeable, indeterminate, than any other animal . . . he is the sick animal [. . .]  
the most imperiled, the most chronically and profoundly sick of all sick animals‖ (qtd. in 
Swanton 29). Quite unlike Aristotle, who believes that man‘s very nature prepares him to 
be virtuous, Nietzsche insists that only those with ―great power of soul and body‖ are 
constituted to receive the virtues. The rest of us feel inferior, impotent, discontented, and 
defeated. Naturally, such negative feelings give rise to self-loathing, which in turn leads 
to resentment and vengefulness.  
 Even Nietzsche‘s exemplar of virtue—the man who somehow escapes the 
sickness and develops great power of soul and body—presents a pessimistic picture. In 
his Genealogy of Morality and Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche describes this ideal type 
not as one who is thriving and happy (eudaimonistic), but as a lonely and ultimately sad 
figure who cannot sustain healthy relationships with others. For this exemplar of virtue, 
―marriage is a calamity‖ and he usually follows ―the path to unhappiness‖ due to his 
inability to get along as a normal member of society (Swanton 29). Furthermore, 
Nietzsche suggests, most of us should not aspire to become this ―ideal type,‖ this paragon 
of virtue and strength, for we are—by our very nature—too enfeebled and weak to handle 
the wrongs and insults that are heaped upon the strong. A strong man can ―shake off with 
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a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others‖; he can turn the other cheek to 
insults, saying ―what are my parasites [and enemies] to me?‖ (qtd. in Swanton 30). The 
weak (i.e., ―average‖) man, however, is not equipped with the requisite strength of mind 
to shake off his detractors. He will therefore become angry and resentful of the masses; 
or, if he tries to turn the other cheek to insults, he will be trampled and crushed by the 
other weak and vengeful men. This explains why solitude, according to Nietzsche, is a 
virtue reserved for the strong. Only the truly virtuous can enjoy and appreciate the 
solitude that accompanies great strength of mind and spirit. Otherwise, as he argues in 
Thus Spake Zarathustra, ―it is loneliness: the escape of the sick as opposed to the escape 
from the sick‖ (qtd. in Swanton 30). The remedy as presented in Zarathustra, ch. 2, 
involves learning to love ourselves, for only when we learn to love ourselves will we be  
able to release our need to roam and finally appreciate our solitude. 
 With Nietzsche‘s deeply pessimistic view of the human condition in mind, 
Swanton sets out to answer the two essential virtue questions stated previously. The first, 
as we recall, queries ―What makes an action right?‖ For Nietzsche, the motive or origin 
of an action is the quintessential factor determining its value. Swanton clarifies the 
Nietzschean perspective as a ―pure ethics of virtue, if by that is meant: the virtuousness of 
the motive is both a necessary and sufficient condition of the rightness of the action 
which flows from it‖ (31). Unlike Aristotle, whose consideration of motive in 
determining rightness of action is strictly conditional,
15
 Nietzsche isolates motive from all 
other factors. Swanton explains:  
For Nietzsche, if the motivation of an altruistic act expresses self-hatred,  
                                                 
15
 In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the motive for an action must be displayed under the 
right circumstances, at the right time, to the right people, and in the right way. Otherwise, the motive is not 
a viable consideration in the determination of right action. 
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and is therefore to be understood as expressing a deep motivation to  
escape into otherness, then the altruism displayed is disvaluable, even if  
lots of people are helped, the people helped are deserving, they are helped 
 in ways which do not undermine their capacities for self-help, and so on  
and so forth. (31) 
Here, Swanton clarifies an issue regarding Nietzsche‘s definition of the words motive and 
origin, for without clarification, one could easily misinterpret his position. Motive or 
Origin of action absolutely does not refer to an individual‘s reason for action; reasons, 
according to Nietzsche, tend to disguise deeper motivations that reveal a person‘s 
weaknesses, such as fear, neediness, and resentment. Reasons are merely the skin that a 
person dons to conceal his more deeply-rooted desires; these hidden desires are the real 
well-springs of his actions. As he explains in Beyond Good and Evil, ―The decisive value 
of an action lies precisely in what is unintentional in it, while everything about it that can 
be seen, known, ‗conscious‘ still belongs to its surface and skin—which, like every skin, 
betrays something but conceals even more‖ (qtd. in Swanton 32). The value, or rightness, 
of an action, then, can only be determined once the skin is pulled back and the deep 
desires revealed. An action can be ―right‖ if and only if the desires at the heart of that 
action express some form of strength in the individual. Any action that betrays weakness 
as its ultimate source must be judged as disvaluable and lacking virtue.  
 Due to his pessimistic view of humanity and the world we inhabit, Nietzsche‘s 
response to question #2—What makes a trait of character a virtue?—also involves 
complex ontology. Swanton reminds us that Aristotelian theory addresses this question in 
a simple and direct manner: a trait of character is a virtue if it contributes to the personal 
51 
 
flourishing (eudaimonia) of the individual possessing it. Although Nietzsche‘s claim—
that actions are right if the underlying motives reveal individual strength—seems to 
imply a philosophy that is eudaimonistic, Nietzsche actually demonstrates little concern 
for individual flourishing. Instead, the locus of concern for Nietzsche is society itself—
and more particularly, society‘s slow but steady decline into mediocrity. Swanton 
summarizes Nietzsche‘s position on the crucial relationship between character traits, 
virtue, and a sick society: 
  It turns out that Nietzsche apparently admires traits which are arguably  
  sick, such as narcissistic grandiosity. How can this be? The problem is the  
  establishment of a virtue ethic for a very bad world. Patterns of behavior  
  can exhibit both strength and weakness, and the combinations which are  
  ―virtuous‖ in imperfect worlds are those which, though not good bets for  
  personal flourishing, may express or promote values which in our actual  
  world are more important. Though in utopia, eudaimonism would be our  
  virtue ethic, in actual bad worlds we need our virtue ethics to be driven by  
  another value: the escape from mediocrity. Until society can be freed of  
  the values of mediocrity, there is no hope for eudaimonia for most of us.  
  In the actual world, most of us are sick with little prospect of full health,  
  since there are too many sick people about from whom we haven‘t been  
  able to insulate ourselves. (33) 
In our sick world, therefore, we are beset with weaknesses that contribute to societal 
decline and degeneration. Through genuine strength of soul and body, an individual can 
endeavor to escape the terror of mediocrity. Since most of us are already too sick, weak, 
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or enfeebled to develop such strength, however, we can only hope that our weaknesses 
produce creative vigor. For Nietzsche, certain weaknesses can be tolerated more than 
others. The type of grandiose narcissism exhibited by Zarathustra, for example, is a 
weakness because it demonstrates a lack of self-knowledge; Zarathustra reached beyond 
his abilities and actual strength, and so failed. This weakness can also be interpreted as 
defiance, however, because Zarathustra refused to accept his human shortcomings; in this 
sense, ―that weakness also exhibits strength as defiance and can be seen as a virtue in our 
actual world since it speaks [. . .] eloquently to the non-display of, and the halting of a 
slide into decadence‖ (34). For Nietzsche, then, a trait of character can only be a virtue if 
it displays some form of strength and works actively against society‘s descent into 
mediocrity.  
Like Nietzsche, neo-Aristotelian philosopher Michael Slote (University of 
Aukland) is also concerned with an agent‘s motivation for moral action. His theory, 
however, hails back to Aristotle in a fascinating reformulation of Aristotle‘s ethics which 
he calls ―Agent-Based‖ virtue ethics. In order to understand his theory of agent-basing, 
we must first understand the points he makes regarding agent-focused and act-focused 
virtue. Since the virtues that Aristotle discusses in Nicomachean Ethics focus on the 
―inner traits and character of the virtuous individual‖ more than on what makes particular 
actions good or meritorious, the Aristotelian approach is, according to Slote, ―agent-
focused‖ rather than ―act-focused‖ (Slote Morals 178). Regardless of Aristotle‘s focus on 
the agent, however, his view is often interpreted as what Slote calls ―act-based‖ because 
the moral rightness of particular actions is not dependent upon the motives or character of 
the agent. Instead, the virtuous individual is simply to be understood as intelligent and 
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sensitive enough to agnize the right and virtuous path in each circumstance without 
relying on specific moral rules. But Slote argues that moral action cannot be perceived as 
independent of the agent or her motives. Instead, he promotes what he calls a ―radical‖ 
approach to understanding virtue: 
A more radical kind of virtue ethics would say that the ethical character of 
actions is not thus independent of how and why and by whom the actions 
are done. Rather, what is independent and fundamental is our 
understanding and evaluation of human motives and habits; and the 
evaluation of actions is entirely derivative from and dependent on what we 
have to say ethically about (the inner life of) the agents who perform these 
actions. The more radical kind of virtue ethics is thus agent-based, not 
merely, like Aristotle‘s views [ . . . ] agent-focused. (Slote Morals 178)   
In essence, then, the inner life of the person performing the actions—not merely the 
overall virtuousness of the person‘s character but, more importantly, that person‘s 
particular motives for action—are central to a genuine understanding of that person‘s 
morality. We must, in other words, tie action to character; we cannot do so, however, 
without first examining the agent‘s motivations and acknowledging that action is entirely 
derived from the ethical assessment we can make about the agent‘s inner life and 
motivation. The primacy of virtue in agent-based ethical theory, according to Slote, 
differentiates it from other ethical theories: ―Many philosophers distinguish ethical 
theories by which of the main ethical concepts—the good, the right, and virtue—they 
make explanatorily primary, and only agent-based forms of virtue ethics do treat virtue 
(claims/ facts about what is admirable or morally good in people) as explanatorily 
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primary‖ (Slote Morals 7). Although virtue also holds a position of primacy in Aristotle‘s 
theory, it is the overall virtue of the sensitive and intelligent agent that matters, not the 
motivation guiding the actions of the agent. 
 Slote further develops his agent-basing in what he classifies as ―warm‖ theories 
because they emphasize compassion (or, more generally speaking, benevolence) as the 
highest secular motive. Influenced primarily by British moral sentimentalism, these warm 
views ―build altruistic human concern explicitly into their aretaic foundations‖ (Slote 
Morals 20). According to Slote, a warm agent-based theory of ethics can be grounded in 
two different forms of benevolence: morality as universal benevolence and morality as 
caring. Essentially, Slote argues, an action can only be considered morally acceptable if  
it is motivated by good or virtuous intentions involving a sense of  benevolence or caring 
about others, ―or at least doesn‘t come from bad or inferior motivation involving malice 
or indifference to humanity‖ (38). He clarifies an important distinction here, in that the 
motivation to act must be judged as entirely separate from any set of established rules or 
expected consequences concerning the action:  
The emphasis on motivation will then be fundamental if the theory claims 
that certain forms of overall motivation are, intuitively, morally good and 
approvable in themselves and apart from their consequences or the 
possibility of grounding them in certain rules or principles. Every ethical 
theory has to start somewhere, and an agent-based morality will want to 
say that the moral goodness of (universal) benevolence or of caring about 
people is intuitively obvious and in need of no further moral grounding. 
(38) 
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Desired or anticipated results of a particular motive are clearly irrelevant in Slote‘s agent-
based theory. Motives are judged solely on ―how well they approximate to the motive of 
universal benevolence, which is the highest and best of motives‖ (Athanassoulis 
―Morals‖).  
After benevolence, Slote ranks the motive of care as essential in determining the 
morality of actions. Like benevolence, which must be universal and objective (as opposed 
to specifically directed only toward those we hold dear), we must demonstrate our love 
and care for all of humanity, not just those who are close to us. Implicit in this concept of 
virtue is also a care and concern for oneself. Anticipating the obvious criticism that we 
cannot be expected to love and care for all of humanity in the same way and to the same 
degree, however, Slote suggests a view that emphasizes a balance between ―intimate 
caring (our concern for near and dear) and humanitarian caring (our concern for people in 
general)‖ (Slote Morals 66). Imagine a father who has two children in their twenties, 
Slote asserts. One of the children is healthy, successful, and independent, while the other 
is physically disabled and dependent. If he genuinely loves both children, the father will 
care for and pay attention to both children. However, if the disabled child requires more 
attention and financial resources in order to survive, and the independent child harbors no 
resentment toward the father, then it is natural for the father to dedicate more time, 
money, and attention to the child who needs it. In other words, the father will not do what 
will produce the most overall good for both children (i.e., their ―aggregate well-being‖) 
because the disabled child simply requires more of the father‘s time and attention. A 
virtuous father, according to Slote, will intuitively recognize his disabled child‘s needs 
and act accordingly. This does not imply, however, that the virtuous father will never 
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spend time helping and caring for the healthy, independent child. Even if the disabled 
child clearly requires more attention and help, a virtuous father who truly loves both 
children will help and pay attention to the independent child at least some of the time 
despite the reality that the disabled child would benefit more from the father‘s undivided 
attention. A virtuous agent, in Slote‘s estimation, will strike a similar balance between 
intimate caring for those who are closest to him/ her and humanitarian caring for all 
people.      
As Slote indicates in chapter seven of Morals from Motives, one important 
concern is glaringly absent from his agent-based theory of ethics as it stands thus far: the 
idea of self-interest or self-concern. Self-interest, Slote argues, is actually required by 
practical reason and serves as the foundation for all moral motivation. A lack of self-
interest is, in other words, irrational, and we cannot hope to act from motives of 
benevolence or caring for others if we do not possess concern for ourselves. In this sense, 
the motive of care for others is directly derived from the motive of self-interest. To 
explicate, Slote clarifies his conception of self-interest as rooted in Aristotle‘s theory of 
Eudaimonia, or the good life. Like Aristotle, Slote believes that all people ultimately 
wish to be happy. However, we can only achieve ultimate happiness if we appreciate love 
and friendship as two of life‘s great gifts; without them, we cannot possibly experience 
true personal fulfillment. Assuming, then, that the love of friends is a requirement for 
happiness, Slote asserts that without the love of friends, we will naturally develop a sense 
of dysphoria. When we experience such feelings of joylessness, we will not be interested 
in helping others, and our actions will not likely be based on ideas of universal 
benevolence or care. By contrast, Slote explains, ―The person who wants/seeks a good, 
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rich, full life for herself may also want/seek to be of substantial help to intimates and 
other people generally in their lives, and for our remaining purposes, I shall assume that 
at least this degree of self-concern is an agent-based requirement of practical reason‖ 
(184). In an effort to counter potential objections regarding the self-centeredness of such 
a theory (one that derives the motive of concern for others entirely from the motive of 
self-interest), Slote warns that ―one‘s concern for near and dear [should] not be dwarfed 
by (typical, strong) self-concern, or, to put things slightly differently, the person‘s 
concern for friends and loved ones should motivationally counterbalance her concern for 
her own interests (as well as her humanitarianism)‖ (186). Again, the proper balancing of 
concern—between ourselves, our loved ones, and our extended community—(an ability 
that most adult rational beings intuitively possess) stands as a critical component of 
Slote‘s theory. 
It is easy to see how concern for oneself and others fits into a contemporary 
version of virtue ideology. We cannot develop genuine friendships, after all, if we have 
no concern or regard for others. And without real friendship, Aristotle reminds us, we are 
incapable of achieving the good life to which we all aspire. From this fundamental 
Aristotelian theory, however, arises yet another neo-Aristotelian theory that has been 
garnering a fair amount of recent critical attention. This new theory, commonly known as 
the ―Ethics of Care,‖ boasts eminent philosophers such as Nel Noddings, Annette Baier, 
Michael Slote, and Virginia Held.
16
 The idea that inspired the concept of ―care‖ as a 
                                                 
16
 In their most recent books, Slote (The Ethics of Care and Empathy--2007) and Held (The Ethics of Care: 
Personal, Political, and Global--2006) develop independent philosophies suggesting that the Ethics of Care 
should be understood and accepted as a stand-alone normative theory as opposed to a branch of virtue 
ethics. Since discussions of care ethics originated within the context of virtue ethics and since scholarly 
challenges to these claims have not yet been articulated, however, I have elected to treat care ethics as a 
development within the scholarly arena of virtue.   
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method of examining and assessing moral behavior, however, finds its origins not in 
philosophy but in the critically acclaimed work of psychologist Carol Gilligan. First 
published in 1982, Gilligan‘s seminal book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory 
and Women’s Development articulates her theory that men and women understand, 
approach, and treat moral problems differently. Written in response to Kohlberg‘s theory 
on the various stages of children‘s moral development, which claims that boys generally 
achieve a higher level of moral development than girls do, Gilligan sets forth an 
extensive criticism of Kohlberg‘s study methodology and assessment tools. One of her 
main arguments concerns Kohlberg‘s scoring method, which Gilligan insists favors 
principle-based reasoning over relation-based reasoning.  Kohlberg concludes that boys 
achieve higher moral development than girls; but Gilligan argues that the study is faulty 
since boys commonly concentrate on principles and girls on relations in the moral 
decision-making process. Women, she argues, ―tend to think of moral issues in terms of 
emotionally involved caring for others and connection to others, whereas most men see 
things in terms of autonomy from others and the just and rational application of rules or 
principles to problem situations‖ (Slote Ethics of Care 1). Gilligan‘s work incited a 
firestorm of critical debate in psychology, sociology, and education theory that continues 
today. It also provided a scholarly context and fertile ground for the ontogenesis of 
contemporary philosophical theories on the ethics of care. 
An esteemed philosopher and educational theorist, Nel Noddings (Ph.D. Stanford, 
1975) has produced ground-breaking research in the ethics of care and its relationship to 
education, social welfare, and family life. In her first book, Caring: A Feminine 
Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984), Noddings advances a view of ethics 
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that she terms ―feminine in the deep classical sense—rooted in receptivity, relatedness, 
and responsiveness‖ as opposed to the more masculine principles of ethics such as 
―justification, fairness, and equity‖ (1). The voice of the mother, Noddings argues, the 
voice of ―human caring and the memory of caring and being cared for, which [ . . . ] form 
the foundation of ethical response‖ has been, to a large extent, silent.  Noddings argues 
that the real source, the very foundation of all ethical behavior is located in the ―human 
affective response‖ (3). This view in no way suggests that the study of ethics should be 
maudlin, or that all consideration of logic should be abandoned during the process of 
moral reasoning. By advancing a view that for women, moral action begins with a 
longing for goodness, however, Noddings clearly departs from conventional masculine 
principles of ethics.  
In her exhaustive analysis of care ethics, Noddings identifies the universal 
feminine—the ―she‖—as the ―one-caring‖ and the universal masculine—the ―he‖—as the 
―cared-for.‖ This generic labeling does not indicate, however, that the one-caring is 
always the female and the cared-for always the male. On the contrary, Noddings 
explains: 
When actual persons are substituted for ―one-caring‖ and ―cared-for‖ in 
the basic relation, they may be both male, both female, female-male, or 
male-female. Taking relation as ontologically basic simply means that we 
recognize human encounter and affective response as a basic fact of 
human existence. (4)    
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Clearly, Noddings‘ theory posits ―relation‖ as central to the ethic since care, as she views 
it, must be reciprocal in nature. The one-caring and the cared-for, in other words, must 
meet one another morally if the relationship is genuinely to be considered a caring one. 
When we engage in a relationship of ethical caring, Noddings suggests, the ethical aspect 
of care arises naturally out of love or the inclination of  one-caring toward cared-for. 
Noddings identifies this purely human relation of caring as ―the human condition that we, 
consciously or unconsciously, perceive as ‗good.‘ It is that condition toward which we 
long and strive, and it is our longing and caring—to be in that special relation—that 
provides the motivation for us to be moral. We want to be moral in order to remain in the 
caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves as one-caring‖ (5). Clearly, the 
recognition of and desire for relatedness constitutes the heart of care ethics. This ideology 
differs significantly from purely logic-based theories of ethics that place the locus of 
value in the action or duty of an independent agent.  
 Philosophers certainly acknowledge the essentiality of desire for relatedness in 
care ethics; however, it alone does not provide the substance necessary for developing a 
successful ethic of care. On the contrary, care ethics requires that the one-caring be fully 
engaged in the relationship—fully present in her commitment to the cared-for. French 
existentialist Gabriel Marcel describes such presence in a relationship as ―disposability 
(disponibilité), the readiness to bestow and spend oneself and make oneself available‖ 
(qtd. in Noddings 19).  In such a relationship, the one-caring need not spend every 
moment with the cared-for: 
Acts at a distance bear the sign of presence: engrossment in the other, regard, 
desire for the other‘s well-being. Caring is largely reactive and responsive. 
61 
 
Perhaps it is even better characterized as receptive. The one-caring is sufficiently 
engrossed in the other to listen to him and to take pleasure or pain in what he 
recounts‖ (Noddings 19).    
Human beings possess an inherent ability to perceive when others are not wholly present 
(indisposable). When this occurs, the cared-for naturally feels unimportant and perhaps 
even non-existent  A long-distance ―one-caring,‖ therefore, may quite plausibly provide 
much more effective care than someone who is physically present but emotionally 
unengaged. 
 The idea of ―full presence‖ as explicated in the previous paragraph presents an 
excellent platform for the analysis of genuine regard in care ethics. In this sense, we 
again see how care as a feminine aspect of ethics distinguishes itself from deontological 
and consequentialist theories. Since there are no rigidly established rules to be followed 
in care ethics, the one-caring must genuinely care. In other words, the specific actions of 
one-caring—uncontrolled by fixed rule— will be various and might change from day to 
day. One-caring‘s entire approach to care, in fact, must be tailored to a particular person 
(cared-for) in a concrete situation (Noddings 24). Behaviors that might please one person 
may actually irritate or anger another. And actions that might satisfy the cared-for under 
certain conditions might nettle him under different conditions. In order for care to 
succeed, then, the one-caring must constantly analyze specific situations—including the 
general disposition of the cared-for—and make careful, judicious decisions regarding 
which action (if any) to take. Despite the multifariousness of actions chosen by one-
caring, however, her actions on a global level will be entirely predictable; if she 
genuinely cares, she will consistently act in a way that demonstrates her concern for the 
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other. Clearly, Noddings is moving away from the notion of objective morality (i.e., 
morality based on logical, rational, rule or consequence-based decision making) and 
toward the very personal heart of care: ―the conviction that an irremovable subjective 
core, a longing for goodness, provides what universality and stability there is in what it 
means to be moral‖ (Noddings 27).  
 The longing for goodness in care ethics relates specifically to the concept of 
empathy, a term that, according to Noddings, has lost its real meaning in our rational 
western society. Noddings reminds us that the notion of empathy simply means ―feeling 
with‖ another person; and this act is receptive in that I ―receive the other into myself, and 
I see and feel with the other‖ (30). She argues that our contemporary understanding of 
empathy denotes a masculine projection of self into other instead of a more feminine 
reception of other into self. This notion of empathy as projection even finds confirmation 
in the Oxford Universal Dictionary: empathy—―The power of projecting one‘s 
personality into, and so fully understanding, the object of contemplation‖ (qtd. in 
Noddings 30). Such a definition promotes the use of clichés such as ―walking a mile in 
someone else‘s shoes‖ to convey empathy, for I am projecting myself into another‘s 
position and then examining the situation in order to understand. On the contrary, 
Noddings insists, real empathy requires no analysis or projection, only receptivity and 
feeling.  
Michael Slote concurs that empathy should be a matter of reception rather than 
projection. Slote posits that empathy ―involves having the feelings of another 
(involuntarily) aroused in ourselves, as when we see another person in pain. It is as if 
their pain invades us; there is a contagion between what one person feels and what 
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another comes to feel‖ (Slote  Ethics 13). Furthermore, Slote insists that a direct 
connection exists between empathy and altruistic behavior. Someone who is in distress, 
in other words, has a much greater chance of receiving help from a person (even a 
complete stranger) who feels empathic distress when faced with the pain of others (14). 
Where one person might walk away, removing himself from the other person‘s pain or 
distress, the empathic person will in all likelihood act altruistically toward the one in 
distress. Genuine caring, then, is empathic caring, according to Slote. And it is this type 
of empathic caring that offers us a plausible standard of moral assessment.    
 As previously mentioned, care ethics requires some degree of reciprocity. One-
caring, in other words, must be met somewhere on the pathway by cared-for or the 
relation will break down. If cared-for never acknowledges the work done or time spent on 
his behalf, one-caring may begin to feel unappreciated and consequently less motivated 
to continue in her capacity as one-caring. At this point, she will generally embark upon 
one of two different courses of action: she will either stop caring entirely, or she will 
continue to care. Each of these options is accompanied by its own set of problematic 
circumstances. If the one-caring becomes completely disgusted by the other‘s lack of 
appreciation, she may quite simply stop caring. Naturally, cared-for will notice the 
change in one-caring, and will most likely state the obvious: ―You don‘t care anymore!‖ 
Although we may think that such an accusation would not bother one-caring (since she, 
in fact, has stopped caring), psychologist Paul Tillich disagrees. Instead, he argues, such 
an accusation strikes one-caring with guilt. Despite rational attempts at justification (i.e. 
―He does not appreciate my efforts‖; ―He has never said thank you or attempted to 
reciprocate my kindness in any way‖ etc.), one-caring will be begin to feel a deep sense 
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of guilt about her attitude shift. She did, after all, want to continue caring; she has merely 
found it impossible to do so. Tillich describes guilt as ontological: 
It transcends the subjective and objective. It is a constant threat in caring. 
In caring, I am turned both outward (toward the other) and inward (my 
engrossment may be reflected upon); when caring fails, I feel its loss. I 
want to care, but I do not. I feel as though I ought to behave as though I 
care, but I do not want to do this. (qtd. in Noddings 38) 
Once cared-for acknowledges her feelings of guilt, she can then determine an appropriate 
course of action (or inaction) to alleviate or learn to live with it. 
  But what happens when one-caring still genuinely cares despite cared-for‘s total 
lack of recognition, appreciation, or reciprocity in the relationship? The maintenance of 
care by one-caring under these circumstances becomes challenging in the extreme. 
Naturally, we want to be appreciated by those to whom we dedicate our care. As long as 
cared-for does not have a medical condition that completely prevents him from 
reciprocating,
17
 we expect some recognition of our efforts by cared-for. Even infants 
respond to their caregivers‘ love by looking into their eyes and smiling or giggling. This 
is enough reciprocity for one-caring, whose efforts at making the baby happy are so 
obviously satisfied. As we know, however, adults often surprise us with behaviors that 
we find difficult to explain or accept. One such behavior concerns cared-for‘s refusal, for 
whatever reason, to reciprocate or even acknowledge the efforts made in his behalf by 
                                                 
17
 Noddings does not include the extremely mentally challenged or those suffering from incapacitating 
illness in her discussion of reciprocity. Obviously, these persons are less capable of engaging in (or 
sometimes even responding to) care relations.   
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one-caring. This is where the ethics of care shows its teeth, demonstrating that it is far 
from an insubstantial theory with no real power to guide our moral behavior. When 
cared-for declines to meet one-caring somewhere on the path, one-caring can either stop 
caring (as discussed above), or continue to care in a real and genuine fashion. The latter 
course of action—and it is action, as one-caring initiates and sustains effort in cared-for‘s 
behalf—is not for the faint of heart. Continuing a course of care for someone who does 
not appreciate it or even spurns it takes stamina and fortitude. The work required in this 
level of caring is taxing not only physically but also emotionally, as one-caring must 
persist in her care despite indifference or rejection by the cared-for.  
A similar situation arises when conflict exists between what one perceives to be 
best for another and what that particular person desires; what the cared-for wants, in other 
words, and what one-caring sees as in his best interest.  In care ethics, as we know, there 
is no law or governing principle guiding decision-making. ―If I behave consistently and 
automatically by rule,‖ Noddings states, ―I cannot be said to care. My interest instead 
seems to be focused on obtaining credit for caring. I want to be considered a ―polite‖ 
person‖ (51). Conflict resolution in care ethics, then, must always involve analysis—of 
the particular situation, the individual person, and the specific nature of the conflict in 
question. We must remember that ethical caring stems from natural caring—what 
Noddings calls love or natural inclination. When conflict arises, then, Noddings suggests 
that we do not need overarching principles to guide our behavior. More effectively, she 
says, ―We turn to our memories of caring and being cared for and a picture or ideal of 
ourselves as carers. [ . . .] Ethical caring‘s great contribution is to guide action long 
enough for natural caring to be restored and for people once again to interact with mutual 
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and spontaneous regard‖ (187). We (consciously or unconsciously) perceive caring 
relations as ―good‖; and since we inherently have a desire or longing to be in such a 
special caring relation, we are motivated to be moral.   
In this chapter, I have offered a summary and explanation of compelling  neo-
Aristotelian scholarly theories. I do not suggest for a moment that this chapter presents a 
comprehensive analysis of contemporary virtue theory, or that my discussion represents 
the philosophy of any particular scholar in its entirety. On the contrary, I have included 
only the theories that I believe will offer the most valuable insights into my examination 
of Shakespeare‘s tragedies through a neo-Aristotelian lens. And so, to that end, the next 
chapter analyzes the various ways that contemporary virtue ethics theory may influence a 
reading of Shakespeare‘s great tragedy of deception, revenge, and lost love—Othello.   
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4 Othello: ―Chaos is come‖ 
 
In this chapter, I will demonstrate how Aristotelian and neo-Aristotelian 
examinations of Shakespeare‘s Othello offer viable and entirely new ways for us to read 
and understand three of the play‘s main characters, Othello, Iago, and Emilia. First, I plan 
to reevaluate the title character, Othello, offering an analysis that calls into question the 
common interpretation of Othello as a sympathetic character. In order to do this, I will 
examine his actions and behaviors through an Aristotelian ethical lens. Next, I will 
analyze Iago‘s motives and character from a neo-Aristotelian perspective, employing 
arguments by Swanton and Nietzsche concerning the important connection between 
motive and inner character. Here, I will offer justification for my argument that Iago is a 
classic example of Nietzsche‘s ―sick animal.‖ And finally, I will explore Emilia‘s 
behaviors and character by employing neo-Aristotelian philosopher Michael Slote‘s 
Agent-Based ethical theory. In this section, I will suggest that only this type of neo-
Aristotelian reading of Emilia‘s character sufficiently addresses the various complexities 
and seeming contradictions between her actions, motives, desires, and overall virtue. 
The character of Othello has always intrigued me because of how sympathetically 
he seems to be portrayed by Shakespeare. Despite the very real fact that he murders 
Desdemona in cold blood, readers traditionally feel great pity for Othello. The victim of 
Iago‘s evil machinations, Othello kills Desdemona in order to preserve his honor. Far 
from being an act of malicious vengeance, however, the very thought of murdering 
Desdemona causes Othello dire emotional pain; his feelings of ambivalence toward her 
and ―the cause‖ he feels he must defend create tremendous inner conflict for him. 
Consider his angst as he approaches the sleeping Desdemona, knowing that he has come 
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to murder her: ―It is the cause, it is the cause, my soul. / Let me not name it to you, you 
chaste stars, / It is the cause. Yet I‘ll not shed her blood, / Nor scar that whiter skin of 
hers than snow, / And smooth as monumental alabaster. / Yet she must die, else she‘ll 
betray more men. / [ . . . ] / [He kisses her.]  O balmy breath, that dost almost persuade / 
Justice to break her sword‖ 18 (V. i. 1-6; 16-17). Only a completely callous reader could 
fail to be moved by the pathos of this scene. We feel pity for Othello because we like him 
and know that he has been maliciously misled by Iago. Thoroughly convinced that he has 
been cuckolded by Desdemona and his first lieutenant, Othello feels that he must murder 
Desdemona in order to preserve his honor. And despite the trauma that we experience 
upon witnessing the rash and unjust murder of the innocent Desdemona, Othello remains 
a sympathetic figure. We do not judge Othello as malevolent or depraved; instead, we 
view him as witless and gullible—in the words of Emilia, a ―dull Moor,‖ a ―dolt, as 
ignorant as dirt‖ (V ii. 163; 188). As a mere dupe of Iago‘s, Othello wins our sympathy. 
We know that his grief upon realizing his enormous folly is genuine; we believe his self-
characterization as ―one whose subdued eyes, / Albeit unused to the melting mood, / 
Drops tears as fast as the Arabian trees / Their med‘cinable gum‖ (V ii. 347-50). There is 
no question that audiences assess Othello‘s character as fully human, significantly 
flawed, and thoroughly likeable. An examination of this widely sympathetic character 
through the lens of Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics, however, reveals a man who 
completely lacks important moral and intellectual virtues and seems to possess no sense 
of moderation (i.e. the Golden Mean). Is this a character deserving of our loyalty and 
sympathy? I argue that Aristotle would answer definitively no.  
                                                 
18
 All Shakespearian quotations are taken from The Complete Signet Classic Shakespeare. Ed Sylvan 
Barnet. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972. 
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 Let us begin with Aristotle‘s moral virtues, several of which Othello decidedly 
lacks. We learn in Book IV of the Nicomachean Ethics that the moral virtue Patience 
must be understood as an intermediate state between irascibility and lack of spirit:  
The man who gets angry at the right things and with the right people, and  
also in the right way and at the right time and for the right length of time,  
is commended; so this person will be patient, inasmuch as patience is 
commendable, because a patient person tends to be unperturbed and not 
carried away by his feelings, but indignant only in the way and on the 
grounds and for the length of time that his principle prescribes [. . .] The 
patient man is not revengeful; he is more inclined to be forgiving. (v. 
1125b 31-37) 
Now let us examine Othello‘s temperament through the Nicomachean virtue lens. When 
we initially meet Othello, he is calm, rational, and unflappable—despite the fact that he 
has just secretly married Senator Brabantio‘s daughter, Desdemona. These qualities are 
essential to Othello‘s effectiveness as a general in the Venetian army, especially now that 
they are at war with the Ottoman Turks. Just moments after exchanging vows with 
Desdemona, Othello is called to the Duke‘s palace to discuss military strategy against the 
advance of the Turkish fleet. As soon as he arrives, however, Brabantio launches a verbal 
attack against Othello, laden with hostile accusations that Othello stole his daughter and 
practiced black magic upon her. Answering the barrage against him with equanimity, 
Othello explains that he ―won‖ Brabantio‘s daughter with tales of his battles and 
dangerous travels in exotic lands, and suggests that they call upon her to speak for 
herself. Far from irascible, Othello counters Brabantio‘s hysteria with composure and 
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presence of mind. As readers, we admire his placid temperament and respect his ability to 
maintain control of a potentially volatile situation. It is important to note, however, that 
Othello‘s case is aided by Venetian law and protocol. Upon hearing the accusations 
against Othello, the Duke immediately calls upon the alleged victim, Desdemona, to 
provide evidence in the form of testimony. When she assures the senate that her love for 
Othello is genuine, the entire case against him is abruptly dismissed. As John Gronbeck-
Tedesco suggests in ―Morality, Ethics, and the Failure of Love in Shakespeare‘s 
Othello,”  ―In the body of the Senate, moral principle and procedural ethics drive a 
wedge between what Brabantio wants and what he wills‖ (261). He wants Othello to be 
arrested for stealing his daughter and practicing black magic on her. As a member of the 
Senate, however, he knows that he must accept the evidence provided by Desdemona and 
accede to the decision of the ruling body. Thus, Othello is given the benefit of a fair and 
rational legal system; and it is precisely this system that allows Othello to respond to 
Brabantio‘s hysteria with patience and reason.    
 Despite his seemingly patient and rational persona, however, we soon begin to 
realize that Othello lacks both the education and the moral fortitude to withstand Iago‘s 
vicious entrapment. He is, as we recall, a Moor—an outsider to Venetian culture and 
education—who has spent most of his life as a soldier, fighting battles against Turks, 
barbarians, and savages. He has had the benefit of neither formal education in the arts and 
philosophy, which would have enabled him to develop sufficient intellectual virtue, nor 
the leisure time necessary to establish and practice good moral habits. In Book II of 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states: 
  Virtue, then, is of two kinds, intellectual and moral. Intellectual virtue  
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  owes both its inception and its growth chiefly to instruction, and for this  
  very reason needs time and experience. Moral goodness, on the other  
  hand, is the result of habit, from which it has actually got its name, being a  
  slight modification of the word ethos. This fact makes it obvious that none  
  of the moral virtues is engendered in us by nature, since nothing that is  
  what it is by nature can be made to behave differently by habituation. For  
  instance, a stone, which has a natural tendency downwards, cannot be  
  habituated to rise, however often you try to train it by throwing it into the  
  air; nor can you train fire to burn downwards; nor can anything else that  
  has any other natural tendency be trained to depart from it. The moral  
  virtues, then, are engendered in us neither by nor contrary to nature; we  
  are constituted by nature to receive them, but their full development in us  
  is due to habit. (i. 1103a 14-26) 
Early in the play, Othello reminds us of his status as an outsider to Venetian manners and 
education: ―Rude am I in my speech, / And little blessed with the soft phrase of peace, / 
For since these arms of mine had seven years‘ pith / Till now some nine moons wasted, 
they have used /  Their dearest action in the tented field; / And little of this great world 
can I speak / More than pertains to feats of broils and battle; / And therefore little shall I 
grace my cause / In speaking for myself‖ (I. iii.  81-89). Clearly, Othello has not been 
polishing his language skills, contemplating great works of art and literature, or 
developing mathematical theorems. Instead, he has been leading a life of excitement and 
adventure beyond the outer limits of civilization. We learn more about these escapades 
when Othello explains to the Duke how he began his courtship of Desdemona. Senator 
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Brabantio had often encouraged Othello to share the stories of his exciting life in the 
fields of battle: ―Of hairbreadth scapes i‘ th‘ imminent deadly breach, / Of being taken by 
the insolent foe / And sold to slavery, of my redemption thence / And portance in my 
travel‘s history, / [ . . . ] /And of the Cannibals that each other eat, / The Anthropophagi, 
and men whose heads / Grew beneath their shoulders‖ (I. iii. 135-38; 42-44). 
Desdemona‘s unabashed interest in these stories served as the catalyst for their 
relationship. Othello is neither a polished intellectual nor a member of high society. 
Although he has won the love of a senator‘s daughter, he possesses neither the education 
nor the culture necessary to understand the sophisticated world she inhabits. He is 
therefore unprepared both morally and intellectually to escape Iago‘s cunning and 
malicious trammel.  
 From an Aristotelian moral perspective, Othello‘s behavior in Acts III - V can be 
classified as excessive (and therefore lacking virtue) in two major spheres of action or 
feeling: rashness and irascibility. Since we have already begun our discussion of 
Othello‘s ―seeming‖ patience, we will begin there. The patient and rational Othello of 
Act I—surrounded by reasonable people  (with the notable exception of Brabantio) who 
respect and abide by the Venetian law—descends quickly and irrevocably into a jealousy-
induced madness in Acts III through V. 
 Othello‘s initial lapse in patience occurs on his first night in Cyprus, after he is 
called by the alarm bell to quell Cassio‘s bibulous assault on Governor Montano. 
Although he had been given a fair chance to explain his own actions to the Senate in 
Venice, Othello now has little interest in learning more than ―How this foul rout began, 
who set it on‖ (II. iii. 207). Eager to get back to bed, where his new bride awaits his 
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return, Othello investigates the situation only enough to know that Cassio instigated the 
violence. Iago‘s report of events is entirely sufficient to have Cassio cashiered. ―Unlike 
the Venetian Senate that finds ways to divine evidence even in the moment of 
deliberation, [ . . . ] Othello acts against Cassio by using Iago‘s reputation as the surrogate 
for evidence‖ (Gronbeck-Tedesco 264). Surely, if the Duke and senators had used the 
highly respected senator Brabantio‘s testimony against Othello as their only evidence, 
Othello would be in prison instead of being commissioned as general of the Venetian 
army in Cyprus. But Othello is not thinking about justice or due process for Cassio; on 
the contrary, he impatiently administers Cassio‘s harsh punishment—―Cassio, I love thee; 
/ But never more be officer of mine‖—so that he can return to the arms of his beautiful 
new bride (II. iii. 246-47).  
 In his discussion of the moral virtue Patience, Aristotle explains that ―The patient 
man is not revengeful; he is more inclined to be forgiving‖ (IV. v. 1126a 38). Clearly, 
Othello loses every scintilla of patience, as well as all attendant rational behaviors, as 
Iago systematically and demonically works on his psyche throughout Acts III and IV. 
When Iago initially attempts to lure Othello into his trap by suggesting Desdemona‘s 
potential unfaithfulness, Othello still seems to be the calm and rational husband of Act I. 
In response to Iago‘s first insinuation about Desdemona‘s infidelity, Othello responds 
with composure and self-confidence: ― ‘Tis not to make me jealous / To say my wife is 
fair, feeds well, loves company / Is free of speech, sings, plays, and dances; / Where 
virtue is, these are more virtuous. / Nor from mine own weak merits will I draw / The 
smallest fear or doubt of her revolt, / For she had eyes and chose me. No, Iago; / I‘ll see 
before I doubt; when I doubt, prove; / And on the proof there is no more but this: / Away 
74 
 
at once with love or jealousy!‖ (III. iii. 183-93). But this façade of self-assurance soon 
fades away, revealing Othello‘s true character. In fact, just a few short moments after this 
beautiful testament to trust and fidelity, Othello is already beginning to question 
Desdemona‘s faithfulness: ―I do not think but Desdemona‘s honest‖ (III. iii. 225). And 
only 40 lines later, Iago has completely convinced Othello that he has been cuckolded: 
―She‘s gone. I am abused, and my relief / Must be to loathe her. O curse of marriage!‖ 
(III. iii. 265-66). Clearly, Othello lacks the self-confidence that he feigned in his earlier 
conversation with Iago and his confrontation with Brabantio in Venice. Iago‘s insidious 
manipulation of Othello certainly lies at the heart of Othello‘s confusion and loss of trust 
in his wife. Instead of taking action that a patient person would, however, (starting with 
an essential discussion with Desdemona) Othello becomes irascible and revengeful. As 
Aristotle reminds us in his theory of the Golden Mean, patience is a virtue existing as the 
mean between two extremes: lack of spirit (a deficiency) and irascibility (an excess). 
―Irascible people get angry quickly and with the wrong people and at the wrong things 
and too violently, but they stop quickly, and this is the best thing about them‖ (Aristotle 
IV. v. 1126a 14-16). Othello behaves in an indisputably irascible fashion—directing his 
anger and violence toward the wrong people. Has Desdemona given Othello any reason 
at all to believe that she is unfaithful? The answer, of course, is no. Iago maliciously 
fabricates the entire affair, using only ridiculous stories of a handkerchief and a sleep-
talking Cassio as evidence. Tragically, however, Othello lacks the moral fortitude to 
handle Iago‘s pernicious assault against his character. His reaction is therefore visceral 
instead of rational, irascible rather than patient.  
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 In Act III, scene iii, Othello‘s ire has been raised by Iago‘s accusation, but he has 
not yet decided to take violent action. Demanding ―ocular proof‖ that Desdemona is 
unfaithful, warning Iago that—if he cannot provide such evidence, he ―hadst been better 
have been born a dog / Than answer my waked wrath,‖ Othello seems to be properly 
directing his anger at Iago (III. iii. 358-59). The cunning Iago immediately dismisses 
Othello‘s demand, however, suggesting that ocular proof would be impossible unless 
Othello were willing to ―grossly gape on‖ and ―behold her [Desdemona] topped‖ (III. iii. 
391-92).  This vulgar proposition naturally exacerbates Othello‘s fragile emotional state, 
adequately preparing him for Iago‘s fabricated story about Cassio: ―In sleep I heard him 
[Cassio] say, ‗Sweet Desdemona, / Let us be wary, let us hide our loves!‘ / [ . . . ] /  Then 
kiss me hard, / As if he plucked up kisses by the roots / That grew upon my lips; laid his 
leg o‘er my thigh / And sigh, and kiss, and then cry, ‗Cursed fate / That gave thee to the 
Moor!‘ (III. iii. 413- 23). Surely, a rational individual would understand that this tale 
lacks the substance requisite to the kind of evidence Othello is seeking.  
His irascibility also causes him to seek vengeance very quickly against his wife 
and Cassio; so, although his temper passes quickly and the Othello at the end of the play 
once again seems calm and deliberate, it is too late: for he has already ―killed the 
sweetest innocent / That e‘er did lift up eye‖ (V. ii. 298-99). Unlike Aristotle‘s ―patient 
man,‖ who—far from engaging his time and energy in vengeful causes—is more likely to 
forgive his wrong-doers, Othello plans a bloody course of revenge against Desdemona  
that very night: ―I will chop her into messes! Cuckold me! / [ . . . ] / I‘ll not expostulate 
with her, lest her body and beauty / unprovide my mind again. This night, Iago!‖ (IV. i. 
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200; 205-6). Othello has easily shed all semblance of patience, and he is resolute about 
the rash and fatal plan he has devised. 
According to Aristotle, the virtue of courage is the mean between the vices of 
rashness, which is an excess, and cowardice, which is a deficiency. He explains in Book 
III of Nicomachean Ethics: 
  The man who exceeds in confidence about things that are fearful is rash.  
  The rash man is considered to be both a boaster and a pretender to  
  courage; at any rate he wishes to seem as the courageous man really is in  
  his attitude towards fearful situations, and therefore imitates him where he  
  can. Hence such people are usually cowardly as well as rash, because  
  while they make a show of confidence when circumstances permit, they  
  cannot face anything fearful. (vii. 1115b 28-33)   
Othello‘s behavior is indisputably rash. By the end of the third scene in Act three, Iago 
has thoroughly deceived Othello into believing that Desdemona has cuckolded him. And 
he has accomplished this with absolutely no solid proof of her infidelity—only 
―imputation and strong circumstances‖ (III. iii. 404-405). If he were truly courageous, 
Othello would confront and question Desdemona about his suspicions. This would be the  
courageous approach because it would require that Othello face a fearful situation: the 
possibility that his new wife would admit her affair with Cassio. Othello chooses not to 
face this frightening possibility, however, precisely because he has rashly decided to 
murder her instead: ―Damn her, lewd minx! O, damn her! / Damn her! / Come [Iago], go 
with me apart. I will withdraw / To furnish me with some swift means of death / For the 
fair devil‖ (III. iii. 472-475).  He rashly decides to murder Desdemona that very night 
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instead of trying to muster the courage to confront her with his suspicions. Othello‘s 
actions, according to Nicomachean standards, are rash because he makes a show of 
confidence but cannot actually face a fearful situation. 
 Once Othello has resolved to murder Desdemona, he rejects the possibility that he 
could be mistaken about her infidelity. Despite her impassioned protestations of 
innocence, Othello remains steadfast in his terrible mission, overconfidently approaching 
the murder as an honor killing. Examination of his behavior through an Aristotelian lens 
again suggests that Othello is rash because he ―exceeds in confidence‖ about something 
that is fearful (III. vii. 1115b 28). The murder scene (Act V, scene ii) is painful precisely 
because the audience knows that Othello is about to perpetrate an egregious and 
completely unwarranted act, and that he is too committed to ―the cause‖ to be stopped. 
Desdemona certainly does her best to save herself, but Othello is executing a plan of 
action from which he cannot be coaxed: 
 Desdemona: O, banish me, my lord, but kill me not! 
 Othello: Down, strumpet! 
 Desdemona: Kill me tomorrow; let me live tonight! 
 Othello: Nay, if you strive— 
 Desdemona: But half an hour! 
 Othello:  Being done, there is no pause. 
 Desdemona: But while I say one prayer! 
 Othello:   It is too late. 
 Smothers her. 
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Othello exhibits indisputably rash behavior, both because he lacks the courage to ask 
Desdemona in a calm and rational way whether or not she has been faithful to him, and 
because he becomes overconfident about the justice of what he considers a sacrificial 
murder.  
Othello does not experience his tragic fall based solely on his lack of moral 
virtues, however; his gross deficiency of what Aristotle calls the Intellectual Virtues also 
greatly contributes to his fall. I begin with Prudence, or practical common sense 
(phronēsis), an intellectual virtue that is essential, according to Aristotle, in making 
decisions regarding how one‘s conduct will affect his or her primary objective—
eudaimonia (the good life). In other words, since we seek the good life as our ultimate 
goal, the prudent person will make decisions that will most likely produce the good life 
for him or herself. Aristotle contends that 
  Prudence is concerned with human goods, i.e. things about which  
  deliberation is possible; for we hold that it is the function of the prudent  
  man to deliberate well; and nobody deliberates about things that cannot be  
  otherwise, or that are not means to an end, and that end a practical good.
19
  
  And the man who is good at deliberation generally is the one who can aim,  
  by the help of his calculation, at the best of the goods attainable by man.  
  (Aristotle VI. vii. 1141b 9-14) 
Although Othello may indeed make prudent military decisions as general of the Venetian 
army, he unfortunately lacks prudence in his personal affairs. In fact, in a delicate 
situation that absolutely requires rational deliberation, Othello unthinkingly interprets 
every trifle that Iago invents as hard evidence against Desdemona. And, as we know from  
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 i.e. one that can be attained in action. (Editor‘s note) 
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our discussion of Othello‘s rash behavior, his failure to deliberate before making the 
decision to murder Desdemona indicates that his primary concern at the time was 
revenge, not attainment of the good life (eudaimonia).  
Othello actually has many opportunities to deliberate about the supposed (and 
highly unlikely) affair between Desdemona and Cassio. He is, after all, being spoon-fed 
―evidence‖ by one source—Iago—and that one source is able to provide only conjecture 
and wild tales, no substantive proof at all. Why would a man who exercises such a high 
degree of prudence in his professional life abandon that intellectual virtue when it really 
mattered? Had he sincerely deliberated about Iago‘s outrageous accusations, had he 
engaged in rigorous intellectual analysis of the situation, he would have realized that 
Iago‘s allegations were impossible. When would Desdemona have had the time for an 
affair? She and Othello are newly married; their wedding night is interrupted by a call 
from the Duke to attend a meeting that Cassio is attending as well. They all depart that 
very night for Cypress, and Cassio is not aboard Desdemona‘s ship. On the first night in 
Cypress, Othello is again called away from his bride to settle a dispute between Governor 
Montano and the drunken first lieutenant, Cassio. Had Othello thought this through, he 
would have understood that an affair between Cassio and Desdemona would have been 
extremely implausible, if not entirely impossible. Had he devoted some quality time to 
deliberating on Iago‘s charges, he would have realized that ―trifles light as air‖ should 
never become ―confirmations strong as proofs of Holy Writ‖ (III. iii. 319-21). But 
Othello does not deliberate, does not engage in intellectual analysis, does not pose 
rational investigative questions; instead, he allows himself to be manipulated, poisoned, 
and entrapped by Iago. His jealousy ―burns like the mines of sulfur,‖ causing him to fall 
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into trances and lose all semblance of self-control. If it is the mark of a prudent person to 
have ―deliberated well,‖ as Aristotle suggests, then we cannot possibly attribute prudence 
to Othello. 
In examining Othello‘s dearth of Aristotelian intellectual virtue, we must consider 
three additional virtues, all of which relate in various ways to deliberation: Intuition, 
Resourcefulness, and Understanding. In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle explains that 
Intuition refers to ―the immediate perception of truth‖ (VI. vi. 1141a note). Not only does 
Othello fail to perceive immediately that Iago is lying to him; he never perceives the truth 
at all! Although he has just married the beautiful, sweet, and pure Desdemona, Othello 
lacks the intuitive capabilities to see through Iago‘s cruel verbal assaults against his new 
bride. This egregious lack of perceptiveness on Othello‘s part corresponds directly with 
the total absence of another intellectual virtue, Resourcefulness. This particular virtue is a 
kind of deliberation that involves reason; as Aristotle explains, it concerns ―correctness of 
thinking‖ and a ―species of correctness of deliberation‖ (VI. ix. 1142b 12; 17). 
Obviously, Othello exercises no correctness of thinking or deliberation. As noted above, 
Othello chooses not to engage in any level of serious deliberation on the matter, opting 
instead to crowd his mind with Iago‘s outrageous tales of spousal deception. With Iago as 
his sole resource, and with no inclination toward reason or correct deliberation, Othello 
plunges head first into the demi-devil‘s sinister trap. Because he refuses to exercise one 
iota of resourcefulness, he becomes very easy prey for the villainous Iago.  
Neither while he is exposing himself to Iago‘s abuse, nor after the enormity of his 
mistake is revealed does Othello understand the events that have transpired because his 
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failure to deliberate about Iago‘s accusations in a meaningful way prevents him from 
reaching a true understanding. Aristotle teaches that  
Understanding is concerned not with things that are eternal and  
immutable, nor with any and every thing that comes into being, but with  
matters that may cause perplexity and call for deliberation. Hence its  
sphere is the same as prudence; but understanding and prudence are not  
the same, because prudence is imperative (since its end is what one should  
or should not do), and understanding only makes judgments.  
Understanding, then, is neither the possession nor the acquisition of  
prudence; but just as the act of learning is called understanding when one  
exercises the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging about another  
person‘s account of matters within the scope of prudence (and judging  
about it rightly because ―well‖ is equivalent to ―rightly‖), the act of  
judging is called understanding. (VI. x. 1143a 4-16) 
Surely Othello‘s predicament causes perplexity and calls for deliberation. As previously 
indicated, however, Othello‘s bewilderment does not spur him to deliberation as it 
should. Instead, it merely causes him to become increasingly unstable and vulnerable as 
he spirals toward the commission of his ultimately tragic actions. Even after murdering 
Desdemona and learning that she was indeed ―the sweetest innocent / That e‘er did lift up 
eye‖ (V. ii. 198-99), Othello still does not understand what has transpired. He asks 
Cassio: ―Will you, I pray, demand that demi-devil / Why he hath thus ensnared my soul 
and body?‖ He realizes that he was deceived by Iago, but he clearly has no conception of 
why or how Iago staged the deception. Nor does Iago provide him (or the audience) with 
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a satisfying answer. Choosing a stoic acceptance of his torture and execution without 
explaining his actions, Iago defiantly responds: ―Demand me nothing. What you know, 
you know. / From this time forth I never will speak word‖ (V. ii. 300-301; 302-303). 
Unlike some of Shakespeare‘s other notorious villains, Iago offers no apology or vaulting 
final speech.  
 Using Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics as a theoretical lens, therefore, we cannot 
possibly interpret Othello‘s character as sympathetic. He is foolish and even pathetic, 
perhaps, but not sympathetic, as he lacks the moral and intellectual fortitude necessary to 
earn our sympathy. A brief examination of Othello‘s character through the lens of the 
other two major systems of ethics (Deontology and Consequentialism
20
) similarly 
condemns his actions, but for different reasons. From a deontological perspective, several 
main tenets of moral assessment must be considered: First, the locus of value of an act is 
in the act or type of act itself, not in the agent‘s motivation for action or the prospective 
consequence of the action.  Additionally, according to Immanuel Kant‘s Supreme 
Principle of Morality, all morality is based on reason as opposed to emotion, feeling, 
sympathy, or self-interest. And finally, the first formulation of the Categorical Imperative 
states that for an action to have moral worth, the agent must be able to will that the action 
become a universal law. An assessment of Othello‘s character through a deontological 
lens requires evaluation of three relevant factors: Othello‘s gullible acceptance of Iago‘s 
outrageous prevarications, his conspiracy with Iago to murder Cassio, and his murder of 
Desdemona. On all counts, a deontological analysis would condemn Othello‘s actions. 
His naïve acceptance of Iago‘s fabrications about Desdemona and Cassio lies in stark 
contrast to Kant‘s Supreme Principle of Morality, which insists that objective reason 
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 See dissertation Introduction for a full explanation of Deontological and Consequentialist Ethics. 
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must be the basis for all moral action. As demonstrated through my Aristotelian analysis 
of Othello‘s actions, reason has nothing at all to do with Othello‘s decisions to believe 
Iago. Instead, emotion and self-interest (i.e., a desire to preserve his honor at all costs) 
serve as the foundation for his gullibility. Regarding Othello‘s other significant actions—
conspiring to kill Cassio and murdering Desdemona: clearly, these actions in and of 
themselves must be condemned. If the locus of value of an act is indeed in the act or type 
of act itself (not the potential consequence), there can be no justification for conspiring to 
murder or for murdering in cold blood. Likewise, it is inconceivable that such acts could 
or should ever be universalized. We can conclude, then, that a deontological analysis 
would roundly and emphatically censure Othello‘s actions. 
 Although a Consequentialist moral examination of Othello‘s character may 
initially seem a bit more forgiving than its Deontological and Aristotelian counterparts, it 
is clear that even the strictest Utilitarians would ultimately fail to find justification for his 
actions. Teleological moral systems, as we recall, place the locus of an action‘s value in 
both the quantity and quality of benefit derived from it. How many people, in other 
words, have benefited from the action? Have people experienced a greater benefit from 
the action than if that action had not been performed at all? And have people benefited 
from this action more than they would have benefited from a different action? In fairness 
to Othello‘s (very wrong-headed and misguided) reasons for murdering Desdemona, a 
consequentialist examination would first look at Othello‘s intentions. Why did he decide 
to murder her? Was it out of spite, anger, or hatred? Clearly not. As we painfully observe 
in the murder scene, Othello passionately loves Desdemona. He smells her as she sleeps, 
kisses her, speaks of her beauty, cries, and shamelessly admits the agony he is 
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experiencing in carrying out this deed. Far from a murder born out of hatred or spite, this 
(to Othello) is a sacrifice—an honor killing. And regarding consequences, Othello firmly 
believes that by murdering Desdemona he will be sparing many more men the pain and 
dishonor of being cuckolded by her. In other words, her death—in Othello‘s opinion—
will benefit many people, whereas her continued life will cause only heartbreak and 
misery, not only to Othello, but to the many men she will undoubtedly cuckold in the 
future. Unlike deontological and Aristotelian analyses, consequentialism would certainly 
look at prospective outcome before passing judgment. An important element of the 
consequentialist theory, however, involves consideration of harm done vs. benefit 
received. Concerning this particular case, in other words, a consequentialist would weigh 
the harm done by Desdemona‘s murder against the benefit received by Othello and the 
imaginary men of the future who will allegedly avoid victimization by her infidelity. 
Clearly, the harm caused by a murder would preponderate any potential damage caused 
by future infidelity.  
Additionally, we must remember that in teleological ethical systems, intended or 
prospective outcomes are not as important as actual results. In the case of Desdemona‘s 
murder, therefore—regardless of Othello‘s reasons or desired consequences—the truth of 
the matter is that Othello‘s basis for action was very flawed and he murdered an innocent 
person. In reality, therefore, her death could not possibly have benefited anyone. The 
same consequentialist reasoning can be applied to Othello‘s involvement in the 
conspiracy to murder Cassio. Since Othello is basing his actions on wildly inaccurate 
information, no possible good can result from this innocent man‘s murder. Ultimately, 
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then, Othello‘s actions would be entirely condemned by a teleological analysis, though 
for different reasons than the other moral systems.  
Othello‘s character lends itself nicely to a variety of rich critical interpretations 
because Shakespeare strategically positions him as both a formidable military leader and 
a witless dupe; a doting husband and a man who is willing to kill to preserve his honor. 
Universally characterized as one of the great Shakespearian villains, on the other hand, 
Iago‘s character does not inspire critical debate about whether or not he is evil. Instead, 
scholars generally accede to Iago‘s iniquity, and focus their efforts either on how he 
employs his cunning in the service of ensnaring those he claims to love, or on what 
factors (psychological, practical, or otherwise) might motivate his actions. An 
introduction of neo-Aristotelian scholarship is therefore worthwhile at this point, as two 
of the movement‘s foremost scholars have developed theories that lend themselves quite 
effectively to an examination of Iago‘s character.   
 I begin with Christine Swanton, professor of philosophy at the University of 
Auckland, whose work with virtue ethics has been the focus of her scholarly endeavors 
for over twenty years. In examining virtue—or lack thereof—as a factor motivating 
behavior, Swanton argues that Aristotle should not be the sole paradigm from which we 
build current theories of virtue ethics. Other philosophers have, after all, concerned 
themselves in various ways with the idea of virtue. Friedrich Nietzsche, for example, 
discusses right action and virtuous traits of character in three of his greatest philosophical 
works: On the Genealogy of Morality, Beyond Good and Evil, and Thus Spake 
Zarathustra. Based on his examination of character and right action in these seminal 
works, Swanton has developed what she terms an ―Outline of Nietzschean Virtue Ethics.‖ 
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If Nietzsche had been interested specifically in Virtue Ethics, in other words, Swanton 
claims that he would have had quite distinctive answers to the questions ―What makes an 
action right?‖ and ―What makes a trait of character a virtue?‖ (Swanton ―Outline‖ 29). 
My present objective is to analyze Iago‘s character through the Nietzschean virtue lens 
that Swanton has formulated. 
 Swanton begins her analysis with a reminder of Nietzsche‘s deeply pessimistic 
view of the human condition, which finds its basis in the idea that mankind‘s normal state 
is one of sickness. He says in On the Genealogy of Morality: ―For man is more sick, 
uncertain, changeable, indeterminate, than any other animal . . . he is the sick animal.  
[ . . . ] The more normal sickness becomes among men—and we cannot deny its 
normality—the higher should be the honor accorded the rare cases of great power of soul 
and body, man‘s lucky hits‖ (qtd. in Swanton ―Outline‖ 29). A large majority of us are, in 
other words, very fragile and predisposed to sickness. This natural human condition, 
according to Nietzsche, stems from our feelings of general impotence. We have an 
insatiable desire to succeed, so we dare to try; but we invariably meet with obstacles and 
reverses that cause us to fail. A sense of self-loathing is born from this constant failure, 
and self-loathing breeds resentment and desire for revenge. This sick individual, as we 
can imagine, is a sad figure for whom successful marriage is impossible. He consistently 
follows ―the path to unhappiness,‖ abandons the society of men, and ―can‘t go back to the 
pity of men‖ (Nietzsche qtd. in Swanton ―Outline‖ 29). Only the few truly strong persons 
among us constitute the ideal type—the ones who can resist succumbing to sickness, 
failure, and self-loathing.  
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Recognizing our human limits, the rest of us should not even attempt to be 
virtuous beyond our ability. For example, when a strong person suffers an insult or 
injury, he is able to forget it and move on with his life; he can ―shake off with a single 
shrug many vermin that eat deep into others‖ (Nietzsche GM I:11). When more enfeebled 
individuals attempt to forget an injury, however, they are really only capable of 
repressing their anger. Such repression causes them to harbor the anger deep within their 
subconscious until it ultimately surfaces, manifesting itself in some ugly or vicious 
behavior. Even if repression does not result in poisonous action, the weak should never 
attempt to turn the other cheek and forget the wrongs done to them. If they do, according 
to Nietzsche, other weak individuals will reward the gesture by exploiting their 
vulnerability—trampling on them and hurting them even more. Likewise, only the strong 
can acquire the virtue of lying well because it requires a true understanding of oneself 
and those to whom the lie will be told. A weak person who tells a lie is characteristically 
lazy, cowardly, and self-serving; as such, he is usually caught in the lie because he 
underestimates the intelligence or perceptiveness of those to whom he lies (Swanton 30).  
In essence, then, Nietzsche has developed a virtue ethic that pertains only to the select— 
the ideal type—the strong. The vast majority of society, however, should not hope to 
reach beyond their standard enfeebled positions to attain the virtues requisite to the 
strong.  This is a far cry from the Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia, wherein we are all 
born completely prepared to receive the virtues.  
 Viewed from this perspective, Iago is a classic Nietzschean sick animal: 
uncertain, changeable, and indeterminate. Clearly predisposed to weakness and fragility, 
Iago neither sets his sights on an Aristotelian notion of eudaimonia nor demonstrates any 
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level of preparation to receive the virtues. Instead, Iago‘s actions reveal his inner feelings 
of impotence and self-loathing. Through soliloquy and dialogue with Roderigo, we learn 
that Iago has failed to achieve career success via the promotion that he believes he 
deserved.  In a decision that Iago interprets as both unwarranted and grossly unjust,  
Othello has promoted Cassio—an arithmetician from Florence— ―That never set a 
squadron in the field, / Nor the division of a battle knows / More than a spinster‖ to the 
position of First Lieutenant over Iago (I. i. 19-21). Cassio‘s promotion has left Iago—
who had demonstrated his skills on the battlefield for years—to serve as Othello‘s 
standard-bearer.  There can be no mistaking Iago‘s bitterness here. Receiving a well-
deserved promotion to First Lieutenant is obviously of exceptional importance to Iago. 
When he is passed over, therefore, and a man with virtually no military experience is 
chosen for the position, Iago becomes umbrageous.  
We can, to a certain extent, understand Iago‘s sense of indignation. After all, who 
among us has not at one point or another been victimized by the often heartless people 
and processes of the professional world? Iago‘s outrage over Cassio‘s promotion, 
however, manifests itself in ways that not only prove Iago‘s villainy, but also establish 
him as the consummate Nietzschean sick animal. Refusing to accept the legitimacy of 
Othello‘s decision and move on with his life, Iago allows his resentment to fester 
inwardly until it develops into an unquenchable desire for revenge. It is worth noting at 
this point that Iago harbors additional resentment against both Othello and Cassio 
because he vaguely suspects (with absolutely no credible reason or semblance of proof) 
that his wife Emilia has cuckolded him with both men. Although Iago‘s casual references 
to the possibility of infidelity assure the audience that not even Iago believes it, he uses 
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the suspicion of such activity to further justify his own sick thirst for vengeance. Iago 
formulates his devious scheme almost spontaneously, as he cunningly builds the innocent 
gestures and normal daily behaviors of other characters into a case against them. Through 
Iago‘s soliloquies, we enter his disturbed mind and watch in horror as the pieces come 
together. We see the seeds of his truly villainous nature in the first soliloquy, when Iago 
reveals his genuine hatred of Othello and his plans to use the foolish Roderigo (who is 
hopelessly in love with Desdemona) in his plot against Othello and Cassio:   
 Thus do I ever make my fool my purse; 
 For I mine own gained knowledge should profane 
 If I would time expend with such a snipe 
 But for my sport and profit. I hate the Moor, 
 And it is thought abroad that ‗twixt my sheets 
 H‘as done my office. I know not if‘t be true, 
 But I, for mere suspicion in that kind, 
 Will do, as if for surety. He holds me well; 
 The better shall my purpose work on him. 
 Cassio‘s a proper man. Let me see now: 
 To get his place, and to plume up my will 
 In double knavery. How? How? Let‘s see. 
 After some time, to abuse Othello‘s ears 
 That he is too familiar with his wife. 
 He hath a person and a smooth dispose 
 To be suspected—framed to make women false. 
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 The Moor is of a free and open nature 
 That thinks men honest that but seem to be so; 
 And will as tenderly be led by th‘ nose  
 As asses are. 
 I have‘t! It is engendered! Hell and night 
 Must bring this monstrous birth to the world‘s light. (I. iii. 371-393) 
Over the course of the nine soliloquies that follow, Iago develops the plan that he has 
engendered in this first soliloquy. Although there can be no question by his tenth and 
final soliloquy that ―hell and night [have brought] this monstrous birth to the world‘s 
light,‖ Iago invents the plan as he goes—spontaneously designing any material he can get 
his hands on into his project.  
As a highly ironic addition to the plot, Iago has previously established a 
reputation as a genuinely honest man—so honest, in fact, that he is widely known by the 
nickname ―Honest Iago.‖ And it comes as no surprise that he stands prepared to exploit 
that reputation at every possible turn, even acknowledging his plans to do so in an Aside 
to the audience. As he observes the love and passion that Othello and Desdemona 
demonstrate for one another upon reuniting in Cypress, Iago says: [Aside] ―O, you are 
well tuned now! / But I‘ll set down the pegs that make this music, / As honest as I am‖ 
(II. i. 196-98).  Casually working his esteemed reputation for honesty into conversations 
with his victims as his plan takes shape, he successfully disallows any suspicion of his 
ulterior motives to develop. In his initial attempt to actuate Othello‘s feelings of jealousy 
over the supposed intimacy between Desdemona and Cassio, for example, Iago responds 
to Othello‘s request for frank disclosure of his thoughts with: ―It were not for your quiet 
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nor your good, / Nor for my manhood, honesty,
21
 and wisdom, / To let you know my 
thoughts‖ (III. iii. 151-53). This response benefits Iago in two ways: it reminds Othello 
that he is honest, and it leads Othello to believe that Iago is trying to be a good friend. By 
this time, naturally, the audience knows that neither of these is the case. A short time 
later, Iago has effectively aroused Othello‘s suspicions about Desdemona‘s fidelity, 
despite Othello‘s efforts to reject the accusations. Enraged by Iago‘s temerity, Othello 
threatens: ―Villain, be sure thou prove my love a whore! / Be sure of it; give me the 
ocular proof; / Or, by the worth of mine eternal soul, / Thou hadst been better have been 
born a dog / Than answer my waked wrath!‖ (III. iii. 356-59). Iago quickly manipulates 
the situation, however, by labeling himself as a fool for thinking that he should be honest 
with his friend Othello: ―O wretched fool, / That lov‘st to make thine honesty a vice! / O 
monstrous world! Take note, take note, O world, / To be direct and honest is not safe. / I 
thank you for this profit, and from hence / I‘ll love no friend, sith love breeds such 
offense‖ (III. iii. 372-76). In this fashion, Iago successfully uses his well-established 
reputation to manipulate people and events as he contrives his diabolical revenge plot.    
 By the third soliloquy, Iago has decided that he is not only going to use Cassio as 
a pawn to ―put the Moor / At least into a jealousy so strong / That judgment cannot cure,‖ 
but that he is also going to manage the situation in such a way that will ―Make the Moor 
thank me, love me, and reward me / For making him egregiously an ass / And practicing 
on his peace and quiet, / Even to madness.‖ At the end of this soliloquy, Iago admits that 
he hasn‘t yet figured out how do accomplish this; his plan is ―yet confused‖ because 
―Knavery‘s plain face is never seen till used‖ (II. i. 299-301; 307-311 ). By that very 
evening, however, he has conceived the first part of the revenge scheme: he will get 
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Cassio drunk before his shift on the watch, and he will put Cassio ―in some action / That 
may offend the isle‖ (II. i. 60-61). Iago pulls Roderigo into the plan by convincing him 
that Desdemona is in love with Cassio, and that Cassio must therefore be sent away from 
Cyprus so that Desdemona can be more easily persuaded to love Roderigo. The gullible 
Roderigo, willing to risk any dangers for the love of Desdemona, agrees to start a fight 
with the drunken Cassio during his shift on the watch. By the time Cassio sobers up and 
regains his senses several hours later, he has already been fired by Othello—not only for 
engaging in drunk and disorderly fighting, but also for assaulting Governor Montano 
when he attempted to break up the fight.     
 In Iago‘s fifth soliloquy, he reveals a thirst for revenge so insatiable that it must 
destroy everyone in its path: 
   Divinity of hell! 
  When devils will the blackest sins put on, 
  They do suggest at first with heavenly shows, 
  As I do now. For whiles this honest fool [Cassio] 
  Plies Desdemona to repair his fortune, 
  And she for him pleads strongly to the Moor, 
  I‘ll pour this pestilence into his ear: 
  That she repeals him for her body‘s lust; 
  And by how much she strives to do him good, 
  She shall undo her credit with the Moor. 
  So will I turn her virtue into pitch, 
  And out of her own goodness make the net 
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  That shall enmesh them all. (II. iii. 347-59) 
Indeed, nobody escapes Iago‘s all-consuming vengeance. By the end of the play, Iago has 
orchestrated a plan so bloody that it is hard to believe he is human: Othello has murdered 
Desdemona and killed himself; Iago has slain his wife Emilia and mortally wounded 
Roderigo, and Roderigo has severely injured Cassio. Naturally, the maestro engineering 
the devastation finds immense satisfaction in the fact that so many innocent souls are 
destroyed. As more and more people are unwittingly drawn into his evil quest for 
revenge, he takes a moment to glory in his success: ―Work on. / My med‘cine works! 
Thus credulous fools are caught, / And many worthy and chaste dames even thus, / All 
guiltless, meet reproach‖ (IV. i. 45-48). There can be no question that Iago—whom   
Roderigo ultimately recognizes as a ―murd‘rous slave‖ and ―inhuman dog‖—presents an 
accurate picture of the Nietzschean sick animal.  
  Nietzsche also differs vastly from Aristotle in his insistence on the purity of 
motive in determining virtuous action. As we recall, Aristotelian theory holds that an 
action can be considered a ―right‖ action if the intention of that action is displayed at the 
right time, to the right people, in the right circumstances, to the right degree, and in the 
right way. The actual quality of motive is not at issue—only the way the motive is 
displayed and carried out. Conversely, Nietzsche looked only at quality of motive in 
determining right action; the origin of an action is what determines its value. For 
example, Swanton explains, ― If the motivation of an altruistic act expresses self-hatred, 
and is therefore to be understood as expressing a deep motivation to escape into 
otherness, then the altruism displayed is disvaluable, even if lots of people are  
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helped, the people helped are deserving, [and] they are helped in ways which do not 
undermine their capacities for self-help‖ (―Outline‖ 31). It is essential to clarify, 
however, that by ―origin‖ of action, Nietzsche does not mean ―reason‖ for action. 
According to Nietzsche, people offer myriad reasons for their actions, many of which 
seem on the surface to be noble and righteous. Often, however, these superficial reasons 
are merely covering and attempting to sanitize deeper, less adulatory motivations such as 
―resentments, fear, and neediness: in short, weakness‖ (32).  ―Origin‖ of action for 
Nietzsche, therefore, refers not to ―the reasons which the agent rehearses to herself and to 
others, but [to] the nature of the deeper desires expressing strength or weakness which 
are the real springs of her actions‖ (32). Viewed from this perspective, it then becomes 
clear that the action itself cannot be separated from its origin since the action (the 
―external performance‖) can only be properly understood once we know exactly what 
deeper motive the action is expressing. As Nietzsche explains in Book I of On the 
Genealogy of Morality, ―Just as the popular mind separates the lightning from the flash 
and takes the latter for an action, so popular morality also separates strength from 
expressions of strength‖ (13). An action can only be judged as right, Nietzsche says, if it 
expresses a strength in the agent. 
  Iago willingly provides the reasons for his actions, both in his conversations with 
Roderigo and his more private moments of soliloquy: he wants to punish Othello for 
neglecting to promote him; he wants to punish Cassio for receiving the promotion over 
him; and he wants to punish both men for his unwarranted suspicion that they have slept 
with his wife.  These are the only reasons that Iago discloses in order to justify his desire 
for revenge. Surely, being passed over for a promotion could never provide sufficient 
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justification for a stable, rational individual to plot murder! But we must remember that 
Iago is neither stable nor rational; he is, conversely, the Nietzschean sick animal—far 
from balanced or well-adjusted. Even if his reasons were rational, though, Nietzsche 
argues that they would be quite useless in understanding Iago‘s actions since reasons 
themselves are superficial, merely covering deeper motivations (such as resentment, fear, 
and neediness) based in human weakness. What, then, are Iago‘s deeper motivations—the 
well-springs of his actions? Unfortunately, Shakespeare does not grace us with an explicit 
answer on this point. His boastful self-description in his initial conversation with 
Roderigo, however, offers some suggestion of the weakness that may be the genuine 
motivator of his actions: ―O, sir, content you. / I follow him [Othello] to serve my turn 
upon him. / [ . . . ] / Heaven is my judge, not I for love and duty, / But seeming so, for my 
peculiar end; /  For when my outward action doth demonstrate / The native act and figure 
of my heart / In complement extern, ‘tis not long after / But I will wear my heart upon my 
sleeve / For daws to peck at; I am not what I am (I. i. 38-62). Here, he touts his 
duplicitous and conniving nature—obviously quite proud of his skillful deception. It does 
not take a mental health specialist, however, to recognize the gross insecurity underlying 
this kind of unhealthy exterior attitude. A weak, insecure, and ineffectual man, employee, 
and husband, Iago compensates for his extreme feelings of inadequacy by creating an 
entirely different persona—one that is strong, cunning, and decisive. Iago transforms this 
weakness—a debilitating insecurity that has cost him an important promotion and made 
him suspect that his wife is unfaithful—into a powerful, bloodthirsty, vengeful ―other‖ 
that nobody (except the unfortunate dupe, Roderigo) recognizes or suspects. From a 
Nietzschean perspective, then, Iago‘s reasons for action are not only insubstantial, but 
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more importantly, they are inconsequential since they merely mask his deep-seated 
weaknesses.    
 Like Nietzsche, neo-Aristotelian philosopher Michael Slote‘s virtue ethics theory 
considers an agent‘s motivation for moral action to be of primary importance. According 
to his ―agent-based‖ theory of ethics,22 moral action cannot be perceived as independent 
of the agent or her motives. In this sense, Slote rejects Aristotle‘s position that the moral 
rightness of an action depends not upon the motives of the agent, but upon the  
intelligence of the virtuous individual who is sensitive enough to recognize the right and 
virtuous path in each circumstance without relying on specific moral rules. Instead, Slote 
maintains that our ―evaluation of human motives, habits, [. . .] and actions is entirely 
derivative from and dependent on what we have to say ethically about (the inner life of) 
the agents who perform these actions (Slote ―Virtue‖ 178). In essence, then, the inner life 
of the person performing the actions—not merely the overall virtuousness of the person‘s 
character, but also that person‘s particular motives for action—are central to a genuine 
understanding of that person‘s morality. Although we must tie action to character, we 
cannot do so without examining the agent‘s motivations and acknowledging that action is 
entirely derived from the ethical assessment we make about the agent‘s inner life and 
motivation. Agent-based views, then, ―clearly allow for agents to be subject to moral 
requirements or constraints or standards governing their actions. But those requirements, 
standards, and constraints operate and bind, as it were, from within (Slote ―Agent‖ 87). 
The primacy of virtue in agent-based ethical theory, according to Slote, differentiates it 
from other ethical theories because ―only agent-based forms of virtue ethics [. . .] treat 
virtue (claims/ facts about what is admirable or morally good in people) as explanatorily 
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primary‖ (Slote Morals 7). Although virtue also holds a position of primacy in Aristotle‘s 
theory, it is the overall virtue of the sensitive and intelligent agent that matters, not the 
motivation guiding the actions of the agent.  
 If agent-based virtue theory requires an acknowledgment of the causal 
relationship between motivation and action as well as the direct connection between 
action and character, how then would such a theory assess Shakespeare‘s Emilia? As 
Desdemona‘s attendant and Iago‘s wife, Emilia‘s part in the first half of the play seems 
rather inconsequential. Between Act III, scene iii and the end of the play, however, 
Emilia‘s role becomes pivotal. Using an agent-based approach to examining this 
character‘s virtue, we will treat her actions as causally connected to her motivations for 
those actions. Once we understand how these particular relationships operate in the play, 
we should be able to make an agent-based determination about Emilia‘s overall virtue.   
 The first time that we see any consequential action by Emilia occurs in Act III 
when she finds Desdemona‘s handkerchief on the floor of Desdemona‘s bedroom.23 Prior 
to this scene, Emilia‘s infrequent dialogue has been strictly limited to her role as 
Desdemona‘s assistant. Her theft of Desdemona‘s cherished handkerchief, however, 
marks a turning point in the significance of her role in the play‘s action. Emilia knows 
that the handkerchief was Desdemona‘s first gift from Othello—a gift that Desdemona 
treasures and keeps with her always. As she reveals in her only soliloquy, however, Iago 
has frequently asked her to steal it from Desdemona, despite the fact that ―she reserves it 
evermore about her / To kiss and talk to‖ (III. iii. 292-93). Emilia decides to indulge her 
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 In this scene, Othello has told Desdemona that he is suffering from a pain upon his forehead (a reference 
to being cuckolded). Failing to understand his implication, Desdemona has offered to bind Othello‘s head 
with her handkerchief to stop the pain. He pushes the handkerchief away, and it falls on the floor. Upset 
and distracted by his sudden anger, Desdemona does not notice that the handkerchief drops onto the floor. 
She exits the room with him, leaving the handkerchief behind.  
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husband‘s fantasy by having the work taken out and giving it to him. She admits, 
however, that ―Heaven knows, not I‖ what he will do with it (96). In this short but 
revealing soliloquy, we are given our first glimpse into Emilia‘s character—a character 
that could easily (but wrongfully, I will argue) be interpreted at this point as devious, 
unkind, and disloyal to Desdemona. She has, after all, stolen a handkerchief that means a 
great deal to Desdemona— solely to please her husband‘s fantasy; and she does not 
necessarily trust that there were noble intentions motivating her ―wayward husband‘s‖ 
request that she abscond with it. But immediately after she surprises Iago with the 
handkerchief, Emilia begins to have second thoughts about her deceptive action. 
Inquiring about Iago‘s plans for the handkerchief, she reminds him that it is Desdemona‘s 
prized possession: ―If it be not for some purpose of import, / Give‘t me again. Poor lady, 
she‘ll run mad / When she shall lack it‖ (III. iii. 314-16). Naturally, however, Iago has no 
intention of returning the handkerchief or revealing his plans to Emilia. Instead, he 
admonishes: ―Be not acknown on‘t. / I have use for it. Go, leave me‖ (III. iii. 317-18). 
The moment that Emilia exits, Iago uses his seventh soliloquy to disclose his plans for the 
handkerchief: ―I will in Cassio‘s lodging lose this napkin /  And let him find it. Trifles 
light as air / Are to the jealous confirmations strong / As proofs of Holy Writ. This may 
do something‖ (III. iii. 319-322). We glean from this passage that Emilia‘s suspicion of 
her husband‘s intentions was valid. What, then, has motivated her to filch the 
handkerchief from Desdemona and give it to a husband who has obviously earned her 
distrust? Furthermore, what motivates her to remain silent in response to Desdemona‘s 
claim upon realizing that the handkerchief is missing: ―Believe me, I had rather have lost 
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my purse / Full of crusadoes‖ (III. iv. 25-26) —and even more critically—when Othello 
demands that she provide it?  
Here, Emilia‘s inaction seems rather cruel as she watches with stoic silence while 
Othello becomes increasingly agitated and threatening toward Desdemona. He even 
relates a tale concerning the magic qualities of the handkerchief, which was apparently 
made by an Egyptian charmer. As long as Desdemona keeps it with her,  
― ‘Twould make her amiable and subdue [Othello] / Entirely to her love.‖ But if she loses 
it or gives it as a gift, she would experience ―such perdition / As nothing else could 
match‖ (III. iv. 59-60; 67-68).  Despite Desdemona‘s obvious dismay over the loss of the 
handkerchief and her shock over Othello‘s rash and frightening response, Emilia remains 
silent. By the time Othello storms away from Desdemona, he has worked himself into 
quite a fury.
24
  Stunned, Desdemona claims, ―I nev‘r saw this before. / Sure there‘s some 
wonder in this handkerchief; / I am most unhappy in the loss of it‖ (III. iv. 99-101). 
Rather than taking moral action by confessing her theft to her dismayed friend, however, 
Emilia opts to use Othello‘s behavior as a platform for her unfavorable assessment of all 
men: ― ‘Tis not a year or two shows us a man. / They are all but stomachs, and we all but 
food; / They eat us hungerly, and when they are full, / They belch us‖ (III. iv. 102-105). 
This harsh judgment against men may be emotionally therapeutic for Emilia, but it serves 
no healing purpose for Desdemona. Emilia‘s continued silence on the matter of the 
handkerchief, conversely, seems to demonstrate her fundamental lack of concern about 
Desdemona‘s emotional and marital health. If she genuinely cared about Desdemona, 
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 In this scene, Othello‘s anger is unintentionally exacerbated by Dedemona‘s persistent pleas on Cassio‘s 
behalf. Believing that his demand that she produce the handkerchief is merely a ―trick to put me from my 
suit‖ (line 87), Desdemona insists that Othello reinstate Cassio as his lieutenant. Naturally, since Othello is 
now convinced that Desdemona is engaged in an illicit affair with Cassio, Desdemona‘s protestations on 
Cassio‘s behalf severely aggravate Othello‘s precarious emotional state.  
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Emilia would feel a natural sense of guilt and remorse, thereby instigating a confession. 
But alas, this confession does not materialize until after Desdemona has been murdered. 
 In Act IV, Emilia becomes more vocal and assertive than she has been previously. 
No longer a mere shadow to Desdemona with an occasional snide remark about men and 
a willingness to comply with her husband‘s requests, Emilia demonstrates that—in 
significant matters such as spousal abuse and injustice—she can be a fierce advocate for 
the wronged. After the intensely painful ―brothel‖ scene wherein Othello labels 
Desdemona ―that cunning whore of Venice,‖ Desdemona is understandably crestfallen 
and Emilia is enraged. Explaining the incident to Iago—thoroughly convinced that a third 
party with ill intentions has aroused Othello‘s suspicions against Desdemona—Emilia 
finds her voice and fearlessly expresses her moral conviction in defense of Desdemona: 
―I will be hanged if some eternal villain, / Some busy and insinuating rogue, / Some 
cogging, cozening slave, to get some office / Have not devised this slander. I will be 
hanged else (IV. ii. 129-32). And when Desdemona suggests that such a man should be 
pardoned by heaven, Emilia passionately disagrees: ―A halter pardon him!  And hell 
gnaw his bones! / Why should he call her whore? Who keeps her / Company? / What 
place? What time? What form? What likelihood? / The Moor‘s abused by some most 
villainous knave, / Some base, notorious knave, some scurvy fellow (IV. ii. 135-40). 
Clearly, Othello‘s unjust accusations against Desdemona have infuriated Emilia, and she 
is not prepared to suppress her anger about it. The irony, naturally, is that Emilia never 
for a moment suspects that her own husband could be the ―villainous knave‖ that poured 
such pestilence into Othello‘s ear. Nor does she imagine that her theft of Desdemona‘s 
handkerchief could have played such a critical role in the evolution of Iago‘s sinister 
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plan. At any rate, deciding that the wrongs suffered by Desdemona are too egregious and 
painful to be endured patiently, Emilia moves from silence to moral action. In Act V, as 
we shall now see, Emilia‘s actions develop gravity and bear tremendous consequence to 
the tragedy.    
 As Act V opens, Iago‘s two murder plots have been set into action. Roderigo will 
murder Cassio
25
 and Othello will murder his own unfaithful wife. When Roderigo attacks 
Cassio, however, the two men merely wound each other. Observing the attack from the 
shadows, Iago sees that neither combatant has been dealt a mortal wound. This does not 
bode well for Iago, as he has a vested interest in both men‘s deaths: ―Live Roderigo, / He 
calls me to a restitution large /Of gold and jewels that I bobbed from him / As gifts to 
Desdemona. / It must not be. If Cassio do remain, / He hath a daily beauty in his life / 
That makes me ugly; and besides, the Moor / May unfold me to him; there stand I in 
much  peril. / No, he must die‖ (V. i. 14-22). Seizing his only opportunity before the 
watch is called up, therefore, Iago stabs Roderigo, who accurately identifies him as an 
―inhuman dog‖ (V. i. 62). 
 As the dark streets of Cypress devolve into chaos, Othello calmly and almost 
ritualistically smothers Desdemona in her bed. Moments later, Emilia rushes to Othello‘s 
room to report the attack on Cassio. To her dismay, however, she learns something much 
more horrifying: that Desdemona lies in her bed near death—absolving Othello of his 
crime with her last breath: 
  Desdemona: O, falsely, falsely murdered! 
    [ . . . ] A guiltless death I die. 
                                                 
25
 Iago has promised Othello that, as a demonstration of his loyalty, he will kill Cassio to avenge the 
wrongs done to Othello by Cassio. In actuality, however, Iago has convinced Roderigo to murder Cassio in 
order to eliminate the competition for Desdemona‘s love.   
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  Emilia: O, who hath done this deed? 
  Desdemona: Nobody—I myself. Farewell. 
    Commend me to my kind lord. O, farewell! 
       [she dies.] (V. ii. 116; 123-25) 
In the ensuing action of the play, Emilia acquires tragic stature as she learns the truth 
about Desdemona‘s murder and boldly confronts Othello with the enormity of his 
heinous action: 
  Othello: She‘s like a liar gone to burning hell! 
    ‘Twas I that killed her. 
  Emilia: O, the more angel she, 
    And you the blacker devil! 
  Othello:  She turned to folly, and she was a whore. 
  Emilia: Thou dost belie her, and thou art a devil. 
  Othello: She was false as water. 
  Emilia: Thou art rash as fire to say  
That she was false. O, she was heavenly true!  
(V. ii. 128-35) 
 And when Othello reveals that Iago has been the source of his information about 
Desdemona, Emilia continues her courageous defense of Desdemona— risking her own 
life when she wakes Othello‘s wrath: 
  Emilia: O mistress, villainy hath made mocks with love! 
    My husband [said] she was false?  
[ . . . ]. If he say so, may his pernicious soul 
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Rot half a grain a day! He lies to th‘ heart. 
She was too fond of her most filthy bargain. 
  Othello: Hah? 
  Emilia:  Do thy worst. 
    This deed of thine is no more worthy heaven 
    Than thou wast worthy her. 
  Othello: Peace, you were best. 
  Emilia:  Thou hast not half that pow‘r to do me harm 
    As I have to be hurt. O gull! O dolt! 
    As ignorant as dirt! Thou hast done a deed— 
    [Othello moves to draw his sword.] 
    I care not for thy sword; I‘ll make thee known, 
    Thou I lost twenty lives. Help! Help! Ho! Help! 
    The Moor hath killed my mistress! Murder! Murder! 
          (V. ii. 152- 167) 
Gratiano, Governor Montano, and Iago all rush into the room upon hearing Emilia‘s cry 
for help. And before this room filled with witnesses, Emilia demands that Iago admit his 
involvement. When he reveals the truth—that he told Othello Desdemona was false to 
wedlock with Cassio—Emilia fearlessly calls him on this devastating lie: ―You told a lie, 
an odious, damned lie! / Upon my soul, a lie! A wicked lie!‖ (V. ii. 180-81). Despite 
Iago‘s orders that she charm her tongue and go home, Emilia stands firmly in her 
commitment to speak the truth. And the truly revelatory part occurs when Othello 
recounts the story of Iago seeing Cassio with the handkerchief—―that recognizance and 
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pledge of love, / Which I first gave her‖ (V. ii. 213-14). Here, we see a completely 
different Emilia from the woman of Act III who stole the handkerchief; here, we see a 
woman who recognizes the far-reaching and annihilative consequences of that action: 
  Emilia: O God! O heavenly God! 
  Iago:  Zounds, hold your peace! 
  Emilia: ‘Twill out, ‘twill out! I peace? 
    No, I will speak as liberal as the north. 
    Let heaven and men and devils, let them all, 
    All, all cry shame against me, yet I‘ll speak. 
  Iago:  Be wise, and get you home. 
  Emilia: I will not. 
    [Iago draws and threatens Emilia.] 
  Gratiano: Fie! Your sword upon a woman? 
  Emilia: O thou dull Moor, that handkerchief thou speak‘st of 
    I found by fortune, and did give my husband; 
    For often with a solemn earnestness— 
    More than indeed belonged to such a trifle— 
    He begged of me to steal‘t. 
  Iago:  Villainous whore! 
  Emilia:  She give it Cassio? No, alas, I found it, 
    And I did give‘t my husband. 
  Iago:  Filth, thou liest! 
  Emilia: By heaven, I do not, I do not, gentlemen. 
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    O murd‘rous coxcomb! What should such a fool 
    Do with so good a wife? 
  Othello: Are there no stones in heaven 
    But what serves for the thunder? Precious villain! 
    [Othello runs at Iago, but is disarmed by Montano. 
    Iago kills his wife.] 
 
  Emilia: Ay, ay. Lay me by my mistress‘ side. (V. ii. 218- 36) 
In conducting an agent-based ethical analysis of Emilia‘s actions, we must   
explore the relationship between the motivation for her actions and the actions 
themselves as well as the connection between her actions and her character. Emilia‘s 
inner life, then, is central to a genuine understanding of her morality.  
 Most moral theorists would read Emilia‘s first significant action—the theft of 
Desdemona‘s handkerchief—as an immoral act. She understood its import to 
Desdemona, knew that Desdemona would ―run mad‖ at the loss of it, and stole it anyway. 
From a deontological perspective, wherein the locus of value of an act is in the act 
itself—not in the agent‘s motive or desired consequence—there can be no moral 
justification for this action. According to deontologist Immanuel Kant‘s first formulation 
of the Categorical Imperative, an act can only be considered moral if it can be 
universalized. In the case of Emilia‘s theft, then, we would need to ask if everyone should 
steal handkerchiefs all the time. Since the answer to this query is a most definite no, then 
Emilia‘s action must be regarded as immoral. Consequentialists and Utilitarians, on the 
other hand, would reserve judgment about the morality of the act until they had 
considered the consequences of the action. In the case of Emilia‘s theft, did the theft of 
the handkerchief bring about positive consequences? Did it bring about the most 
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happiness (or the greatest good) for the most people? Since the theft of the handkerchief 
only made one person (Iago) temporarily happy; and since it indirectly caused great 
pain—and arguably even death—to Othello, Desdemona, and Emilia, we can determine 
unequivocally that consequentialists would assess the theft as an immoral and 
unjustifiable action.  
The matter of the stolen handkerchief is not quite this simple to Aristotelian and 
neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists, however. From a purely virtue ethical perspective, 
Aristotle would insist that a virtuous person intuitively knows which actions are moral 
and avoids those actions that are immoral.   The moral rightness of Emilia‘s action, then, 
depends neither upon the action itself, nor her motives, nor even the possible 
consequences of her action, but upon whether she is a virtuous individual—one with the 
intelligence and sensitivity to recognize the right path in each circumstance without 
relying on specific moral rules. Since Aristotle‘s assessment of individual actions 
depends entirely on an agent‘s overall virtuous character, however, and since we cannot 
pretend to know enough about Emilia‘s character when she steals the handkerchief in Act 
III to make a determination about her overall virtue, it is safe to suggest that there can be 
no Aristotelian ethical judgment about Emilia‘s action this early in the play. A neo-
Aristotelian agent-based analysis of Emilia‘s action yields similar results, for it requires 
that we examine the action as entirely derivative of Emilia‘s inner life—her desires and 
motives—as well as the general virtuousness of her character. In Act III of the play, we 
know very little about Emilia‘s inner life. All we can say at this point is that, although she 
seems to be an attentive assistant to Desdemona, she does not (initially) experience any 
moral angst about stealing the handkerchief. Conversely, she says, ―I am glad I have 
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found this napkin‖ and immediately decides to give it to Iago, despite her total lack of 
knowledge regarding his plans for it. ―What he will do with it, / Heaven knows, not I,‖ 
she admits. But her desire—her motivation—as we see in her next words, is ―to please 
his / fantasy‖ (III. iii. 289; 295-97). We know, therefore, only that Emilia is an attentive 
servant who does not mind filching her employer‘s handkerchief to please her husband. 
Since agent-basing determines the moral worth of actions as derivative of the agent‘s 
inner life (desires and motives) and the overall virtuousness of the agent‘s character; and 
since (as argued above) we know precious little about Emilia‘s inner life and overall 
virtue at this point, it is impossible to draw a responsible ethical conclusion about 
Emilia‘s actions in Act III. 
By Act V, however, when Emilia‘s character has been more thoroughly 
developed, an agent-based analysis of her actions becomes possible. Emilia develops 
stature as a tragic heroine in Act V, due in large part to the moral strength of word and 
deed that she exhibits upon learning of Desdemona‘s untimely death. As previously 
discussed, Emilia bravely confronts Othello, forcing him to acknowledge the stupidity of 
his barbaric actions. Even when he threatens to draw his sword upon her, Emilia 
courageously stands against him: ―I care not for thy sword; I‘ll make thee known, / 
Though I lost twenty lives. Help! Help! Ho! Help! / The Moor hath killed my mistress! 
Murder! Murder!‖ (V. ii. 165-67). Moments later, she demonstrates similar fortitude in 
her investigation of Iago‘s role in the murder. Despite his repeated admonishments and 
demands that she hold her peace, Emilia persists: ―No, I will speak as liberal as the north. 
/ Let heaven and men and devils, let them all, / All, all, cry shame against me, yet I‘ll 
speak‖ (V. ii. 219-21). Even after Iago has drawn his sword to threaten Emilia, she holds 
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her moral ground, focusing her attention not on Iago‘s sword but upon clarifying the true 
sequence of events for Othello: She had found the handkerchief by chance and had given 
it to Iago because he had often begged her—―with a solemn earnestness--/ More than 
indeed belonged to such a trifle‖—to steal it (V. ii. 227-28). Iago continues to threaten 
Emilia, calling her a filthy liar and villainous whore, yet she insists that Othello, 
Montano, Gratiano, and of course Iago hear her. Emilia‘s final words before Iago stabs 
her are directed toward Othello: ―O murd‘rous coxcomb! What should such a fool / Do 
with so good a wife?‖ (V. ii. 233-34). In this scene, Emilia reveals herself as one of 
Shakespeare‘s great heroines, a voice of truth and justice for Desdemona. 
Could this woman—this pillar of moral strength and fortitude who willingly 
places her own life in jeopardy to reveal the heinous crimes committed by Othello and 
her own husband—possibly be the same woman who filched the handkerchief in the first 
place? According to an Agent-Based ethical system, the answer is a resounding yes. 
When we examine an action (such as Emilia‘s theft of the handkerchief) in isolation, as 
we attempted above, agent-basing yields no definitive response. When we view her 
character as a whole, however, (a requirement of agent-basing that cannot be done 
responsibly until Act V), a clear picture of Emilia emerges. An agent-based analysis of 
Emilia begins by developing an understanding of her entire character—including her 
motives and desires (her inner life) and her overall virtuousness. In Act V, Emilia‘s virtue 
is beyond question. The strength and courage she exhibits are clearly indicative of and 
derived from her morality. Her rejection of Othello‘s mendacious accusations against 
Desdemona illustrates Emilia‘s honest and forthright nature. Upon discovering her 
husband‘s treacherous involvement and her own unwitting contribution to the tragedy, 
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she continues to hold her moral ground—revealing truths even as Iago‘s sword runs 
through her breast. Clearly, Emilia‘s primary motivating factors are justice, benevolence, 
and loyalty, all in the service of honesty. Her inner desire is that the entire company 
understand the truth, regardless of the potential consequences to her personally. In light 
of her moral fortitude in Act V, then, as Emilia‘s actions fall directly in line with her 
virtuous character, we must interpret her one bad act (the theft of the handkerchief) as 
exactly that: one unethical action, one indiscretion, committed by an otherwise moral 
individual. We may, according to agent-basing, even interpret the theft of the 
handkerchief as essentially deriving from Emilia‘s sense of loyalty to her husband (a 
virtue) and her desire to please him—both of which speak to the goodness of her 
character. Despite the fact that Emilia‘s action (the theft of the handkerchief) ultimately 
plays a critical role in Iago‘s villainous plan of destruction, an agent-based approach 
rejects the notion that any one action can be judged in isolation. Every action must be 
viewed in terms of its connection with the agent‘s inner life (motives and desires) and 
overall character. Her unfortunate peccadillo, then, does not alter or minimize an agent-
based assessment of Emilia‘s character as decidedly virtuous. 
A brief analysis of Emilia‘s character through the lens of Aristotelian virtue 
theory yields a similar general conclusion despite its concern with different value 
structures. Like the neo-Aristotelian approach, strict Aristotelian examination of Emilia‘s 
character is impossible prior to Act V because we simply do not know enough about her 
as a whole person to make responsible character assessments. As Act V progresses, 
however, we clearly see that Emilia possesses several virtues of great import in 
Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethic: courage, truthfulness, patience, and righteous 
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indignation. As I argue at the beginning of this chapter, Othello behaves rashly, which is 
a vice of excess (the deficiency being cowardice). The Golden Mean for this particular 
sphere of emotion (fear / confidence), however, is courage—the mean between the vices 
of rashness and cowardice. Emilia is indisputably courageous as she unfolds critical 
truths to Othello and the island‘s officials, such as Montano and Gratiano. Both Othello 
and Iago threaten to slay her if she does not silence her tongue, yet she courageously 
stays her course until the entire truth is revealed.  
Under these circumstances, Emilia‘s virtue of courage is tied closely to the three 
other virtues previously mentioned: truthfulness, patience, and righteous indignation. In 
the realm of self-expression, Aristotle states that the vices of excess and deficiency are 
boastfulness and understatement, respectively, and the virtuous Golden Mean is 
truthfulness. As previously indicated, Emilia insists on revealing the horrible truths about 
both Othello‘s and Iago‘s actions. She discloses these truths courageously and heroically 
but certainly not boastfully, as she knows very well that her marriage, her husband‘s life, 
and even her own life are at stake. Regarding the emotions of anger and indignation, 
Emilia again avoids both excess and deficiency (irascibility and lack of spirit as the vices 
related to anger, and envy and malicious enjoyment as the vices related to indignation, 
respectively). Instead, she hits squarely upon the virtues of patience and righteous 
indignation. Despite her shock and outrage at learning that Othello has murdered 
Desdemona, Emilia patiently and logically questions Othello‘s reasons for committing 
such a deed. She does not become irascible (as Othello had earlier), but she is certainly 
angry as she sets things straight for Othello. According to Aristotle, it is quite alright to 
become angry for the right reason, at the right person (or people), and to the right 
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degree—especially if the anger is due to an injustice that has occurred. This particular 
form of anger, known as righteous indignation, can occur either when one suffers an 
injustice or when one receives an entirely undeserved benefit. In Emilia‘s case, the 
righteous indignation she experiences stems from Othello‘s completely unjustifiable 
murder of Desdemona and his conspiracy with Iago to stage Cassio‘s murder. As we see, 
then, an examination of Emilia‘s character through an Aristotelian virtue lens supports 
and validates the neo-Aristotelian agent-based reading of Emilia as an indisputably 
virtuous tragic heroine.        
I have herein attempted to offer a new approach for examining three of the 
primary characters in Shakespeare‘s masterpiece Othello, The Moor of Venice. Through a 
standard Aristotelian virtue ethics lens, I have analyzed the title character, determining 
that an Aristotelian reading disallows sympathy for Othello. Although most audiences 
feel tremendous sympathy for Othello, concluding that he was victimized by the 
villainous Iago and therefore faultless, an Aristotelian interpretation rejects this notion 
entirely. Instead, from an Aristotelian perspective, Othello not only lacks virtuous 
character traits, but actively exhibits several dangerous vices, such as rashness, 
irascibility, and jealousy. These behavioral excesses allow him to become blinded to 
obvious truths and reality and cause him to commit the unforgivable sin of murdering his 
chaste and innocent wife. Using a neo-Aristotelian ethical strategy developed by 
Christine Swanton, I have also altered the generally accepted interpretation of Iago as the 
evil genius—the mastermind of villainy and destruction in the play. Instead, according to 
Swanton‘s Nietzschean application of virtue, Iago must be understood as the Nietzschean 
―sick animal‖—insecure, self-loathing, and pathetic. And finally, I have explored 
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Emilia‘s character through Michael Slote‘s neo-Aristotelian theory of agent-basing. In so 
doing, I have concluded that Emilia is more than merely an expedient dramatic device, 
more than Shakespeare‘s convenient method of getting the handkerchief into Iago‘s 
insidious hands in Act III and revealing the truth in Act V. Instead, an agent-based 
analysis of Emilia‘s character—unlike either a deontological or consequentialist 
analysis—lends itself to a complete investigation of her actions (and inaction) in Acts III 
through V as connected to and deriving from both her inner life (i.e., her desires and 
motives) and her overall virtue. And from this thorough exploration, we can conclude 
that—despite Emilia‘s commission of a transgression with egregious consequences—she 
must certainly be viewed as a pillar of virtue and moral fortitude. 
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5 ―Bring some covering for this naked soul‖:  
The Ethics of Care in King Lear 
 
This chapter examines three female and three male characters in Shakespeare‘s 
King Lear—specifically Cordelia, Goneril, Regan, Kent, Edgar, and the Fool—from the 
theoretical perspective of neo-Aristotelian Care Ethics. As we recall from chapter two, 
―The New Aristotelians: 21st Century Virtue,‖ the Ethics of Care as moral theory has 
gained recent critical attention as a viable and important contribution to the renewed 
study of virtue.
26
 As a newly introduced branch of Neo-Aristotelian Ethics, the Ethics of 
Care maintains that the philosophical idea of caring is essential to our moral development 
and ethical behavior. Although the concept of Care has always been integral to fields 
such as psychology and human services, ethicists have never before launched a concerted 
scholarly effort to develop a Theory of Care focusing on how Care operates from a moral 
and philosophical perspective in our lives.
27
 In the 18th century, philosophers moved 
away from Aristotle's focus on Virtue and toward newer aspects of normative ethics--
Deontology and Teleology. With their focus on rules (Deontology) and consequences 
(Teleology), these moral systems obviously emphasize concerns other than Caring. The 
return to a consideration of Aristotle's Virtue in the 1990's and the 21st century, 
however, has inspired the development of an entire branch of philosophy that locates the 
very essence of morality in human caring. This notion of Caring as philosophically 
necessary to human morality is a scholarly innovation that impacts both the philosophical  
and the literary communities, as it offers an avenue for us to gain greater insight and a 
                                                 
26
 Chapter two offers a detailed examination of the history and development of the Ethics of Care as moral 
theory.   
27
 A notable exception to this claim is the medical ethics focus on care in end-of-life decision- making. 
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deeper appreciation of literature from a new and significant philosophical perspective. 
Not even Aristotle, with his focus on virtuous character, concerned himself with what 
contemporary Care Ethicists call a genuine focus on Care as a guide to moral 
development.  
In this chapter, I employ the philosophical lens of Care Ethics to demonstrate the 
important ways in which Care operates in moral decision-making. I chose King Lear 
precisely because the characters are undeniably either good or evil. My application of 
Care Ethics to their moral decision-making is not intended, therefore, to offer alternative 
interpretations of their characters, as I did in the previous chapter. Instead, I offer a  
reading of the characters‘ actions and decisions that is informed specifically by Care 
Ethics in order to demonstrate how the philosophy of care operates in a work of literature 
wherein Care is foundational. Lear and Gloucester, the tragic heroes of the plot and 
subplot, both find themselves in positions requiring others to care for them. Cordelia, 
Kent, the fool, and Edgar embrace their loved ones‘ needs—immediately engaging 
various approaches, strategies, and degrees of care for the play‘s heroes. Goneril, Regan, 
and Edmund, on the other hand, not only reject their roles as care-givers but also engage 
in overtly hostile behaviors toward their supposed loved ones. Using Care Ethics as a 
lens, we see that decisions regarding how we care about others are not only influenced by 
our existing morality but also motivate the ways in which we conduct the other aspects of 
our lives. Decisions regarding if, how, and to what degree we care, in other words, are 
influenced by who we already are, and they also play an important role in determining 
who we become.  
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In recent years, eminent scholars such as Nel Noddings, Virginia Held, and 
Michael Slote have reengaged with Aristotle‘s theory that benevolence—or altruistic 
human concern—is the highest secular motive. Originating with psychologist Carol 
Gilligan‘s seminal work on gender and morality, In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women’s Development (1982), the Ethics of Care explores the various ways 
that human beings express caring attitudes and respond to situations that call for 
benevolence. Michael Slote argues that action can only be considered moral if it is 
motivated by good or virtuous intentions involving a sense of  benevolence or caring 
about others, ―or at least doesn‘t come from bad or inferior motivation involving malice 
or indifference to humanity‖ (Morals 38). He clarifies an important distinction though, in 
that the motivation to act must be judged as entirely separate from any set of established 
rules or expected consequences concerning the action. Desired or anticipated results of an 
action, according to Slote, are clearly irrelevant. Likewise, motives for action are judged 
solely on how closely they approximate the motive of universal benevolence, which must 
be understood as the highest of human motives.  
In a discussion of universal benevolence as ultimate motivator, the very idea of 
self-interest may seem out of place. Chapter seven of Slote‘s Morals from Motives, 
however, clarifies the important relationship between moral motivation and concern for 
self. Slote argues that self-interest is not only required by practical reason but actually 
serves as the foundation for all moral motivation. A lack of self-interest is, in other 
words, irrational, and we cannot hope to act from motives of benevolence or caring for 
others if we do not possess concern for ourselves. In this sense, the motive of care for 
others is directly derived from the motive of self-interest. Rooted in Aristotle‘s theory of 
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Eudaimonia (the good life), Slote‘s conception of self-interest relies on the generally 
accepted principle that people ultimately wish to be happy. We can only achieve ultimate 
happiness, however, if we appreciate love and friendship as two of life‘s great gifts; 
without them, we cannot possibly experience true personal fulfillment. Assuming, then, 
that the love of friends and family is a requirement for happiness, Slote asserts that 
without such love, we will naturally develop a sense of dysphoria. When we experience 
such feelings of joylessness, we will not be interested in helping others, and our actions 
will not likely be based on ideas of universal benevolence or care. By contrast, Slote 
explains, ―The person who wants/seeks a good, rich, full life for herself may also 
want/seek to be of substantial help to intimates and other people generally in their lives‖ 
(184). In an effort to counter potential objections regarding the self-centeredness of such 
a theory (one that derives the motive of concern for others entirely from the motive of 
self-interest), Slote warns that ―one‘s concern for near and dear [should] not be dwarfed 
by (typical, strong) self-concern, or, to put things slightly differently, the person‘s 
concern for friends and loved ones should motivationally counterbalance her concern for 
her own interests‖ (186). This proper balancing of concern—between ourselves, our 
loved ones, and our extended community—stands as a critical component of Slote‘s 
theory, without which we are incapable of achieving the good life to which we aspire. 
The idea of counterbalance as the cornerstone for an ethics of care serves as an 
excellent point of departure for our discussion of King Lear. Genuine ethical caring, as 
outlined by neo-Aristotelian philosophers Nel Noddings, Virginia Held, and Michael 
Slote, operates in three distinct ways in Lear. Employing vastly different methods and 
strategies, Cordelia, Edgar, Kent, and the Fool effectively demonstrate sincere concern 
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for their loved ones. We will begin with King Lear‘s daughter, Cordelia, who is generally 
considered one of Shakespeare‘s most pure and selfless heroines. As the play opens, the 
elderly king has gathered his three daughters together for the purpose of dividing his 
kingdom among them, thereby divesting himself of the cares of state. In a vain and self-
aggrandizing gesture that everyone except the king recognizes as dangerous, Lear decides 
to ration the kingdom according to which daughter can profess to love him the most. This 
behavior is typical of the aged king who has been fawned over all of his life and 
thoroughly enjoys the flattery.  The two eldest daughters, Goneril and Regan, play 
immediately into their father‘s childish whim— pleasing the foolish old king with their 
grandiloquent and unctuous declarations of love. When the time comes for Cordelia 
(Lear‘s youngest and favorite daughter) to profess her love, however, she finds herself 
incapable of the inflated, false, and degrading flattery proclaimed by her sisters. Instead, 
Cordelia speaks simply and honestly, claiming that she loves Lear as a child should love 
a parent: ―Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave / My heart into my mouth. I love your 
majesty/ According to my bond, no more nor less‖ (I. i. 91-93). Naturally, this response 
enrages the king, who had been expecting Cordelia‘s protestation of love to be even 
―more opulent‖ than the others. When she refuses to revise her claim of duty, Lear reacts 
explosively, ultimately disowning his youngest daughter entirely, despite the Earl of 
Kent‘s heartfelt pleas on her behalf.  
Suddenly dowerless, the virtuous Cordelia is rejected by the Duke of Burgundy, 
who had come to Lear‘s castle seeking Cordelia‘s hand in marriage. Fortunately, 
however, the King of France—Burgundy‘s rival for Cordelia‘s hand—recognizes her 
virtue and takes her as his wife: ―Fairest Cordelia, that art most rich being poor, / Most 
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choice forsaken, and most loved despised, / Thee and thy virtues here I seize upon. Be it 
lawful I take up what‘s cast away‖ (I. i. 250-54). With a rich and powerful husband who 
loves her and appreciates her worth, Cordelia now has an ethical decision to make. 
Should she leave with France and obey her father‘s command to terminate all contact and 
communication with him? It certainly would be the easy choice; she is now the Queen of 
France, after all, and could certainly busy herself with the demands of her new title and 
position. But Cordelia has already established herself as good, kind, and honest. It comes 
as no surprise, therefore, that despite her father‘s rash and cruel behavior toward her, she 
remains steadfast in her love and devotion to him. In fact, Cordelia beautifully 
exemplifies the virtues intrinsic to neo-Aristotelian care ethics. 
After Cordelia is disowned by Lear, she leaves for France with her intended 
husband and she disappears from the immediate action of the play for a long period of 
time. The reader does not see Cordelia again until Act IV, scene iv, when she has arrived 
in Dover with the French army. Although the reader has not been directly privy to 
Cordelia‘s actions during the previous three Acts, the Earl of Kent (disguised as a servant 
to the king) reveals in Act II, scene ii and again in Act III, scene i, that he and Cordelia 
have been in correspondence regarding the spiteful actions of her sisters against her 
father, and that she is gathering the French forces to rescue Lear. Cordelia genuinely 
loves and cares about her father, and she realizes that he has begun to make some very 
poor decisions in his old age. His decision to disown Cordelia, divide his kingdom 
between Goneril and Regan, and take turns living with each of them for one month at a 
time, for example, is rash and ill-considered. All three daughters understand this and 
realize that no good can possibly come of it. The two older sisters are selfish, false, and 
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cold-hearted—incapable of giving their father the care and attention that he requires in 
his old age. Only Cordelia possesses the love, patience, and kindness that Lear will 
require now that he has abdicated his power. As Cordelia bids farewell to her sisters, she 
issues a warning that ―Time shall unfold what plighted cunning hides, / Who covers 
faults, at last shame them derides‖ (I. i. 280-281). Upon Cordelia‘s departure, Goneril and 
Regan unfold their concern about their father‘s failing judgment to one another. They 
know that the burden of caring for their father now rests entirely on their shoulders, and 
the thought of dealing with his erratic disposition and poor judgment unsettles them. 
Goneril says, ―You see how full of changes his age is. The / observation we have made of 
it hath not been little. / He always loved our sister most, and with what poor / judgment 
he hath now cast her off appears too grossly.‖ Regan‘s response: ― ‘Tis the infirmity of 
his age; yet he hath ever but slenderly known himself‖ (I. i. 288- 292) indicates their 
understanding that Lear‘s lack of self-knowledge—a condition arising from naively 
believing his subjects‘ false flattery for so long—will only be exacerbated as his mental 
faculties further decline with old age.  
As indicated previously, Cordelia‘s absence does not prevent her from monitoring 
the dramatic events transpiring between her father and sisters through correspondence 
with Kent and strategically-placed spies (disguised as servants) in Goneril and Regan‘s 
households. As Lear moves with his rowdy train of 100 knights from one sister‘s palace 
to the other‘s, each reduces the number of attendants they will allow in his train until 
Goneril heartlessly suggests that Lear needs not even one knight to attend him. Cordelia 
knows through her contacts in England that her sisters have viciously allowed Lear to 
depart from their homes in a rage, with nowhere to take refuge from an approaching 
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storm. By the time Cordelia has assembled the French army and led them to Dover to 
rescue Lear, however, Lear has lost his sanity. Having experienced a dramatic and heart-
wrenching emotional breakdown on the barren heath—with a wild storm raging all 
around him—the old king cannot sustain his connection with reality. Cordelia learns that 
he has been spotted wandering aimlessly in the fields after his breakdown, draped in 
flowers and weeds and singing to himself. Crestfallen by his degenerated condition, 
Cordelia‘s only concern lies with helping her father.  
Once Lear is found and brought to the French camp at Dover, he collapses into a 
deep and long sleep. After sufficient time has passed, the doctor advises that Cordelia 
wake him gently to see if his wits are restored. Although it takes him a few moments to 
understand that he is alive—and has not been brought back from the grave—Lear‘s 
senses slowly return. In this very moving scene, he recognizes his loving daughter 
Cordelia and acknowledges the great wrong he has committed against her: 
 Lear:  I am a very foolish fond old man, 
  Fourscore and upward, not an hour more nor less; 
  And, to deal plainly, 
  I fear I am not in my perfect mind. 
  [ . . . ]. Do not laugh at me, 
  For, as I am a man, I think this lady 
  To be my child Cordelia. 
 Cordelia: And so I am, I am. 
 Lear:  Be your tears wet? Yes, faith. I pray, weep not. 
  If you have poison for me, I will drink it. 
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  I know you do not love me; for your sisters 
  Have, as I remember, done me wrong. 
  You have some cause, they have not. 
 Cordelia: No cause, no cause. (IV. vii. 60 – 75) 
Cordelia has been watching over her father from afar, and now that they have been 
reunited, she wants him to know that she has forgiven him and loves him unconditionally.            
The story of Cordelia‘s care for her father beautifully illustrates some of the critical 
theories outlined in Nel Noddings‘ book Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and 
Moral Education (1984).  In this book, Noddings advances the philosophies introduced 
by psychologist Carol Gilligan in her seminal work In a Different Voice: Psychological 
Theory and Women’s Development (1982). As suggested in chapter two of this 
dissertation, Gilligan‘s work articulates her theory that men and women understand and 
treat moral problems differently. Initially written in response to Kohlberg‘s theory on the 
various stages of children‘s moral development, which claims that boys generally achieve 
a higher level of moral development than girls do, Gilligan‘s work sets forth an extensive 
criticism of Kohlberg‘s study methodology and assessment tools. One of her main 
arguments concerns Kohlberg‘s scoring method, which Gilligan insists favors principle-
based reasoning over relation-based reasoning.  Kohlberg concludes that boys achieve 
higher moral development than girls; but Gilligan argues that the study is faulty since 
boys commonly concentrate on principles and girls on relations in the moral decision-
making process. Women, she argues, ―tend to think of moral issues in terms of 
emotionally involved caring for others and connection to others, whereas most men see 
things in terms of autonomy from others and the just and rational application of rules or 
principles to problem situations‖ (Slote Ethics of Care 1). Gilligan‘s work provided a 
122 
 
scholarly context and fertile ground for the development of contemporary philosophical 
theories on the ethics of care.  
Dr. Nel Noddings, philosopher and educational theorist, has produced ground-
breaking research in the ethics of care and its relationship to education, social welfare, 
and family life. In Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (1984), 
Noddings advances a view of ethics that she terms ―feminine in the deep classical 
sense—rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness‖ as opposed to the more 
masculine principles of ethics such as ―justification, fairness, and equity‖ (1). The voice 
of the mother, Noddings argues, the voice of ―human caring and the memory of caring 
and being cared for, which [. . .] form the foundation of ethical response‖ has been, to a 
large extent, silent.  Whereas the field of ethics has primarily been guided by ―Logos, the 
masculine spirit,‖ Noddings suggests that the more appropriate approach would be 
through ―Eros, the feminine spirit‖ (1). Noddings argues that the real source, the very 
foundation of all ethical behavior is located in the ―human affective response‖ (3). This 
view in no way suggests that all consideration of logic should be abandoned during the 
process of moral reasoning. By advancing a view that for women, moral action begins 
with a longing for goodness, however, Noddings clearly departs from conventional 
masculine principles of ethics.  
Cordelia operates as a beautiful representation of Noddings‘ feminine principle of 
ethics. From the very beginning, she demonstrates her honest and genuine love for her 
father and acknowledges her duty to him for the care he has provided: ―You have begot 
me, bred me, loved me. I / Return those duties back as are right fit, / Obey you, love you, 
and most honor you‖ (I. i. 96-98). Failing to understand the sincerity and love inherent in 
123 
 
this response, Lear interprets Cordelia‘s words as harsh and ―untender.‖ But Lear is far 
off the mark here, for Cordelia understands the importance of care in a loving 
relationship. Her father has given her the gift of care all of her life; and she so cherishes 
this gift that she refuses to minimize its worth by ―heaving [her] heart into [her] mouth‖ 
and showering Lear with false flattery (I. i. 93). Here, Cordelia‘s voice is that which 
Noddings calls the voice of ―human caring and the memory of caring and being cared for, 
which [ . . . ] form the foundation of ethical response‖ (1). Clearly, Cordelia‘s moral 
action—stating her love for her father honestly—begins with a longing for goodness, 
which, according to Noddings, is a predominantly feminine approach to ethics. 
Although Lear rashly disinherits Cordelia, her genuine love and care for her father 
is immediately evidenced by her efforts on his behalf behind the scenes. As discussed in 
Chapter Two, an essential requirement of care ethics is that the one-caring be fully 
engaged in the relationship—fully present in her commitment to the cared-for. Presence 
in this respect, however, does not necessitate constant physical presence; clearly, ―acts at 
a distance bear the signs of presence: engrossment in the other, regard, desire for the 
other‘s well-being‖ (Noddings 19). Despite Cordelia‘s physical absence from Lear after 
Act I, scene I, she works feverishly on his behalf (without his knowledge)—mobilizing 
French troops under her new husband‘s command to save her father.  As Noddings posits, 
human beings can usually perceive when others are not wholly present in their caring 
commitment, and when this occurs, the cared-for naturally feels unimportant and perhaps 
even non-existent. Cordelia irrefutably provides more effective care from a distance than 
her sisters Goneril and Regan, who use their physical presence as a weapon against their 
father.     
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Cordelia‘s care for Lear reflects her purely natural and genuine love for him. She 
recognizes and affirms the importance of ―relatedness‖ in her family crisis; and such 
recognition and desire for relatedness, according to Noddings, constitutes the heart of 
care ethics. She is fully present as ―one-caring‖ (despite her physical absence) and 
exhibits genuine regard for her father‘s plight. In this sense, we again see how care as a 
feminine aspect of ethics distinguishes itself from deontological and consequentialist 
theories. Since there are no rigidly established rules to be followed in care ethics, the 
care-giver must genuinely care. Cordelia‘s actions, in this instance, are not controlled by 
fixed rule and may therefore change from day to day. Despite the potential 
multifariousness of actions chosen by Cordelia, however, her actions on a global level are 
entirely predictable from a care ethics standpoint: since she genuinely cares, she  
consistently acts in a way that demonstrates her concern for Lear. Cordelia‘s actions 
clearly demonstrate Noddings‘ movement away from the notion of objective morality 
(i.e., morality based on logical, rational, rule or consequence-based decision making) and 
toward the very personal heart of care: ―the conviction that an irremovable subjective 
core, a longing for goodness, provides what universality and stability there is in what it 
means to be moral‖ (Noddings 27). Cordelia beautifully illustrates this natural longing for 
goodness that Noddings insists rests at the heart of morality. 
The longing for goodness in care ethics relates specifically to the concept of 
empathy, a term that, according to Noddings, has lost its real meaning in our rational 
western society. Noddings reminds us that the notion of empathy simply means ―feeling 
with‖ another person; and this act is receptive in that I ―receive the other into myself, and 
I see and feel with the other‖ (30). She argues that our contemporary understanding of 
125 
 
empathy denotes a masculine projection of self into other instead of a more feminine 
reception of other into self. This notion of empathy as projection even finds confirmation 
in the Oxford Universal Dictionary: empathy—―The power of projecting one‘s 
personality into, and so fully understanding, the object of contemplation‖ (qtd. in 
Noddings 30). Such a definition promotes the use of clichés such as ―walking a mile in 
someone else‘s shoes‖ to convey empathy, for I am projecting myself into another‘s 
position and then examining the situation in order to understand. On the contrary, 
Noddings insists, real empathy requires no analysis or projection, only receptivity and 
feeling. 
Michael Slote concurs that empathy should be a matter of reception rather than 
projection. Slote posits that empathy ―involves having the feelings of another 
(involuntarily) aroused in ourselves, as when we see another person in pain. It is as if 
their pain invades us; there is a contagion between what one person feels and what 
another comes to feel‖ (Slote Ethics of Care 13). Furthermore, Slote insists that a direct 
connection exists between empathy and altruistic behavior. Someone who is in distress, 
in other words, has a much greater chance of receiving help from a person (even a 
complete stranger) who feels empathic distress when faced with the pain of others (14). 
Where one person might walk away, removing himself from the other person‘s pain or 
distress, the empathic person will in all likelihood act altruistically toward the one in 
distress. Genuine caring, then, is empathic caring, according to Slote. And it is this type 
of empathic caring that offers us a plausible standard of moral assessment.  
From the beginning of the play, Cordelia, the Earl of Kent, and Lear‘s Fool 
demonstrate the kind of empathic caring that Noddings and Slote discuss. These 
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characters exhibit no degree of self-interest in their initial efforts to guide Lear in the 
decision-making process or to protect him once he has stubbornly pursued a wrong-
headed course of action. Kent works diligently to convince Lear that he should neither 
disinherit Cordelia nor divide his kingdom between the two selfish, manipulative 
daughters. His empathic caring manifests itself in his pleas on Cordelia‘s behalf in Act 
I— immediately after Lear has disowned Cordelia. Before Kent can articulate his 
concerns about Lear‘s rash decision, Lear warns him that ―The bow is bent and drawn,‖ 
and that he should avoid becoming the arrow‘s next victim (I. i. 143). Clearly, Lear has 
worked himself into a heightened state of anxiety, and he is warning Kent that one wrong 
word may result in his own banishment. But Kent is not worried about his own well-
being; his empathic concern is for Cordelia only, whom he recognizes as Lear‘s only 
sincere and honest daughter. In a bold stand against Lear‘s irrational decision, Kent 
defends Cordelia: ―What wouldst thou do, old man? / Thinkst thou that duty shall have 
dread to speak / When power to flattery bows? To plainness honor‘s / bound / When 
majesty falls to folly. Reserve thy state, / And in thy best consideration check / This 
hideous rashness. Answer my life my judgment, / Thy youngest daughter does not love 
thee least, / Nor are those empty-hearted whose low sounds / Reverb no hollowness‖ (I. i. 
146-153). Despite Lear‘s increasing fury, Kent persists in Cordelia‘s defense: ―Revoke 
thy gift, / Or whilst I can vent clamor from my throat, / I‘ll tell thee thou dost evil‖ (I. i.  
164-166). Kent fully understands his own precarious position in the court of this 
imprudent king, yet he has become so indignant about Lear‘s injustice toward Cordelia 
that he remains steadfast in her cause. Even after Lear follows through with his threat and 
banishes Kent, the good earl‘s parting words to Cordelia demonstrate his selfless, 
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empathic concern for her: ―The gods to their dear shelter take thee, maid, / That justly 
think‘st, and hast most rightly said‖ (I. i. 183- 84). In this scene, Kent demonstrates the 
kind of connection between empathy and altruism that Slote views as essential to genuine 
caring. Openly receptive to Cordelia‘s feelings of loss and betrayal, Kent works 
altruistically on her behalf— risking dire consequence and ultimately suffering a similar 
proscription.  
Despite his banishment, Kent silently vows his continued loyalty to the king. This 
action does not arise from a sense of blind allegiance, however. Instead, Kent‘s 
determination to continue his service to Lear stems from his genuine love for the king 
and his desire to protect him not only from his own poor judgment but also from his 
vicious daughters. Disguising his appearance and accent, therefore, Kent determines to 
secure employment as a servant to Lear. He contemplates this course of action as he 
prepares to approach Lear: ―Now, banished Kent, / If thou canst serve where thou dost 
stand condemned, / So may it come, thy master whom thou lov‘st / Shall find thee full of 
labors‖ (I. iv. 4-7). Kent so loves the aged and foolhardy king that he rejects the 
possibility of leaving at a time when he believes Lear needs him most. Genuine empathic 
care motivates Kent‘s decision here. Disregarding an order of banishment from the king 
and pursuing a more difficult course of action than if he had obeyed the order and 
remained independent, Kent anticipates Lear‘s needs and remains receptive to his 
feelings. 
Despite King Lear‘s rash and foolish behavior, Kent remains loyal by serving the 
king in disguise, and Cordelia remains true by gathering the French army to rescue her 
father.  But Lear also has the good fortune of having his kind-hearted Fool by his side: a 
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court jester who employs witticisms in an attempt to guide Lear‘s decision-making in the 
beginning of the play, and offers his comfort and support as Lear‘s situation 
progressively worsens. Naturally, since he is the court jester, his remarks are cleverly 
disguised as jokes and riddles; but the fool‘s cheeky comments fail to conceal his genuine 
concern for the foolish old king. Soon after Lear has divided his kingdom between 
Goneril and Regan, for example, the fool says, ―Nuncle, give me an egg, and I‘ll give 
thee two crowns.‖ Lear asks, ―What two crowns shall they be?‖ And the fool responds: 
―Why, after I have cut the egg i‘ th‘ middle and / Eat up the meat, the two crowns of the 
egg. When thou / Clovest thy crown I‘ th‘ middle and gav‘st away both / Parts, thou 
bor‘st thine ass on thy back o‘er the dirt. / Thou hadst little wit in thy bald crown when 
thou / Gav‘st thy golden one away (I. iv. 158-165). Lear‘s fool, who is always close by, 
offers a plethora of such admonishments, most of which the king bears patiently as the 
random musings of a fool. But Kent understands that the fool is demonstrating real 
insight into Lear‘s misguided decision-making. After reciting a rhyme in which the fool 
suggests that Lear should be the one wearing motley, Lear asks, ―Dost thou call me fool, 
boy?‖ When the fool responds, ―All thy other titles thou hast given away; that thou wast 
born with,‖ Kent immediately observes: ―This is not altogether fool, my lord‖ (I. iv. 150-
153). But at this point in Act I, Lear is yet unconvinced of the egregious error he has 
made. That fact does not become clear to him until his two vicious daughters have, 
individually and as a team, abused, berated, and degraded him throughout the entirety of 
Act II.  
Act II concludes at Gloucester‘s castle, where Goneril and Regan have met to 
demonstrate their solidarity against their father. The daughters have reduced Lear‘s 
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retinue from one hundred to fifty knights, to twenty-five— ultimately suggesting that he 
really needs not even one attendant with him. Unable to endure the cruelty of this last 
humiliation, Lear finally accepts the enormity of his folly. As the tempests outside and 
within Lear‘s mind begin to rage, Lear storms out of the castle. Turning to his loyal fool, 
Lear admits his tenuous grasp of reality: ―O Fool, I shall go mad!‖ (II. iv. 283). In the 
subsequent scenes, the fool‘s actions reveal a loyalty that is rooted in genuine compassion 
and increasing empathy for the king. Although we never learn what becomes of the 
knights in Lear‘s train, we assume that they disperse and go their own ways when they 
realize that Lear can no longer support their high-maintenance lifestyle. Lear‘s fool, 
however, stays by his side—even as Lear rages at the gods and the elements in the wild 
storm on the heath. The fool makes a valiant effort to protect the king by coaxing him out 
of the storm and into shelter, even suggesting that Lear swallow his pride by returning to 
Gloucester‘s castle: ―O nuncle, court holy-water in a dry house is / better than this rain 
water out o‘ door. Good nuncle, / in; ask thy daughters blessing. Here‘s a night pities / 
neither wise man nor fools‖ (III. ii. 10-13). But Lear‘s dramatic break with reality 
prevents any engagement with common-sense decisions. And when he refuses to take 
shelter, his fool (who has not lost his sanity) demonstrates true empathy by allowing 
himself to be battered by the tempest right alongside Lear. The fool‘s empathic concern 
for Lear manifests itself in a very explicit sense here, as he literally opens his heart and 
body to receive the anguish and physical punishment that Lear is experiencing. Scholars 
still debate the significance of the fool‘s final lines at the end of this scene: ―And I‘ll go 
to bed at noon‖ (III. iv. 84). Some suggest that, since these are the last lines he speaks—
and they are in the middle of the play—that is merely Shakespeare‘s way of writing the 
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fool out of the play ―at noon‖—i.e., half-way through the play. Others argue that the 
storm has been too much for him and these are the fool‘s dying words. He is, in other 
words, dying in the noon-time of his life—i.e., half-way through his life. If we interpret 
the fool‘s last words as a death-bed statement, then we must understand his loyalty on the 
heath as heroically self-sacrificing.    
As previously discussed, care ethics requires some degree of reciprocity. One-
caring, Noddings posits, must be met somewhere on the pathway by cared-for or the 
relation will break down.
28
 But what happens when one-caring still genuinely cares 
despite cared-for‘s lack of recognition or reciprocity in the relationship? The maintenance 
of care by one-caring under these circumstances becomes challenging in the extreme. 
Naturally, we want to be recognized and appreciated by those to whom we dedicate our 
care. Even infants respond to their caregivers‘ love by looking into their eyes and smiling 
or giggling. This is enough reciprocity for one-caring, whose efforts at making the baby 
happy are so obviously satisfied. As we know, however, adults often surprise us with 
behaviors that we find difficult to explain or accept. One such behavior concerns cared-
for‘s refusal, for whatever reason, to reciprocate or even acknowledge the efforts made in 
his behalf by one-caring. When cared-for declines to meet one-caring somewhere on the 
path, one-caring can either stop caring or continue to care in a real and genuine fashion 
(Noddings 69-74). The latter course of action—and it is action, as one-caring initiates and 
sustains effort in cared-for‘s behalf—is taxing both physically and emotionally.  
In King Lear, non-reciprocity of care manifests itself through both the title 
character (Lear) and the tragic hero of the subplot, Gloucester. Since the king has no idea 
                                                 
28
 See Chapter 2 for a complete discussion of reciprocity in Care Ethics. 
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that Cordelia is working feverishly on his behalf from afar, he cannot possibly reciprocate 
by acknowledging or appreciating her as one-caring. Although she is ―fully present‖ in 
her long distance role as one-caring, she does not reveal her plan to Lear; he cannot, 
therefore, be expected to meet her half-way as cared-for. Likewise, Gloucester does not 
know that his faithful son Edgar, disguised as Poor Tom, a Bedlam beggar, is the one 
caring for him after his eyes are gouged out by the evil Duke of Cornwall. Gloucester  
accepts the assistance of his two loyal servants who bandage his bleeding eyes after he is 
blinded and thrust out of his own castle. But when an old man (Gloucester‘s long-time 
tenant) tries to serve as his guide, Gloucester begs to be left alone: ―Away, get thee away; 
good friend, be gone: / Thy comforts can do me no good at all‖ (IV. i. 15-16). When they 
take shelter in the hovel and find Poor Tom hiding there, Gloucester eagerly requests that 
Tom become his guide because, as he says, ― ‘Tis the time‘s plague, when madmen lead 
the blind‖ (IV. i. 46). Giving Tom the entire contents of his purse, Gloucester asks Tom 
to lead him to the very edge of one of the high cliffs of Dover. ―From that place,‖ 
Gloucester says, ―I shall no leading need‖ (IV. i. 77-78).  Demonstrating gratitude by 
verbal affirmation and the gift of money to Poor Tom, Gloucester proves his willingness 
to participate in the ethical give-and-take of caring offered by Poor Tom. But is he, 
according to the philosophical standards of neo-Aristotelian Care Ethics, truly receptive 
of the care offered by his son Edgar? And more importantly, can the relationship between 
Edgar and his father be characterized as one of caring? I would argue that the answer to 
both questions is a definite no.  
Nel Noddings offers excellent support for this position in what she calls a ―logical 
analysis of the caring relation‖ (68). Noddings argues that two factors must be present in 
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order for a caring relationship to exist: 1.) The cared-for must understand that the one-
caring truly has an attitude of caring for him, and 2.) This attitude of caring must 
successfully impact the cared-for. Furthermore, if X (cared-for) does not recognize that Y 
(one-caring) actually cares, we must accept the fact that a caring relation does not exist. 
Noddings fully realizes that it may seem paradoxical that one-caring must rely on the 
cooperation of cared-for (via recognition and understanding) in order for the caring 
relation to exist. She therefore expounds the theory: 
Caring involves two parties: the one-caring and the cared-for. It is 
complete when it is fulfilled in both. [ . . . ] Suppose I claim to care for X, 
but X does not believe that I care for him. If I meet the first-person 
requirements of caring for X, I am tempted to insist that I do care—that 
there is something wrong with X that he does not appreciate my caring. 
But if you are looking at this relationship, you would have to report, 
however reluctantly, that something is missing. X does not feel that I care. 
Therefore, sadly, I must admit that, while I feel that I care, X does not 
perceive that I care and, hence, the relationship cannot be characterized as 
one of caring. This result does not necessarily signify a negligence on my 
part. There are limits in caring. X may be paranoid or otherwise 
pathological. There may be no way for my caring to reach him. But, then, 
caring has been only partly actualized. (68) 
The act of caring, then, can only be completed when cared-for recognizes and receives 
the care. Certainly, one-caring can choose to continue her care despite cared-for‘s lack of 
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receptivity. One-caring, however, must then accept the fact that she is working in an 
incomplete relation.                                                                                                                      
 When the blinded Gloucester encounters Poor Tom in the hovel and solicits his 
assistance in climbing to the top of one of the cliffs, he fully believes that he is being 
aided by a madman who will allow him to fall to his death. In reality, of course, he is 
being led by his loyal son Edgar, who would never allow his beloved father to jump off 
the cliff. In this scene, there can be no question that Edgar is fully engaged as one-caring.  
In the hovel prior to their departure for Dover, Gloucester confesses his previous 
blindness and consequent wrong-doing to his loyal son, whom he believes he has lost 
forever: ―I have no way and therefore want no eyes; / I stumbled when I saw. Full oft ‘tis 
seen, / Our means secure us, and our mere defects / Prove our commodities. O dear son 
Edgar, / The food of thy abusèd father‘s wrath! / Might I but live to see thee in my touch, 
/ I‘d say I had eyes again!‖ (IV. i. 17-22). In this scene, of course, Gloucester is speaking 
to the Old Man (his tenant) and Poor Tom, fearing that he will never have an opportunity 
to beg forgiveness of Edgar. But Edgar has heard the confession and is crestfallen at the 
sight of his father‘s degradation; he therefore resolves to guide his father and protect him 
from further injury. A logical question at this particular juncture might be: Why does 
Edgar choose not to disclose his real identity to Gloucester at this time? After all, one 
would think that the knowledge that he is now under the care of his beloved son instead 
of a madman would have to provide great joy and comfort to the blinded old duke. But 
Edgar decides not to reveal his identity, instead allowing his father to believe that he is 
being led to a location suitable for his suicidal intentions. What could possibly motivate 
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this seemingly irrational decision? A sufficient answer may be found in three varieties of 
Care Ethics: non-rational care, natural care, and ethical care. 
Nel Noddings suggests that genuine caring—the kind that springs from the very 
heart of the care-giver—is, in a very basic sense, non-rational. In order to explain her 
position, Noddings calls upon a theory provided by child development psychologist Urie 
Bronfenbrenner: ―In order to develop, a child needs the enduring, irrational involvement 
of one or more adults in care and joint activity with the child.‖ When asked to clarify his 
use of the term ―irrational,‖ Bronfenbrenner explains, ―Somebody has got to be crazy 
about that kid!‖ (qtd. in Noddings 61). Noddings believes the same must be true in caring 
situations between adults. The attitude of the care-giver, in other words, ―is a total 
conveyance of self to other, a continual transformation of individual to duality to new 
individual to new duality. Neither the engrossment of the one-caring nor the perception of 
attitude by the cared-for is rational; that is, neither is reasoned‖ (61). The basic 
relationship in genuine caring, then, is not rational; the care-giver, quite simply, is crazy 
about the cared-for. In exploring the Edgar-Gloucester relationship, it is clear that Edgar 
loves and respects his father unconditionally; he is crazy about him. Edgar loves his 
father the same when he is the noble son Edgar as he does when he becomes Poor Tom 
the beggar, or a country peasant (the accent he adopts after Gloucester thinks he has 
fallen from the cliff and survived by some miracle). His love for his father is unrelenting 
whether Gloucester is a noble and kind Duke, a rash and wrathful father, or a repentant, 
humbled old man. Regardless of their individual identities, the new dualities they form 
together, or the decisions they make, Edgar‘s love for Gloucester is steadfast and his 
caring assured.   
135 
 
The next type of care we can associate with Edgar is what Noddings calls ―natural 
caring.‖ Natural caring, as we shall see, shares a close connection with ethical caring. 
Noddings argues, however, that natural caring holds a position of primacy, as it exists as 
a precondition for ethical caring. She explains that ―morality as an ‗active virtue‘ requires 
two feelings and not just one. The first is the sentiment of natural caring. There can be no 
ethical sentiment without the initial, enabling sentiment. In situations where we act on 
behalf of the other because we want to do so, we are acting in accord with natural caring‖ 
(79).  Edgar‘s natural desire to care for his father is incontestable. But his method and 
approach to caring for the lost and blinded Gloucester reveal an ethical complexity far 
beyond mere natural caring. Noddings argues that ethical caring requires a certain effort 
that is not necessary to natural caring. The one-caring, in other words, experiences a 
conflict between his own personal desires and whatever he feels must be done for the 
other. He feels that he ―must‖ do something for the other despite his strong desire not to. 
This type of ethical caring, according to Noddings, occurs in response to our fondest 
memories of receiving and giving care:  
The memory of our own best moments of caring and being cared for 
sweeps over us as a feeling— as an ―I must‖— in response to the plight of 
the other and our conflicting desire to serve our own interests. [. . .] When 
I encounter an other and feel the natural pang conflicted with my own 
desires—―I must— I do not want to‖— I recognize the feeling and 
remember what has followed it in my own best moments. I have a picture 
of those moments in which I was cared for and in which I cared, and I may 
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reach toward this memory and guide my conduct by it if I wish to do so. 
(80)    
Edgar‘s decision not to reveal his true identity to his father may be understood through 
this lens of ethical caring. Upon seeing the tragedy of his own father— blinded and 
bandaged— Edgar‘s natural inclination would surely be to reach out to his father, tell him 
that all is forgiven, that his loving son is there to care for him now, and that all will be 
well. But Edgar resists the personal desire to reveal this emotionally-charged information 
to a man in such a fragile, vulnerable state. The pain and humiliation Gloucester has 
experienced has devastated him, and Edgar does not know if his father would be able to 
handle the additional stress of confronting the son he has wronged. But it pains Edgar to 
keep his identity undisclosed. Although he never explains his reasoning explicitly, 
Edgar‘s Asides reveal how difficult this decision is for him. In Act IV, scene I, for 
example, when Edgar (as Poor Tom) has agreed to lead Gloucester to Dover, Edgar says 
[Aside]: I cannot daub it further. / [ . . . ] / And yet I must.—Bless thy sweet eyes, they 
bleed‖ (53-54). And when they arrive at what Gloucester believes to be the top of a cliff, 
he bids Poor Tom farewell, asking him to leave: ―Go thou further off; / Bid me farewell, 
and let me hear thee going.‖ Edgar responds, ―Now fare ye well, good sir. [Aside] Why I 
do trifle thus with his despair / Is done to cure it‖ (IV. vi. 30-33). Here, Edgar indicates 
that his intention in playing along with Gloucester‘s desire to end his life is to somehow 
bring his father back to his senses. It is a difficult role to play, but Edgar feels strongly 
that this is the only way to cure Gloucester‘s despair.  
As the play winds toward conclusion, the French army has lost the battle, Lear 
and Cordelia have been imprisoned, and Edgar has defeated Edmund in a duel. Edgar 
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relates his entire experience as Poor Tom to Albany, who has asked where he had hidden 
and how he had known what happened to his father. After telling the tale, Edgar explains 
that he finally revealed his true identity to his father half an hour earlier: ―I asked his 
blessing, and from first to last / Told him our pilgrimage. But his flawed heart--/ Alack  
too weak the conflict to support--/ ‘Twixt two extremes of passion, joy and grief, / Burst 
smilingly‖ (V. iii. 196-200). Clearly, Edgar had made the right ethical decision in not 
divulging his identity to his emotionally over-wrought father earlier. He believed, 
however, that Gloucester—who was no longer despairing and suicidal—would now be 
capable of handling the emotional reunion with his loyal son. Unfortunately, Edgar  
misjudged his father‘s physical strength; the knowledge of his tender son‘s ministrations 
was just too much for Gloucester‘s fragile heart. Despite his father‘s death, however, 
Edgar clearly engages in both natural and ethical caring for Gloucester throughout the 
play. He does not need overarching principles to guide his behavior. Instead, as 
Noddings, suggests, Edgar simply calls upon his best memories of caring and being cared 
for in order to motivate him beyond natural caring and into the more challenging realm of 
ethical caring.   
As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, my intention is to examine both good 
and evil characters in King Lear through the lens of neo-Aristotelian Care Ethics in order 
to determine the role or significance of gender in the characters‘ ethical decision-making 
processes. Noddings and Gilligan have both concluded that the essential concept of 
―care‖ as a motivator to ethical decision-making is guided more by the feminine spirit 
(Eros)— the approach of the mother, than by the masculine spirit (Logos)— the approach 
of the detached one. Neither scholar suggests, of course, that care cannot be embraced 
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and practiced by men, only that care is rooted in ideals that they consider more feminine 
than masculine— ―receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness‖ (Noddings 2). Gilligan 
argues that men tend to focus on principles and logic while women concentrate on 
relations in the moral decision-making process. Women commonly assess moral issues in 
terms of caring for others and becoming emotionally connected to others, whereas men 
generally look at how rules and existing rational principles can be used to solve moral 
problems. In Gilligan‘s article titled ―Woman‘s Place in Man‘s Life Cycle‖ (Harvard 
Educational Review), Gilligan says, ―Women not only define themselves in a context of 
human relationship but also judge themselves in terms of their ability to care. Woman‘s 
place in man‘s life cycle has been that of nurturer, caretaker, and helpmate, the weaver of 
those networks of relationships on which she in turn relies‖ (440). What, then, can be said 
about the good characters in Lear? Three of the four truly virtuous characters in the play 
are men (Kent, Edgar, and the Fool) and only one (Cordelia) is a woman. Certainly, all 
four of these characters serve as nurturers, caretakers, and helpmates. Kent, Edgar, and 
the Fool demonstrate high degrees of caring in their relationships with others— certainly 
comparable to the level of care exhibited by Cordelia . Furthermore, as I shall discuss 
momentarily, two of the exceedingly wicked characters in the play are Lear‘s own 
daughters, Goneril and Regan. Standing in diametric opposition to the positions advanced 
by Noddings and Gilligan, the behavior of Lear‘s evil daughters calls into question the 
theory that women care primarily about relationships and emotional connection to others 
in the moral decision-making process. I will discuss the unethical behaviors of Goneril 
and Regan simultaneously since they present a unified front against their father. Granted, 
the relationship between the sisters becomes increasingly contentious as the play 
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progresses— with each sister vying for the attentions of the cunning Edmund. Ultimately, 
in a grand act of jealousy, revenge, and self-loathing, Goneril poisons Regan and kills 
herself.
29
 The sisters do not turn against each other, however, until they have acted in 
vicious solidarity against Lear. It is precisely this cruelty toward their aged father that I 
will focus on here.      
In order to appreciate the full extent of their evil, it is important to understand 
how maliciously Goneril and Regan deceive Lear at the beginning of the play. Remember 
that Lear has decided to divest himself of all cares of state by dividing his territories 
among his daughters. In determining who shall receive the largest parcel, Lear vainly 
decides to make his gifts dependent on each daughter‘s protestation of love for him: 
―Which of you shall we say doth love us most, / That we our largest bounty may extend / 
Where nature doth with merit challenge‖ (I. i. 51-53). Both daughters immediately offer 
oleaginous declarations, Goneril first: ―Sir, I love you more than word can wield the 
matter; / Dearer than eyesight, space, and liberty; / Beyond what can be valued, rich or 
rare; / No less than life, with grace, health, beauty, honor; / As much as child e‘er loved, 
or father found; / A love that makes breath poor, and speech unable: / Beyond all manner 
of so much I love you‖ (55-61). Next, Regan assures her father that she is made of that 
―self mettle as my sister,‖ but that Goneril‘s declaration of love actually falls short of her 
own. In fact, she insists, ―I profess / Myself an enemy to all other joys / Which the most 
precious square of sense professes, / And find I am alone felicitate / In your dear 
                                                 
29
 Goneril and Regan both fall in love with Edmund, who deceitfully pledges his love to both women.  
Regan‘s husband Cornwall is fatally wounded by a servant at the end of Act III. Goneril‘s jealousy is 
inflamed by the knowledge that her sister, now a widow, will legally be able to pursue her relationship with 
Edmund. She therefore enlists Edmund‘s service in planning to murder her husband Albany, and she 
poisons Regan. When her plot against Albany is discovered and Edmund confesses his involvement, 
Goneril kills herself. Shortly thereafter, Edmund dies from the mortal injury he received at Edgar‘s hands. 
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highness‘ love‖ (72-76). Lear is extremely pleased with these false and hyperbolic 
testimonies, and he looks to Cordelia for a ―third more opulent than your sisters‖ (86). 
When she expresses her love simply and sincerely—―I love your majesty / According to 
my bond, no more or less‖ (93-94)— Lear becomes incensed at what he interprets as her 
―untender‖ speech. As previously discussed, he disinherits Cordelia entirely, dividing all 
of his territory between the two fulsome sisters. We learn quickly from Kent, Cordelia,  
and even Goneril and Regan themselves that their exaggerated protestations of love were 
offered in the spirit of greed, not truth. The cunning sisters acknowledge Lear‘s poor 
judgment in casting Cordelia off so rashly, and they vow to work together in their 
dealings with the old king. Goneril says, ―Pray you, let‘s hit / together; if our father carry 
authority with such / disposition as he bears, this last surrender of his will / but offend us. 
[ . . . ] We must do something, and i‘ th‘ heat‖ (I. i. 302-305). Thus, we learn at the very 
beginning that these two deceitful sisters are willing to work as a team to ensure that 
Lear‘s ill-considered decisions do not begin to inconvenience them. They are not thinking 
of ways to care for their father in his old age—how to help him, make him feel welcome 
and comfortable in their homes, show their gratitude for everything he has given them. 
Instead, they are thinking only of themselves, selfishly planning how to prevent Lear‘s 
interference in their lives. 
One of Lear‘s conditions upon abdication of his crown is that he and his retinue of 
one hundred knights will take up residence at each of his daughter‘s castles for one 
month intervals. Naturally, the daughters agree to the conditions at the time, as Lear is 
bestowing authority, wealth, and property upon them. As soon as Lear and his train move 
in with Goneril, however, the eldest daughter‘s true nature is revealed and the problems 
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begin. Goneril‘s harsh ingratitude and disrespect for her father are first displayed in Act I, 
scene iii, when she encourages Oswald (her steward) to be negligent of Lear‘s needs and 
demands. She claims that Lear‘s attendants are too riotous, that Lear himself is behaving 
like a child, and that the situation must be brought under control. ―If he distaste it,‖ 
Goneril says to Oswald, ―let him to my sister, / Whose mind and mine I know in that are 
one, / Not to be overruled. Idle old man, / That still would manage those authorities / That 
he hath given away. Now, by my life, / Old fools are babes again, and must be used / 
With checks and flatteries, when they are seen abused‖ (I. iii. 15-21). We must remember 
that Lear has just handed tremendous power over to Goneril, as well as half of his 
property. It is certainly within her authority and financial means to provide adequate 
space and provisions for Lear and his retinue. But these are not actually the issues at the 
heart of Goneril‘s displeasure; in reality, Goneril and her sister want to shed themselves 
entirely of the responsibility of their aged father. Their unspoken but obvious intention, 
therefore, is to create living conditions that prove undesirable and unacceptable to Lear. 
Goneril makes the first move by reducing his retinue by fifty knights, a cruel and 
insulting action that greatly offends Lear. When Goneril presents a weak and 
unconvincing case suggesting that she fears for the safety of her own household members 
in the presence of this rowdy train of knights, her husband Albany responds that she 
―fears too far‖ (I. iv. 329).  Here, Goneril essentially admits that her fears are unfounded 
by telling Albany that she‘d rather fear too far than ―trust too far‖ (330). She chides her 
husband for his ―milky gentleness‖ in refusing to support her actions against Lear, to 
which he responds: ―How far your eyes may pierce I cannot tell; / Striving to better, oft 
we mar what‘s well‖ (I. iv. 347-48). This comment reveals two important truths: Albany 
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understands his wife‘s potential for evil, and he knows that there is no justifiable cause to 
―mar what‘s well‖ by reducing Lear‘s retinue.   
 Far from being ―fully present‖ as ones-caring, Goneril and Regan strive 
consciously to be as absent as possible to avoid the responsibility of caring for their aged 
father. In fact, when Regan receives word that Lear is on his way to her castle, she and 
her husband Cornwall purposefully leave their estate so they will not be home to receive 
him. Upon finally arriving at Gloucester‘s castle, where he assumes he will find his 
daughter Regan, Lear is mortified by yet another indignity: Regan and Cornwall have put 
Lear‘s messenger (Kent) in the stocks! In sheer disbelief over this scandalous action, Lear 
denies that it could be true: ―They durst not do‘t; / They could not, would not do‘t. ‘Tis 
worse than murder / To do upon respect such violent outrage‖ (II. iii. 22-24). Obviously, 
Regan is keeping her promise to operate in league with her sister, heaping insults and 
indignities upon Lear‘s heart and mind until he breaks.  
It is worth noting here that despite Lear‘s often rash, petulant, and highly 
explosive temperament, he is actually just ―a very foolish fond old man‖—extremely 
sensitive and easily wounded by word and deed (IV. vii. 60). Unable (and perhaps 
unwilling) to find a healthy balance between states of devastation and fury, Lear reacts to 
his daughters‘ unkind actions by moving seamlessly between rage and heart-break. When 
Goneril reduces his retinue by half, for instance, Lear simultaneously cries, yells, and 
curses his daughter: ―Life and death, I am ashamed / That thou has power to shake my 
manhood thus! / That these hot tears, which break from me perforce, / Should make thee 
worth them. Blasts and fogs upon thee! / Th‘ untented woundings of a father‘s curse /      
Pierce every sense about thee!‖ (I. iv. 298-303). Never one to conceal his emotions, Lear 
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makes sure that everyone around him knows exactly how he is feeling at all times. 
Exhibiting wild and erratic moods swings between despair and rage throughout the play, 
Lear heaps curses upon others one moment and finds himself weeping inconsolably the 
next.  
 Perhaps the most reasonable explanation for Lear‘s tenuous emotional state is 
simply his advanced age. Because he is ―Fourscore and upward, not an hour more or 
less,‖ he has decided to ―shake all cares and business from our age, / Conferring them on 
younger strengths, while we / Unburthened crawl toward death‖ ( IV. vii. 61; I. i. 39-41). 
He just wants his life to be easy now that he is old, and he believes that his daughters and 
their husbands will take care of him. He has, after all, given them everything— power, 
authority, all of his material wealth— not to mention a lifetime of fatherly care, 
education, and love (as Cordelia graciously indicates in the first scene). But Goneril has 
no intention of showing gratitude for her many gifts. After she has reduced his retinue 
and Lear has stormed off to live with Regan instead, Lear clearly states that he wants, 
needs, and expects Regan to keep her end of the bargain— to care for him, respect his 
needs and wishes, behave like a grateful daughter: ― ‘Tis not in thee / To grudge my 
pleasures, to cut off my train, / To bandy hasty words, to scant my sizes, / And, in 
conclusion, to oppose the bolt / Against my coming in. Thou better know‘st / The offices 
of nature, bond of childhood, / Effects of courtesy, dues of gratitude. / Thy half o‘ th‘ 
kingdom hast thou not forgot, / Wherein I thee endowed‖ (II. iv. 170-77). In discussing 
the plight of the blinded Gloucester, who is cared for by his disguised son Edgar, and 
Lear, who is cared for by the disguised Earl of Kent, we saw that the ―cared-for‖ has an 
important role in the caring relationship. If the ―cared-for‖ does not acknowledge the 
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efforts of the care-giver or does not reciprocate by meeting the one-caring somewhere on 
the road, the relationship cannot be characterized as truly caring because it is incomplete, 
only partly actualized. In the case of Lear and his two daughters, however, Lear most 
certainly does his part to meet his care-givers half-way. He hands everything over to 
them in exchange for their care. The conditions are clearly established from the 
beginning; everyone involved understands and accepts them, and all that is left to do is 
abide by those conditions as Lear crawls toward death.   
 Goneril and Regan, however, prove quite unwilling to complete the caring 
relationship. Nel Noddings explains such a relationship through the lens of Gabriel 
Marcel‘s existentialist theory of ―indisposability.‖  According to Marcel, one who is 
―disposable‖ demonstrates a readiness to ―spend oneself and make oneself available.        
[ . . . ] She does not identify herself with her objects and possessions. She is present to the 
cared-for‖ (qtd. in Noddings 19). Goneril and Regan, on the contrary, display an attitude 
of ―indisposability.‖ Such persons come across ―even to one physically present as absent, 
as elsewhere. When I am with someone who is indisposable, I am conscious of being 
with someone for whom I do not exist; I am thrown back on myself‖ (Marcel qtd. in 
Noddings 19). In a relationship wherein the care-giver is indisposable, the cared-for feels 
no warmth, comfort, or engrossment from the one-caring. Quite simply, the one-caring 
does not truly care. This is the devastating truth that Lear learns about his daughters as 
they degrade and humiliate him throughout Act II. Despite Lear‘s hearted pleas to what 
he hopes is Regan‘s nobler spirit, she remains steadfast in her allegiance to Goneril. 
Entirely indisposable, absent in her role as care-giver, Regan not only turns Lear‘s retinue 
away but also tells Lear that he must apologize to Goneril, finish the month with her, and 
145 
 
then come back when she is ready for him: ―I looked not for you yet,‖ she says, ―nor am 
provided / For your fit welcome‖ (II. iv. 229-30). Both daughters reject Lear‘s efforts to 
receive the care he needs, instead taking turns reducing his retinue further and further 
until Regan viciously suggests that he needs not even one attendant. We must remember 
that neither daughter refuses to care for Lear himself; they merely reject the original 
terms of Lear‘s abdication— that he and his one hundred knights would live with each 
daughter for one month intervals. As he reminds them, ―I made you my guardians, my 
depositaries, / But kept a reservation to be followed / With such a number‖ (II. iv. 248-
50). Lear quite correctly views their refusal to accommodate his full retinue as a breech 
of contract— one that both daughters eagerly accepted when Lear was in the process of 
dividing his kingdom.  
 Act II, scene iv, wherein Goneril and Regan take turns reducing Lear‘s train until 
they have eradicated it entirely, reveals the truly heartless nature of both women. They 
can clearly see how distraught their father is becoming over their harsh, unreasonable 
demands, but his outbursts of sorrow and ire merely fuel their ruthlessness. When Regan 
suggests that she will accommodate no more than twenty-five knights with Lear, he 
reminds her: ―I gave you all.‖ Far from grateful, however, Regan responds with hostile 
ingratitude: ―And in good time you gave it‖ (II. iv. 246-47). Faced with the offensive 
reality of keeping only twenty-five knights, Lear turns back to Goneril, concluding that 
she must love him twice as much as Regan since she is allowing him to keep fifty 
knights. But this idea is quickly dismissed when Goneril asks, ―What need you five-and-
twenty? ten? or five?‖ And showing no whit of mercy, Regan deals the final blow: ―What 
need one?‖ (II. iv. 58-60). Lear‘s ―reason not the need!‖ response is one of the most well-
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known and heart-wrenching passages in the play. In it, Lear realizes that he has fallen 
from great heights to miserable depths. A powerful, respected king of England only days 
ago, Lear has been effectively reduced to nothing. What he has not voluntarily given to 
his daughters, they have viciously stripped from him, and now— unable to mentally and 
emotionally process this stupefying ordeal— the old king fears (rightly) that he will lose 
his mind:   
O reason not the need! Our basest beggars 
Are in the poorest thing superfluous. 
Allow not nature more than nature needs, 
Man‘s life is cheap as beast‘s. [ . . . ] 
You see me here, you gods, a poor old man, 
As full of grief as age, wretched in both. 
If it be you that stirs these daughters‘ hearts 
Against their father, fool me not so much 
To bear it tamely; touch me with noble anger, 
And let not women‘s weapons, water drops, 
Stain my man‘s cheeks. [ . . . ]. 
I have full cause of weeping, but this heart 
Shall break into a hundred thousand flaws 
Or ere I‘ll weep. O Fool, I shall go mad! (II. iv. 262-80) 
This scene poignantly illustrates the power that care-givers can wield over the cared-for if 
they so desire. Literally at the mercy of his daughters, Lear must either dismiss all of his 
loyal attendants and resign himself to a sad and lonely existence, or reject his daughters‘ 
harsh edict, leave the castle with his train, and face the approaching tempest.  
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Noddings addresses this type of abusive behavior, suggesting that real danger 
exists when the care-giver lacks the love required by natural caring or the sense of justice 
required by ethical caring. When this occurs, the cared-for finds himself at the mercy of a 
potentially cruel ―other.‖ The cared-for has no immediate power or authority, and can 
only hope that his care-giver ―will care, will receive, will extend a hand to help.‖ If this 
does not happen, Noddings posits, ―every depravity conceived and yet to be conceived is 
a real possibility‖ (107). Unfortunately, we see such depravity at the end of Act II, as 
Lear flies from Gloucester‘s castle in high rage. Instead of mustering one iota of justice 
or compassion for their aged father, the wicked daughters command Gloucester to shut up 
his doors against the oncoming storm—and against Lear‘s re-entry. When Gloucester 
expresses deep concern for his dear old friend‘s safety in such a wild tempest, the 
daughters reveal their true depravity; ―My lord, entreat him by no means to stay,‖ Goneril 
commands Gloucester. And Regan‘s moral degeneracy even allows her to feel justified in 
blaming Lear for any injuries that may befall him: ―O, sir, to willful men / The injuries 
that they themselves procure / Must be their schoolmasters. Shut up your doors‖ (II. iv. 
299-301). This traumatic scenario illustrates the potential for depravity to which 
Noddings refers when the care-giver does not possess the capacity for natural or ethical 
caring.    
It seems, however, that in examining such reprehensible behaviors, we must look 
beyond the ideals of natural and ethical caring; we must inquire into the role of justice in 
an ethic of care. Philosopher Virginia Held extensively discusses the relationship between 
justice and care in her book The Ethics of Care As Moral Theory. Held explains that 
some care ethics scholars believe that an ethic of justice contrasts so sharply with ideas of 
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care that the two ethics cannot co-exist within the same moral theory. The reason for this 
perceived division lies in the focus of the two ethics:  
An ethic of justice focuses on questions of fairness, equality, individual  
rights, abstract principles, and the consistent application of them. An ethic 
of care focuses on attentiveness, trust, responsiveness to need, narrative 
nuance, and cultivating caring relations. Whereas an ethic of justice seeks 
a fair solution between competing individual interests and rights, an ethic 
of care sees the interests of carers and cared-for as importantly intertwined 
rather than as simply competing. Whereas justice protects equality and 
freedom, care fosters social bonds and cooperation. (Held 15)  
Ideas of justice and care undoubtedly emphasize very different aspects of ethics, which 
has motivated moral theorists to view them as mutually exclusive. But such a division has 
become increasingly unacceptable to care ethicists such as Virginia Held, who argues that 
since justice and care both hold great moral importance, they should be seen in tandem 
with one another. Furthermore, as the most deeply fundamental value, care actually 
―provides the wider and deeper ethics within which justice should be sought‖ (Held 17). 
According to Held, in other words, if we understand the ethics of care properly, we see 
that justice is an important part of the practice of care. This does not mean, of course, that 
the ethics of care is superior to justice ethics— only that it provides a sufficient 
framework within which considerations of justice may be made. Held posits that 
―Equitable caring is not necessarily better caring, it is fairer caring. And humane justice is 
not necessarily better justice, it is more caring justice‖ (16). Although it is possible to 
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administer care without considering how justice is specifically served in each situation, 
values such as fairness and individual rights certainly enhance the ethics of caring. 
 Unfortunately, ideals associated with justice are not a part of the program that 
Goneril and Regan have mapped out for their father. Their care involves no level of  
humane justice, no consideration of what might be fair or right or equitable to Lear. 
Instead, they mask their unjust treatment of the old king with irrelevant arguments about 
his age, his unreasonable demands, and the potential problems that Lear‘s attendants 
might pose. Goneril and Regan physically demonstrate their solidarity, for instance, by 
taking one another by the hand. When Lear inquires why Regan would take Goneril (who 
has at this point reduced his train to fifty men) by the hand, Regan chooses to ignore 
Lear‘s concern about her sister‘s harsh decision. Instead, she allows Goneril the pleasure 
of responding: ―Why not by th‘ hand, sir? How have I offended? / All‘s not offense that 
indiscretion finds / And dotage terms so‖ (II. iv. 191-91). This smug reply is merely a 
strategy of diversion—meant to distract Lear from the issue of his retinue and make him 
feel enfeebled and incompetent. Regan strengthens the impact of this offense with a 
direct suggestion: ―I pray you, father, being weak, seem so‖ and a moment later: ―Give 
ear, sir, to my sister, / For those that mingle reason with your passion / Must be content to 
think you old‖ (II. iv. 198; 231-33). Once they have sufficiently abused him for being 
old, they attempt to persuade him that their decision to reduce his numbers is founded in 
logic and reason. Regan insists that having so many followers is dangerous and 
expensive: ―Both charge and danger / speak ‘gainst so great a number. How in one house 
/ Should many people, under two commands, / Hold amity? ‘Tis hard, almost impossible‖ 
(II. iv. 236-39).  Goneril further insists that if Lear would content himself with the 
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existing servants in the daughters‘ castles, Goneril and Regan themselves could control 
them if they slacked in their service to Lear. Although these suggestions indeed sound 
reasonable and logical, we must remember Lear‘s original condition: that one hundred 
knights would accompany him on his sojourns at each daughter‘s home. Regardless of 
how sensible it seems to reduce the numbers of his attendants, therefore, the act itself 
smacks of injustice and selfish corruption.   
In exploring the deplorable actions of Goneril and Regan in this play, I have  
framed the discussion in some of the rational ideologies of care ethics: natural and ethical 
caring, empathy, reciprocity, and justice. In so doing, I am working under the assumption 
that these daughters— like so many other selfish, greedy, ungrateful children of 
privilege— possess the capacity for rational thought and the ability to make ethical 
decisions. The choices they make, in other words, are conscious and deliberate, and do 
not arise from any diminished mental capacity. If we accept this premise, there is only 
one reasonable conclusion: Goneril and Regan are, in the purest philosophical sense, evil. 
Like Jean-Paul Sartre, Noddings believes that real evil cannot be redeemed: ―When one 
intentionally rejects the impulse to care and deliberately turns her back on the ethical, she 
is evil, and this evil cannot be redeemed‖ (115). One who is evil, in other words, has 
chosen to be so—like one who chooses to be good has made a conscious decision in that 
direction. Evil, then, is not a state from which someone can be rescued by another. 
Instead, the one who has chosen evil must decide to reject it, to terminate it 
unconditionally. But Goneril and Regan have no intention of rejecting their evil choices 
and turning toward the light. In fact, Regan ―tops the lot‖ of Shakespeare‘s most evil 
characters, according to contemporary philosopher Colin McGinn, for her part in the 
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blinding of Gloucester. She so thoroughly enjoys her husband Cornwall‘s vicious act of 
stamping Gloucester‘s first eye out that she encourages him to take the other as well: 
―One side will mock another. Th‘ other too‖ (III. vii. 73). When a loyal servant tries to 
stop this barbarity, Regan stabs him in the back; and she derives pleasure from assuring 
Gloucester that it was his own son Edmund who betrayed him. After both of Gloucester‘s 
eyes have been gouged out, Regan delivers what many consider the cruelest line in all of 
Shakespeare: ―Go thrust him out at gates, and let him smell / His way to Dover‖ (95-96). 
McGinn says, ―Regan revels in the direct cruelty of violent acts, accompanied by verbal 
viciousness— no pity, no compassion, no justice. Regan spits villainy‖ (127).   By the 
time poor Gloucester and Lear realize that their offspring are irrevocably corrupt, the 
damage has been done. Lear believes that he has lost his one loyal daughter Cordelia, and 
he now feels ―How sharper than a serpent‘s tooth it is / To have a thankless child‖ (I. iv. 
290-91). Noddings claims that we are often completely lost because we learn too late that 
we are dealing with evil. This, she explains, is an ―unavoidable danger of acting under the 
guidance of an ethic of care‖ (116). Lear possesses many personal flaws: he is 
vainglorious, prideful, petulant, and often a terrible judge of character. But with a good 
heart and a trusting disposition, he is most certainly ―a man / More sinned against than 
sinning‖ (III. ii. 59-60). 
Earlier in this chapter, I explained the Ethics of Care as ―feminine in the deep 
classical sense—rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness‖ as opposed to the 
more masculine principles of ethics such as ―justification, fairness, and equity‖ 
(Noddings 1). This in no way indicates, however, that care ethics as a moral theory 
should be viewed as gender-specific to women only. Philosophers and psychologists have 
152 
 
dedicated a great deal of time and study to the discussion of how women and men differ 
in their approach to morality and their search for the ethical in human relationships. As 
Noddings posits, women certainly have reasons for their moral decisions, but ―the 
reasons point to feelings, needs, situational conditions, and their sense of personal ideal 
rather than universal principles and their application‖ (96). The notion that women and 
men often approach ethical decision-making from different perspectives, however, should 
not be interpreted as evidence that the ethics of care is more appropriately suited to 
women than to men. After all, as I have demonstrated in this chapter, three of the four 
truly caring characters in King Lear are men, and only one is a woman. And by the same 
token, the two most uncaring and vicious characters in the play are Lear‘s own daughters. 
We must recognize, therefore, that both men and women are fully capable of embracing 
or rejecting care as a guide to moral living. As Michael Slote optimistically suggests in 
The Ethics of Care and Empathy (2007), a fully developed ethics of care has the potential 
to serve as a ―total or systematic human morality, one that may be able to give us a better 
understanding of the whole range of moral issues that concern both men and women‖ (3).  
Shakespeare‘s masterpiece King Lear serves as a rich and edifying illustration of the 
various ways that Care Ethics may not only bear upon our individual ethical decisions, 
but may also deepen our understanding of the universal human moral condition.  
The analysis of literature through various philosophical lenses has become a 
burgeoning field of study in recent years, capturing the interest and attention of scholars 
in both disciplines. Over the past thirty or so years, we have gained beneficial insights 
from examinations of literature through every possible value system and moral theory, 
including deontological and utilitarian ethics, moral relativism, virtue theory, ethical 
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egoism and idealism, existentialism, intuitionism, and moral luck, just to name a few. The 
introduction of Care Ethics— a completely new moral theory that we may now add to our 
arsenal of philosophical tools for the exploration of literature— is very exciting.  A 
significant branch of Neo-Aristotelian Ethics, the Ethics of Care establishes the 
philosophical idea of genuine caring as essential to our moral development, maintaining 
that the very essence of our morality is to be found in human caring. The philosophical 
necessity of caring for others and using care as a guide to moral decision-making may 
now inform our readings and open the door to exciting new possibilities in literary 
analysis, as I have herein modeled with my analysis of Lear.     
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Conclusion 
Neo-Aristotelian Virtue: Opening New Doors for Interdisciplinary Study 
 
 
Renowned psychiatrist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross said, ―People are like stained-glass 
windows. They sparkle and shine when the sun is out, but when the darkness sets in, their 
true beauty is revealed only if there is a light from within.‖ This insightful glimpse into 
human nature has been the lodestar for my dissertation research.  It is so easy for us to 
appear radiant when the sun is shining: when life is good, friends are genuine, and those 
who profess to love us actually do. Who could fail to glimmer in the brilliant light of the 
sun? Such effulgence, however, merits neither accolade nor commendation; it is natural, 
easy, and therefore unimpressive. In this dissertation, I am more concerned with two 
other types of people: those whose inner light reveals true beauty even in the darkest 
hour, and those whose blackened souls deaden all light, all joy, all goodness. 
Shakespeare‘s tragedies offer bountiful examples of both virtue and vice, as 
contemporary philosopher Colin McGinn explains in Shakespeare’s Philosophy (2006): 
―Shakespeare‘s characters are, above all, ethical beings. They are defined by their moral 
qualities, their virtues and vices, their propensities toward good and bad. They make an 
ethical impression on the audience, from the moment of their introduction. We cannot see 
them as anything other than morally constituted beings, living embodiments of vice and 
virtue‖ (178). My objective in this dissertation has been to explore various ways that 
virtue and vice operate in two of Shakespeare‘s greatest tragedies, Othello and King Lear, 
through the lens of contemporary virtue ethics theory. 
For as long as the scholarly field of literary analysis has existed, literati have been 
investigating the moral fortitude of Shakespeare‘s characters. There is certainly no dearth 
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of literary scholarship (both older and current) employing various moral philosophies as a 
lens for analyzing Shakespeare‘s plays. Important critical work of this kind has been 
advanced by esteemed scholars such as John Andrews, David Beauregard, Catherine 
Belsey, Colin McGinn, John Gronbeck-Tedesco, Jean Lepley, Grace Tiffany, and Lewis 
Walker.
30
 A smaller and more concentrated body of scholarship commits itself 
specifically to an Aristotelian virtue ethics reading of Shakespeare, focusing on how 
various characters embody or otherwise exemplify virtues and vices as presented in 
Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics. W.R. Elton, Leon Golden, Agnes Heller, Irving Massey, 
Rodney Poisson, and Leah Scragg
31
 are among the scholars who have published 
important critical analyses in this area.  None of these works, however, has established a 
connection between contemporary virtue theory and Shakespeare‘s plays. This 
dissertation provides the essential foundational elements for a connection of that nature, 
and illustrates how  shifts in ethical analysis may impact our readings of Othello and 
King Lear. It is important scholarship in that it provides a burgeoning new field of 
philosophical analysis from which literary scholars may now draw for their own 
examinations of literature. And although my particular analysis deals exclusively with 
Shakespeare‘s characters, Neo-Aristotelian Virtue Ethics easily lends itself to analysis of 
                                                 
30
 John Andrews ―Ethical and Theological Questions in Shakespeare‘s Dramatic Works‖ and ― ‗Dearly 
bought revenge‘: Samson Agonistes, Hamlet, and Elizabethan Revenge Tragedy‖; David Beauregard  
―Justice: Virtue on Trial in The Merchant of Venice and Hamlet‖; Catherine Belsey ―The Case of Hamlet‘s 
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―Should Rome Burn? The Morality of Vengeance in Coriolanus (and Beyond)‖ and ―Shakespeare and the 
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many types of literature. Those who are interested in the connections between ethics and 
literature, therefore, now have an entirely new reservoir of excellent source material.   
Some of the prominent ethicists who have embraced neo-Aristotelian ideologies 
include Martha Nussbaum, Roger Crisp, Julia Annas, Michael Slote, Philippa Foot, 
Rosalind Hursthouse, Thomas Hurka, Christine Swanton, Justin Oakley, Virginia Held, 
Nel Noddings, and Nafsika Athanassoulis.
32
 For the purposes of this dissertation, 
however, I have focused primarily on the works of those whose virtue theories most 
effectively lend themselves to Shakespearian literary analysis: Christine Swanton, 
Michael Slote, Virginia Held, and Nel Noddings.
33
 In determining which tragedies to 
explore through the virtue lens, Colin McGinn‘s book Shakespeare’s Philosophy: 
Discovering the Meaning Behind the Plays (2006) proved to be nothing less than 
inspirational. In it, he ranks the virtues and vices as presented in Shakespeare‘s plays, 
arguing that deception is the principal vice and honesty the primary virtue:   
―The chief weapon of the villainous Shakespearean characters is always deception, and 
not, say, outright brutality. [. . .] Deception is not just a necessary means to nefarious 
ends, but an evil end in its own right. It is a basic form of power over other people, an 
assertion of individual will‖ (181). Likewise, McGinn asserts, morally excellent 
Shakespearean characters are always completely honest, forthright, and plainspoken—
even when they realize that their candor may be disadvantageous to them (182). Upon 
reading this passage in McGinn‘s book, I knew instantly that Othello and King Lear 
would become the analytical focal points of my dissertation. Iago, Goneril, Regan, and 
                                                 
32
 This is not a comprehensive list of contemporary virtue scholars; I have named only those who seem to 
be the most prolific in this field of specialization.  
33
 In Chapter Two, I also explain how neo-Aristotelian ethics has developed through the publication of 
important scholarship by Rosalind Hursthouse, Philippa Foot, Justin Oakley, and Nafsika Athanassoulis.  
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Edmund all use deception as a weapon— as a means of power over others. And as for the 
moral exemplars, Desdemona‘s completely innocent pleas on Cassio‘s behalf and 
Cordelia‘s refusal to inflate her protestations of filial love beautifully demonstrate the 
qualities that make honesty the primary virtue in Shakespeare‘s plays.  
 How, then, might we formulate a neo-Aristotelian reading of Othello and Lear, 
starting with honesty and deception as the fundamental ethical touch points? I begin, in 
chapter three, with a discussion of the most tragic dupe in all of Shakespeare, Othello. 
Generally regarded as a victim of Iago‘s deceptive machinations, Othello is usually 
interpreted as a tragic and pitiful character— one deserving of our sympathy. Although 
he murders his beautiful and innocent wife Desdemona, it almost breaks his heart to 
commit this ―honor killing.‖ He has been maliciously deceived by Iago, so we do not 
judge him as malevolent or depraved— only as witless and gullible. I demonstrate, 
however, that an examination of this widely sympathetic character through the lens of 
Aristotle‘s Nicomachean Ethics reveals a foolish and pathetic man who lacks the moral 
and intellectual fortitude necessary to earn the reader‘s sympathy. 
 I treat Iago next, analyzing his character through the Nietzchean virtue lens 
presented by neo-Aristotelian philosopher Christine Swanton. Nietzsche‘s deeply 
pessimistic view of the human condition includes his argument that mankind‘s normal 
state is one of fragility, weakness, and predisposition to sickness. Viewed from this 
philosophical perspective, I argue that Iago is a classic Nietzschean sick animal; his 
actions reveal his inner feelings of impotence and self-loathing, both professionally and 
personally. One of the reasons he is able to manipulate others and weave his malicious 
web of deceit so successfully is because he has previously established a reputation as 
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―Honest Iago.‖ Colin McGinn posits that ―there is no greater villain in Shakespeare than 
someone who has a reputation for honesty but is actually anything but. [. . .] That is an 
inversion of the greatest vice for the greatest virtue, and it shows that the detection of 
moral qualities is by no means easy‖ (182).  Throughout the course of the play, Iago 
compensates for his extreme feelings of inadequacy by creating a different persona: a 
powerful, vengeful, bloodthirsty ―other‖ that nobody recognizes or suspects. 
 The rise of Emilia from unobtrusive handmaid to tragic heroine comprises the 
remainder of my analysis of Othello. Using neo-Aristotelian philosopher Michael Slote‘s 
―agent-based‖ theory of ethics as a lens, I trace Emilia‘s evolution from one whose 
devotion to her husband unwittingly causes her to play a part in Iago‘s devastating plan 
of deception—to one whose commitment to truth and goodness inspires her to stand 
defiantly against him. She moves from silence in Acts I - III to moral action in Acts IV 
and V— staunchly defending Desdemona‘s character at every turn and even placing her 
own welfare in jeopardy by censuring Othello and incriminating Iago. I argue that an 
agent-based analysis of Emilia‘s character is impossible in the first three acts of the play 
because we do not know enough about her inner life and overall virtue to judge her 
actions responsibly. By Act V, however, her moral fortitude is beyond question. Despite 
the fact that Emilia‘s theft of Desdemona‘s handkerchief ultimately plays a critical role in 
Iago‘s villainous plan of destruction, an agent-based approach rejects the notion that any 
one action can be judged in isolation. Every action must be viewed in terms of its 
connection with the agent‘s inner life (motives and desires) and overall character. Her 
one unfortunate transgression, then, does not alter or minimize an agent-based assessment 
of Emilia as a pillar of virtue and moral fortitude. 
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 Chapter four employs various theoretical perspectives integral to neo-Aristotelian 
Care Ethics as a vehicle for analyzing good and evil characters in King Lear. The Ethics 
of Care examines the ways that we care for each other and respond to various situations 
that call for benevolence. Based on theories advanced by Care Ethics scholars such as 
Nel Noddings, Michael Slote, and Virginia Held, I examine the primary characters in 
Lear to determine how care operates and motivates ethical decision-making in the play. 
The first character that I analyze from a care ethics perspective is Cordelia, one of 
Shakespeare‘s most pure and selfless heroines. Lear misinterprets Cordelia‘s genuine 
declaration of sincere love and appreciation as harsh and untender— a sign that she does 
not really love him— and he rashly disinherits her. Despite this castigation, however, she 
beautifully exemplifies the virtues intrinsic to neo-Aristotelian care ethics by monitoring 
her aged father from afar. She keeps tabs on her father and sisters through various sources 
in the sisters‘ households, and works feverishly to mobilize the French Army to save Lear 
from the vicious claws of her two sisters. Fully present as ―one caring,‖ Cordelia 
exemplifies the very personal heart of care ethics: ―the conviction that an irremovable 
subjective core, a longing for goodness, provides what universality and stability there is 
in what it means to be moral‖ (Noddings 27).   
 Next, I discuss the Earl of Kent and Lear‘s fool as truly empathic characters, 
according to the revised care ethics definition of empathy. Although empathy has come to 
mean projecting oneself into another‘s position in order to fully understand, care ethicists 
claim that empathy requires no projection, only receptivity and feeling. Slote and 
Noddings posit that a direct connection exists between empathy and altruistic behavior; 
and since altruistic behavior is a sign of genuine caring, then empathic caring offers a 
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plausible standard of moral assessment. Both Kent and the fool act upon their feelings of 
empathy for Lear. Although Lear has banished Kent, he disguises himself and gains 
employment as Lear‘s servant. Kent‘s only motivation for continuing his service to Lear 
is his desire to protect Lear from his two malicious daughters and his own poor decisions. 
As one of Lear‘s oldest and dearest friends, Kent‘s actions are inspired by the genuine 
love and empathy he feels for the aged king. Likewise, Lear‘s fool demonstrates 
empathic concern for him on various levels. A kind and caring soul, the fool remains by 
Lear‘s side, attempting to make him recognize the error of his decisions, and offering his 
comfort and support as Lear‘s situation progressively worsens.    
 The idea of reciprocity holds tremendous importance in Care Ethics, as the care-
giver must be met somewhere on the pathway by the cared-for if the relation is going to 
succeed. In a truly caring relationship, the person receiving the care must recognize and 
appreciate the benefit he is receiving, or the relation cannot be said to be fully actualized. 
I posit that an incomplete relationship exists in King Lear, between Edgar and his father, 
the Duke of Gloucester. Edgar engages in both natural and ethical caring for Gloucester, 
and there can be no question that he loves his father unconditionally. Because Edgar is 
not truthful about his identity, however, his caring relationship with Gloucester cannot be 
considered complete by neo-Aristotelian care ethics standards. Gloucester does not play a 
reciprocal role in the relationship—receiving, acknowledging, and appreciating the care 
offered by his son—so the caring relation is never actualized. 
 As a final order of business in chapter four, I discuss those ―unnatural hags,‖ 
Goneril and Regan, whose contemptible treatment of their aged father flies in the face of 
accepted care ethics principles. Noddings and Gilligan argue that women care primarily 
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about relationships and emotional connection to others in the moral decision-making 
process, whereas men use rules and rational principles to solve moral problems. But these 
two cunning daughters have developed no sense of regard for emotional connection or 
relationships that do not directly benefit them. On the contrary, they hyperbolically 
profess their love for Lear when he is dividing his kingdom, but they immediately fear 
the inconvenience that will accompany his total divestiture. Instead of caring for their 
father in his old age—making him feel welcome in their homes and showing gratitude for 
all he has given them—the two vile sisters work in solidarity to make his living 
conditions unacceptable. In abdicating the throne, divesting himself of the cares of state, 
and dividing his kingdom between Goneril and Regan, Lear demonstrates that he just 
wants his last years of life to be easy. He has given his daughters all of his power, 
authority, and material wealth—as well as a lifetime of fatherly love—and he is now 
hoping that they will care for him. Far from making themselves available and fully 
present for their father, however, these vicious daughters strive to be absent from their 
homes and otherwise unavailable for Lear in order to avoid their responsibilities toward 
him. As the supposed cared-for, Lear does everything in his power to complete the caring 
relationship; he recognizes that he is now at the mercy of their kindness and generosity, 
and he is ready to receive and appreciate their care. But the care never materializes, and 
in its place Goneril and Regan display harsh attitudes of ―indisposability.‖ I conclude my 
discussion of these wicked characters by arguing that they are evil in the purest 
philosophical sense— a type of evil that cannot be redeemed. 
 I certainly accept the theory that men and women approach ethical decision-
making from different perspectives. I can also see clearly how the Ethics of Care may be 
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―feminine in the deep classical sense—rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and 
responsiveness‖ as opposed to the more traditional masculine principles of ethics, such as 
―justification, fairness, and equity‖ (Noddings 1). This does not indicate, however, that 
care ethics as a moral theory should be understood as gender-specific to women only. As 
I demonstrate in chapter four, the ethics of care is no more appropriately suited to the 
female characters in King Lear than to the males. Men comprise three-quarters of the 
truly caring characters in King Lear, and only one of the caring souls is a woman. 
Likewise, the two most loathsome, malevolent, and uncaring characters in the play are 
Lear‘s daughters. Both men and women, therefore, must surely be capable of embracing 
or rejecting care as a guide to moral living.   
 This dissertation presents a scholarly framework for the application of neo-
Aristotelian ethics in literary analysis and points the way to further scholarship in this 
field. Christine Swanton‘s pluralistic theory of virtue, for example, would certainly 
impact a reading of Hamlet‘s struggle between action and non-action. And Judith Jarvis 
Thomson‘s utilitarian re-classification of the virtues into ―moral‖ virtues and ―all 
purpose‖ virtues (which can as easily be used for evil as for good) will undoubtedly yield 
a fascinating new perspective on Hamlet‘s character and decision-making processes. 
Julius Caesar and Antony and Cleopatra also present promising areas for further 
application of neo-Aristotelian ethics in Shakespeare‘s tragedies, especially as they 
pertain to the virtues of friendship and loyalty, and the Aristotelian theory of the 
relationship between individual happiness and the health of the state. Neo-Aristotelian 
philosophers Rosalind Hursthouse and Philippa Foot have developed fascinating 
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contemporary theories about friendship, loyalty, love, self-love, and community health 
that will serve as enlightening lenses for analysis of these plays.   
 Shakespeare said, ―Virtue and genuine graces in themselves speak what no words 
can utter.‖ While this is surely a nugget of truth and wisdom worth keeping, we must 
acknowledge that poets, playwrights, and philosophers throughout the ages have 
dedicated themselves to the study, discussion, evaluation, assessment, and glorification of 
virtue. So, although virtue in itself may speak what no words can utter, countless words 
have nevertheless been uttered on virtue‘s behalf. With this dissertation, I enthusiastically 
contribute to both the philosophical and the literary study of virtue, and I hope that my 
work here inspires others to continue the discussion. Aristotle cautioned that finding the 
Golden Mean between the vices of deficiency and excess is difficult because there are so 
many ways to be evil and only one way to be good. Since this continues to be true in our 
world— since we still contend with murderers, liars, and wicked characters who would 
steal our souls— we must respond by developing ethical systems appropriate to the times. 
Although still in its infancy as a moral system, neo-Aristotelian Ethics holds great 
potential to become a viable guide to human behavior in our contemporary world. And as 
long as we continue to produce splendid exemplars of virtue among us—those whose 
inner light shines even in the darkest hours—we will walk confidently in the knowledge 
that our human connection to Shakespeare, history‘s preeminent literary philosopher, 
remains strong.   
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